

Love as *Idea of Being*
Personagenesis and the Realization of the Other

by
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Dissertation

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Dedication

It is with sincere respect and regards that I dedicate this effort in love to my wife

Tina, in whom and with I have shared *idea of being* for over 31 years.

Abstract

Love is created being's harmonic embodiment of the Absolute's self-attraction. As an application of Antonio Rosmini's *idea of being*, the indeterminate appurtenance is the source of *personagenesis (being-with-other)* and fosters a *syzygetic* relation with the socio-culture at large (*beings-with-us*). From the beginning of critical scholarly inquiry, the topic of love has been examined from nearly all academic fields and methodological approaches. My seminal argument in what follows is the claim: love is not what being does; love *is* being determined as the *idea of being*—love is the last abstraction. Ontological considerations have erroneously posited love as a *capacity* inherent in being and flows necessarily as a rational element terminating in a conscious choice. Such a locution of love culminates in a taxonomy: one elects to be selfless or benevolent, aspires to familial tenderness, desires an attraction, or simply is inclined to love oneself. Common to each is the subject choosing to 'give' relative to the subject who 'receives'. These so-called types are not discounted in this project, but their prevalent acceptance masks love as *idea of being*. Pacified by the prevailing schema, any sensing of that interior pre-rational notion of 'something' working in the subject remains under-discovered. I intend to show that as 'being and love' are convertible, together *beings* form *syzygetic* relations evidenced not as the *doing* act of subjects together, but together the *subjects* doing. This ontological singular is not merely a participation or conscious act by self and with other, but rather a harmonic embodiment exposing *idea of being* as love. The 'last-abstraction' validates the foundational *idea of being* where saturated experiences confirm what is otherwise only tacitly known—'to love *is* to be'.

Acknowledgements

I would like to further acknowledge my dear wife Tina. With a \$500 gift, we spent the first 15 years of our marriage developing an art studio enterprise to feed our hearts and bodies, and to provide a home to house our growing family. As we continued to attune to our needs both material and immaterial, together we spent the next 15 years moving forward with my education, crawling one course at a time so as to not incur debt; this project is the culmination of that effort. Now, if the Absolute provides me health and ability, along with my daughters Nicole, Christi, and Stephanie, their husbands, and my grandchildren, we will together develop a communal family compound where all of the aspects of *idea of being* will be lived out as a harmonic embodiment of love evinced in the world.

Though there have been many who have supported me in varied ways through two graduate degrees and this Ph.D., it should be duly noted that Creston Davis and his vision for GCAS College, Dublin has been a fine capstone to my doctoral academic experience. From the first time we met in the States through the academic process, it has been a pleasure with Creston to be part of something ‘bigger than oneself’ and frankly revolutionary. May the future be kind to such an endeavor of hope.

Approval Page

Love as *Idea of Being: Personagenesis* and the Realization of the Other


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
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
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


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Prologue

With this prologue, I would like to briefly offer preliminary remarks prior to describing my intent. My project *in nuce* is first to explain the convertibility, i.e., the interchangeability in the presence of a real distinction, of ‘knowing and being’.¹ Though an inherited argument I will demonstrate how I arrive at that finding in original fashion. Mimicking that process applied to the interchangeability of ‘loving and being’ will reveal a second coupling. Removing the middle term (being), I will conclusively argue for the convertibility of ‘knowing and loving’ demonstrating the foundational idea for knowing as love expressed as *idea of being*.

To that end I will employ ‘knowing’ in the epistemological vein of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, where as an ontology this *idea of being*² terminated with a certainty ascribed to what he conceived as the divine appurtenance. Upon this *idea of being* all knowing is predicated, i.e., all ideas terminate in the *idea of being*³ as the last abstraction.⁴ Astonished at the simplicity of this proposed solution, his personal humility⁵ pressed him to question why no philosopher had stumbled on his project’s conclusion before, i.e., all innate ideas which were deemed necessary for Plato, Kant, and such, were in reality ‘one’ and originate in created being as Ideal being.⁶ Rosmini

¹ This claim obviously is not original to Rosmini. *Via* Aristotle, Aquinas holds “the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested” (cf. ST-I, q16, a3, ad1).

² q.v. Section I, i, v, where I offer the definition of *idea of being* (Ideal being) as it appears in the thought of Antonio Rosmini.

³ Though I have no intention here to explicate the necessity of the Absolute to substantiate my claim of the origin of this *idea of being*, allow it to suffice that Rosmini neither relied on dogmatic suppositions nor summarily dismissed the supernatural.

⁴ I will speak further what is meant here by abstraction in my section on definitions. For now, allow ‘abstraction’ to be understood not as the absence of things concrete as a Hegelian reduction, but an indeterminate universal—a first principle as an abstraction of Divine being.

⁵ Rosmini was reproved and condemned by the Roman Catholic Church for ‘ontologism’ and he may have been afforded little choice in submitting to his censure. Cf. following footnote.

⁶ This occurred in part amidst his attempt to reconcile faith and reason. Though readily accessible, Rosmini’s case of antagonism with the Catholic hierarchy is little known. Asked by Pope Pius VII among others to reconcile faith and reason, his philosophical approach was condemned in some part by his perceived overemphasis and reliance

confirmed this order of knowledge in contrast to what he contended were evidential inherited epistemological errors of past philosophers. Employing a dialectical exchange of thinkers past and present, he thought that “if philosophy is to be believed and loved once again it must on the one hand be reconciled with the opinions of the ancient thinkers and on the other express those opinions according to the method of modern thinkers.”⁷

My thesis is to philosophically demonstrate that comparatively the *idea of being* is likewise the last abstraction upon which all other ideas of love are predicated—differentiating in that love maintains both a priority in terms of hierarchical ordering and primacy of origin. Rosmini’s reductive epistemological abstraction which eluded previous philosophers has a parallel application with my project in that Ideal being as love has been masked by variants establishing love as values ‘in the other’ or ‘in the self’. This deficiency camouflages love as both singular (as *being*) and *the* origin of being within the human person. I will demonstrate love as *idea of being* by rational systematic judgements with no weight of dogmatic force.⁸ This will require for me the same vigilance to systematically dismantle the inherited schemas of love in similar fashion that Rosmini’s project profited from that approach epistemologically. I will acknowledge there are certain implications that arise necessarily by withdrawing any metric of value which require a reframing of the relation of love to knowing. Primary among them is that love becomes antecedent to cognition (love which is ordered to knowing, and not vice versa) implying no dependence of

on reason. But politically his work *Of the Five Wounds of the Holy Church*, where he analogously connected each wound to a recognizable deficiency, instigated the concern and led to accusations ranging from ontologism to pantheism. This held until 1993 with John Paul II’s publication of *Fides et Ratio* whereupon he received specific mention as a great philosopher, ranked alongside Maritain, Gilson, Stein, Lossky, and such (cf. §74). Then Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger posited Rosmini himself was in not error, though certain interpretations flowing from it have been.

⁷ Antonio Rosmini, *Theodicy: Essays on Divine Providence*. Trans. and Ed., Terence Watson and Denis Cleary (Durham, UK: Rosmini House, 2009), Ch. 29, §148, p. 102.

⁸ If left within a theistic perspective that claim is a foregone orthodox conclusion, i.e. God is love, the appurtenance is *of* God, so therefore the appurtenance is love.

appraisal or rational choice.⁹ I conceive this ‘love’ not as pure will nor irrational, but premised with love *as* ontology not as an ontology *of* love.¹⁰ Like *idea of being* itself is prior epistemologically, so too love as *idea of being* as itself is prior to loving; the form by which love takes hold.

This dissertation is designed to argue towards love as an *innate idea of being* that precedes knowing, yet as convertible with knowledge this *being as love* as ‘the’ last abstraction—the appurtenance—is the origin of love. For the human person this ideal being is simultaneously innate as the *idea of being*, and foreign as the appurtenance of the Absolute in created being. This rightly implies that this *idea of being* is essentially relational where this ‘being with others’ concretely results in the understanding of one’s self (*personagenesis*) and the realization of the ‘other’ (ontological solidarity).¹¹ In order to accomplish this, my proposal is arranged to work categorically (explicitly and directly) through two premises.

The first premise will demonstrate the ideas of ‘knowing and being’ as convertible. That was Antonio Rosmini’s project via the innate *idea of being*. In the long and rich epistemological tradition where innate knowledge¹² has both been affirmed and denied, in many instances it has

⁹ Traditionally these are essential prerequisites of love—one loves the other or an attribute of the other because they/it contains *value x*, or because of value *x* within the one who loves, they desire or choose the other.

¹⁰ My proposal of ‘love as ontology’ expressed as the Rosminian divine appurtenance* is not identical with Dietrich von Hildebrand’s ‘nature of love’, though closer to Ferdinand Ulrich’s ‘metaphysics of being’ [Cf. respectfully *The Nature of Love*, St. Augustine’s Press, 2009; and “Thinking Love at the Heart of Things. The Metaphysics of Being as Love in the Work of Ferdinand Ulrich by Stefan Oster,” *Communio* 37 (Winter 2010), 660-700]. *Interesting to mention is that Christian Eastern thought (Palamas) has a more explicit expression of *theosis* than the Western tradition, in that the concept of the energy/essence distinction surfaces as an application to my project here. I will briefly address that in Section V, b, iii, 2).

¹¹ As a rhetorical device, in the Appendix I use literary reference to show that the credibility of this realization is both experientially affirmed and epistemologically verified tacitly in the objectivity of universally relatable subjective evinces.

¹² Though there are variations in this epistemological camp, at this juncture I will leave it as the capacity for knowing prior to experience, whether dormant or implicit.

been neglected for its perceived subjectivity.¹³ I will present a historical survey towards a single purpose to demonstrate that each epistemological system, and innate knowledge in particular, rests on a necessary single presuppositional foundation as a criterion, i.e., Rosmini's *idea of being* which previous systems neither acknowledged nor denied.

The issue is that asserting multiple starting points for ideas neglects to account for *the* point of origin itself and then all forthcoming epistemological inquiry (certainty) only further masks the indeterminate *idea of being*. Rosmini follows Heidegger here when he argues this being “which is to be determined, is in a certain way already understood”¹⁴ as there must be something of the idea understood even if it's not articulated. That initial ‘something’ must be accounted for because “no attempt to seek an understanding about anything occurs or proceeds from some prior total lack of understanding.” Rosmini's indeterminate *idea of being* exhausts the understanding of origins. If from a partial understanding of being, one only moves toward greater understanding or one tries to move toward a greater understanding,¹⁵ then the consummation of that understanding is predicated on the fullness of understanding itself. To illustrate this via a systematic articulation of the deficiency in Rosminian fashion, i.e., I will proceed through a historical timeline to disclose (identify and address) the deficiency of each system of the absence of the primitive idea of thought as ‘ideal being’. This will prepare the ground for the distinction of Rosmini's appurtenance as foundational being and assert that ‘knowing and being’ are logically ontologically convertible.

¹³ Certainly, John Locke is principal among those whose own systems form direct criticisms of innate ideas. In summary, he would hold that if that which is in the mind is thought to be only that which is in the subject, then it holds no objective export and thereby lacks verification only in the particular subject.

¹⁴ Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009), Ch. 2, §15, 143.

¹⁵ Dunstan Robidoux, “Two Rival Notions of Being: Rosmini, Heidegger, Rahner, and Lonergan rev. ed.”, *The Lonergan Institute: For the Good Under Construction*, January 2011.

In the second section, I will correspondingly examine the historical concept of love. This will progress from the Classicalist theories through the era of Judeo-Christian influence, to the Enlightenment period, continuing up to and including the 20th century ‘rise of the ego’ and postmodern assumptions. The goal of this survey will be to ferret out the misconstrued applications and varied expressions of love that have contributed to the confusion this research intends to uncover and overcome. In parallel fashion to the first section the object is to assert the convertibility of ‘being and love’ as predicated on Rosmini’s appurtenance as the last abstraction of love.

My third section will synthesize the premised convertible pairs ‘being as knowledge’ and ‘love as being’, concluding in the final conversion of ‘love as knowledge’ (primacy of love). This will be evidenced both as a synderesis (*scintilla conscientiae*) where one’s being is revealed to the *I*, along with a crescendo of intimacies (the *We* as a relational ontology) as homogenously disclosed in the Absolute. The resultant ‘visible saturated’ event(s) will be shown as the transfigured *We* and an intrapersonal re-creation (*personagenesis*) as the investable resultant inherent in the claim. From this arises a necessary *syzygetic* relation with the socio-culture at large (*beings-with-us*) ultimately forming thus rescuing the individual from corporate egoism, ultimately drawing one in with a perichoretic spilling-out of the Absolute.

I. Introduction

*The philosophers have only interpreted the human person in various ways; the point, however, is to change.
~what Karl Marx should have said.*

This introduction addresses the significance of love as knowledge in regard to its theoretical attributes, i.e., consideration of the scope of study and intrapersonal perspectives. Beyond the statement of issue, research question, methodology, etc., I will state up front the objections to my general claim including mention of the study's limitations and implicit assumptions. There will be a portion reserved to address my intended use of terms (definitions). Importantly though, built into my understanding of the relationality and revelatory aspects of love, knowledge, and being, is the assertion that not all things known and loved can be systematically articulated yet can be still undoubtedly experienced as being.¹⁶

Issues with love—a review of the literature

The ontology of love to some extent has always been present as a topic of study both within the secular and theistic academic circles. In my exposition pertaining to a review of the body of literature, there has been a noticeable lacuna perhaps not with an ontology of love but with love as ontology.¹⁷ These examples illustrate a crescendo towards my particular ontological approach to

¹⁶ Accordingly, in the appendix I will provide a rhetorical move that is meant to offer a like-experience determinative of my thesis. This will ideally (1) ground the academic argument, but also (2) foster such a movement in the reader as an experience designed and explicated from the text, i.e., the proposal's subject content (a love-like event) to accompany the reader's intellectual grasp (knowledge-like happening).

¹⁷ What I have deemed here with love as an ontological pursuit.

love affirming love situated *as* the Absolute harmonizing the created with the Uncreated.¹⁸ There nonetheless remains a lacuna I intend to fill in articulating the ‘how’ of this claim.

Lacuna of love as an ontological pursuit

Here I will offer abridged examples of the intersection of love and ontology; my notion of ‘love as ontology’ is the subsequent apex of these magnified summaries. Beginning with the Oxford film aestheticist Reidar Due *ontological love* pertains to those erotic relationships associated with human sexuality. He holds this ‘reciprocal erotic’ as a historically persistent theme within an expressed relationality. It exists within “a realm where the erotic subject confronts its own perspective on its desire with a third-person perspective on that same desire...moving within an equilibrium as within a distribution of speaking positions”¹⁹ where positions are relative to the desire and the ‘other’. I begin here as this is the ‘popular bent’ in the study of love for modern times. Construed by the erotic, the ontological priority of relationality over the subject is only grasped within a context of a narrative ‘love plot’.

Then love with the Nigerian metaphysician Francis Etim in his “Ontology of Love” is featured as a human phenomenon where love becomes a clear ‘choice’ that *affirms* the person in the *totality of his or her being*.²⁰ Elevated securely beyond the mere erotic, it retains for him love in the form of ‘types’. Those categories hold as bare minimum an expression of appreciation and devotion, yet erotic love thus is contained as a type. Then according to Søren Kierkegaard one can witness a migration where love becomes an eternal validity asserting itself integrally to the

¹⁸ i.e., *panentheism* (all is in God—not a part of God) as opposed to *pantheism* (God and the material universe are identical—as with Spinoza).

¹⁹ Cf. Reidar Due, *Love in Motion: Erotic Relationships in Film*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013, p. 40, for a more nuanced and certainly fuller treatment.

²⁰ Cf. Francis Etim, “Ontology of Love” in *International Journal of Asian Social Sciences*, 3(2), 2013, 492-510, specifically page(s) 494ff.

human's *central and inner being*. This love is given to every human individual occupying a definitive quality where the person *becomes* love if they are *in* love. For Kierkegaard it is the assuming of the other where "without a *you* and *I* there is no love, and with *mine* and *yours* there is no love."²¹

Migrating from the 'you and I' to a creative and uniting love, the contemporary Ilia Delio²² further speaks of the connection between love and suffering. The significance is that love in this regard has as its object 'more being' and thus a greater good or wholeness. She employs the analogy that as "energy is the fire of life, then love is the energy of all life"²³ (55). Lastly, this 'love is the energy' grants a nod back toward Pierre Teilhard de Chardin in that he proposed on the part of God the absolute gratuitous creation of the cosmos where this 'energy-as-love' is a sharing of the created and Creator. He proposes that "creation is not merely a gift of God; it is being-in-love *with* God...claiming that the 'I can be saved only by becoming one with the universe'"²⁴ which itself emanates from the created love of the Absolute.

My project of 'love as ontology' is not simply some grasping of reality's order 'out there'. Love is not one more 'object' to be investigated alongside being(s) and determined by value, aspects of union, or affective states. Neither can this love as ontology become the notion of an inaccessible ideal even if it resides within a certain realm of inarticulation.

²¹ Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, *Works of Love*. Trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 2009), 248ff.

²² A Franciscan Religious who hold doctorates in both Pharmacology (Rutgers) and Historical Theology (Fordham).

²³ Cf. Ilia Delio, *The Unbearable Wholeness of Being: God, Evolution and the Power of Love* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2013), 53ff.

²⁴ Cf. Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Christianity and Evolution: Reflections on Science and Religion*. Trans. René Hague (San Diego, CA: Harcourt, Inc., 1974), 69ff.

A point to be made evident in relation to this study is that non-articulation is not the antithesis or even a detriment to the claim of ‘knowing’²⁵ this ‘being as love’. Central to de Chardin’s statement is that love, though not absent, has been left unrevealed²⁶ and therefore remote from the transformative power that allows it to have an effect on the human person as an understanding of one’s self (*personagenesis*) and realization of the ‘other’ (ontological solidarity). The significance of ‘knowing’ love as knowledge can be identified as qualitative effects.

The idea of love historically

I do not intend to systematically reiterate a historical analysis of the idea of love. Even in the ‘Schemas of Love’ section of Part II the point is to demonstrate a presupposition or deficiency found within selected historical expressions. The idea of love I propose is (1) a reproduction to ‘know’ in terms of an icon where love as an idea is not situated as either an ideal or sentiment but as *being*, and (2) and to be determinative of the entirety of the domain it encompasses propose love as the ‘knowing source’ and last abstraction as the *idea of being*. To be clear, there is no idea of ‘though’ or of ‘love’ without this *idea of being*. It is ‘all encompassing’ not unlike arguing the existence of God²⁷ where both this origin of knowledge (*idea of being/icon*) and sphere (Absolute transcendence) are arguably modalities one exists *in*. The point is that any discovery of this love

²⁵ The *idea of being* proposed here is not a Platonic recollection or the empirical gathering of facts but the foundational principle as the last abstraction which instigates knowing. It is clear that at this point the assertion may appear unfounded. As an essential premise I state it here to clarify the means of certainty, not to demonstrate it as the means to knowing which will be delineated in the research forthcoming.

²⁶ Keep in mind that this love is a harnessing of the energies of the Absolute, for the Absolute.

²⁷ This study will make no attempt to argue for God’s existence. In fact, it would be antithetical to the premise, even if as is the point here, that a certain presupposition to the existence of the Absolute in the schema of the convertibility of love and knowing.

as *idea of being* is in the exposure, and the uncovering is in the disclosure—the witnessable effect²⁸ that I have referred to as the point of inarticulation.

This becomes *the* issue of love where the intangible is sought in the corporeal—we want to see what *itself* cannot be seen and the effect is one’s only access to the underlying reality. There is a similitude in the field of astrophysics where imperceptible black holes cannot be seen but are discoverable by what they effectuate.²⁹ The force on stellar objects observed in proximity to the ‘unseen’ reality can only be evidenced by the visible effect. In this way the ‘proof’ of a black hole’s existence is identified by the observable. Love as being follows that same paradigm. This claim is neither a concession nor reduced to pure subjectivity.³⁰

The first salient point is obviously exposed in (1) the ubiquitous attention of love as a supreme idea, alongside beauty, truth, and such where each has been primarily identified as a human pursuit. The persistence in great literature, music, and art all stand as testimony to that indication.³¹ The second point of the nature of the idea of love is obvious but necessary to state; (2) it is never a ‘settled idea’. The unresolved pursuit of love’s nature is even more when the idea *is* being rather than when the nature of the idea of love is a ‘thing’ to be desired.

²⁸ Here it helps to clearly understand the import of poetic moments where love seems to break through as an arguably universal experience that the literature pericopes, I present expose.

²⁹ According to the theory of relativity, nothing can travel faster than the speed of light, nor anything else for that matter. So black holes are not directly visible. They are though detectable, because of the immense gravitational force they possess.

³⁰ No sublime moment in literature or film would have any universal export if it were not accepted that what was being portrayed was a mere particular expression.

³¹ I would add these mediums are intermediaries between the pedestrian and academic camps. As an illustration in Dostoevsky’s *Demons* the passionate character Stepan Trofimovich states “without science, without bread, life is possible—only without beauty it is impossible, for there will be nothing left in the world” (cf. Fyodor Dostoyevsky. *Demons*. Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1994), Part II, Chapter I, IV, 486). Here the term beauty like love is the ‘supreme’, something chosen “from the ranks according to one’s character; [that which one] makes his god” (cf. Plato. *Phaedrus* in *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I. trans B. Jowett. New York, NY: Random House, 1892, §252b, 256).

This pursuit and unsettledness tend to present love as merely experiential. If that were true it follows that love would be perceived as ‘living’ another’s experience formed primarily in the other’s subjective modality. How would one measure the quality of this love? It would leave no ‘pure state’ for love to be measured, except against some ethereal ideal. By that schema, claiming ‘love as a nature’ commits the fallacy of placing an ideal in the actual.³² This material-relational interaction fosters a deceptive transmission of ‘love as a nature’ to the ‘nature of love’—which is the very error I wish to expose.^{33 34}

The ‘nature of love’ is then relapsed to an ideal, a solidarity cultivated (communal solidarity) where love begins its ascent to the ideal of selflessness.³⁵ Here the human person seeks that transcendent aspect of love fulfilled in the respective giving ‘to another’. The nature of love is expressed within the psyche, and the ideal finds parallel forms within “popular movies like *The*

³² Though some modality of love is always present in ‘each being’ the form could only be constructed by the material.

³³ I can demonstrate how this flaw is disclosed in the manner a human’s physical maturation of the body (material-relational interaction) is evidenced in and by cultural signals. It offers a clear point demonstrating how the antithesis of my dissertation’s premise of love as the acceptance of the ‘nature of love’ masks the ‘idea of love’ as *being* allowing the ideal to be realized in the actual.

³⁴ For an example by analogy, consider how the popular mindset of the idea of love follows the cadence of one’s physical and psychological advancement (cf. I’ve expanded on the notion that came to me in the introductory reading of Norton and Kille’s *Philosophies of Love*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1971, cf. 4-5). As infants, love is absorbed by the child in the form of care and comfort. In the toddler stage this love begins to be articulated and thus identified with security related to ‘mother’ or ‘father’, where the child is instructed to ‘love everyone’ in a transcendental sense as the basis for future unconditional acceptance. By the adolescent/school years as emancipation ensues, the love based on the brief but shared history becomes challenged. At this stage, the historical “view has the advantage over the transcendent view that it renders many naturally appropriate cases of love rational and many intuitively senseless cases irrational” (cf. Berit Brogaard. *On Romantic Love: Simple Truths About a Complex Emotion* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 92); a modality of ‘shared love as rational love’ and ‘unconscious love as irrational love’. There arrives a ‘senseless’ conception of ‘falling in love’ that comes to the fore as courtly love commences and the ‘love’ attachments of early development migrate to romantic love—the irrational (love everyone) becomes accepted as rational (love this one). Interesting here is that a risk (Provided in this analysis are simple scenarios in order to make a point. Certainly, children experience the pain of separation and/or alienation from those they have historical (and biological) ties to) becomes associated with giving oneself to another and jealousy (not wanting another to ‘take what is yours’) is often guarded against. At this juncture, sexual congress and love are interchangeable. Sex, colloquially understood as ‘love-making’ becomes some gradient of Kierkegaard’s *eros/agape* incompatibility and Freud’s *libido* driven force.

³⁵ Keep in mind that this is not simply one person’s experience, but as the stages progress there is a remembrance and witness to the effect love has had at various points in life.

Notebook [that] portrays heroic old people who continue to love their spouse, in spite of enormous hardship. They love them in spite of the fact that an important part of the beloved's brain has become beset with plaques and tangles."³⁶ This romantic 'futuristic' vision of selfless irreplaceability gives credence to the idea of the 'here and now' selfless irreplaceability. This is the physiological stage of the partner/provider,³⁷ where the nature of love as a conquering energy force gains momentum. Ultimately, this grandparenting wisdom enters the equation, now the individuals become the *font loci* of a 'counsel love' expressed as sage reflection. The reciprocity of previous stages assumes the form of an expository legacy.

In these physiological stages one could ferret out the convergence of love as an ideal or love in its experiential actuality. But what of the nature of love is universally there? Who determines the value? Historical ubiquity of pursuit of love aside, it lacks consensus. There is Plato's irrational attachment from the *Phaedrus*; the rejoicing in truth and hope of all things according to Paul of Tarsus; Augustine's "anxiousness to satisfy the need...looking around for some object to love,"³⁸ the Cartesian passion where "as joined with what we love, in such a way that we imagine a whole of which we think ourselves to be only one part and the thing loved another;"³⁹ Vladimir Solovyov's "sexual love as the highest flowering of individual life"⁴⁰ shared by both animals and humans; ...a myriad of historical expressions can be added. Certainly, there is what some consider to be ultimate love (*agapeic ideal?*), but I am arguing that this determinative

³⁶ Brogaard, 100.

³⁷ Note that what one is 'partnered with' or 'cares for' need not be an individual.

³⁸ Augustine. *Confessions*. Trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London, England, Penguin Books, 1961), Book II, 1, 55.

³⁹ René Descartes, *The Passions of the Soul*. Trans. Stephen H. Voss (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989), Article 80, 62.

⁴⁰ Vladimir Solovyov. *The Meaning of Love*. Trans. and Ed. By Thomas R. Beyer, Jr. (Great Barrington, MA: Lindisfarne Books, 1985), cf. Chapter 2, 35.

nature of ideal love is misguided when tied to erotic desire, affirming the other, and even centrality of being or as the 'energy of life'.

This leaves necessarily a divergence between that ethereal ideal love and the actual experiential love. The latter remains a punctuation of experience that never can entirely encapsulate the former. Any philosophy of love relative to one's own expression seems incapable to fully encapsulate the bracketed experience that has but the ability to point to an exemplar. The convergence of the perfect form and concrete experience appears in the 'tangible' where it becomes confused with the universal, or diverges in the 'exemplar' which is confused with exclusivity. The experiential love may appear to have innate qualities, but is closer in fashion as simply 'proper for the person' as opposed to a nature.

I have argued here that the uniqueness of my thesis is that (1) historically love has not overcome the tension between reason and sentiment, and remains some semblance of an ethereal supreme idea, and since it (2) has not become a settled idea it osculates between what is shared and what is unique. The origin of this love has not been satisfactorily demonstrated philosophically and lacks certainty.

Statement of significance of love as knowledge

In terms of that philosophically established certainty, the fundamental issue of positing 'love as knowledge' seems to naturally form the question "What constitutes knowledge or wisdom derived from love?" One aim of this research is to disclose "I love; therefore, I know what?" as a fundamentally flawed inquiry. Knowledge is not derived *from* love per se, but rather love as the *idea of being* is convertible with yet foundational for knowledge, i.e., without love there is no knowledge. It is not an epistemology of love claiming that because one loves *B* therefore one knows *A* reducing love as a *means* to knowledge as an *end*. The philosophical life has taken as an

objective the ‘pursuit of wisdom’. Perhaps in that aspirational journey one comes ‘to love what one knows’ but not ‘to love, therefore to know’. Where modern objectivity is thought to be *in* the certainty of ‘knowing’. This is plainly explicated in the Temple inscription ‘Know thyself’ and the implicit refrain may be to love the truth certainly known. Any affirmation to ‘Love thyself’ would flow from the truth known confirming the error of modern parlance by placing ‘to know’ in precedence of ‘to love’. What I propose is neither ‘Know thyself’⁴¹ or ‘Love thyself’, but rather [read with a pause after the colon] ‘Love; ...Thyself’ where each is a reiteration of the one *being*. Keep in mind the goal of love as ontology resultant in a new way of thinking of love that ultimately terminates in personagenesis.

Statement of significance of *personagenesis* and realization of the other

The term *personagenesis* is an obvious thematic blending. ‘Person’ is an integral term in philosophical anthropology. It is not meant here to refer to distinct consciousnesses, collective memories, or a metaphysical notion of personhood akin to Locke’s application of “a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit...capable of law, and happiness and misery.”⁴² There is an import though of a type of agency where assuming a moral modality results not in an ‘is’ but a ‘becoming’. This presents a “vertical transcendence in which the will, as the essential of the person and not as a power determines itself”⁴³ is not simply a ‘future oriented’ aspiration which grants the present ‘person’ value; it is constituted of love as the innate *idea of being*.

⁴¹ I do recognize Hegel’s Absolute as the ‘Know-Thyself’, which is akin to self-knowledge becoming its own ‘true and essentiality’ of Being.

⁴² John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1996), Book II, Chap xxvii, 148.

⁴³ Robert A. Connor, “Person as Resonating Existential.” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 1992, Vol LXVI, No. 1, 45.

Here *personagenesis* structuralizes the ‘self-giving’ capacity of *becoming* where at no time is any ‘living human’ not a person; love *cannot* become. This modality forms a breach from the Cartesian subjective self-conscious that exhibits and forms itself *as* and *in* independence. Against that modern turn then there is no person ‘outside of persons’, and the notion of solidarity is not something ‘added’ to personage but inherent through the *idea of being*. With this personagenic advent of ‘person’ one can contrast with two broad systems. It is opposed to (1) the collectivist understanding where a person’s social order derives the value of the individual from the good of the community, or where one finds (2) the ‘individualist’ person where society itself is patterned after this ego-centric modeling. In each there is a waning and ebbing of ‘freedom’ and ‘relationality’ that are in perpetual tension. But the understanding I present in terms of *personagenesis* results in (3) the mutualist comprehension of the self where agency is communitarian⁴⁴ predicated on Rosmini’s last abstraction.

In this regard, one cannot ‘be’ without being a ‘giver of one’s self’ and the ‘giving’ is not value directed. This does not simply mean the ‘self gives’, but that solidarity with the other is conjoined to the self via the shared appurtenance; this is *personagenesis*. All *beings* are *beings for*, and that relation concretely results in the understanding of one’s self (*personagenesis*) and the realization of the ‘other’ (solidarity) as logical consequences of the shared *idea of being*. Love is the motion of transcendence from person to person, yet this ‘motion’ is the Absolute present in the created (*idea of being*) drawing itself to the Absolute-in-the-other (created), and importantly the Other-as-the-Absolute (uncreated). Love cannot be confined to a particular relational classification conditioned towards ‘accepting’ or ‘evaluating’ the other, i.e., it is never I love and accept you as

⁴⁴ Robert C. Roberts, and Mark R. Talbot, Eds. *Limning the Psyche: Explorations in Christian Psychology* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans’s Publishing Company, 1997), cf. 35-36. I accept this relationality is not unique to my project, liturgical aspirations, ubuntu, and many other systems explore and promote this solidarity.

my family, friend, lover, delicious food, etc. To exist *is* to love; it is unqualified and passive.⁴⁵ I argue that this is genuine intimacy, but “intimacy is not cognitive knowledge based on abstraction, but knowledge base on experience, on union with the other”⁴⁶ with love as originating in and with the last and primitive abstraction.

Scope of study

In order to illustrate this *personagenesis* and origin of the other within the ‘last abstraction’, there are varied expressions proposed as significant to love within the human person as *Ideal Being*. This includes aspects of liturgical aspirations⁴⁷ (*ad spirare*) which amount to cultivating ejaculatory inter-relational recurrences that provoke subjectivity and render the individual as a non-ceasing receiver and relayer of love. The system I employ is an expository approach dependent on that supra-natural idea of being both native and foreign to created persons.⁴⁸

The pursuant delimitations will not result in an authentic treatment of personhood in terms of consciousness, nor neuro-biological evidences of love as environmental sensory responses. As

⁴⁵ Though this passivity is not removed from being (completed in spite of intent) as *personagenesis* is an active harmonizing of subject to subject.

⁴⁶ Roberts and Talbot, 37.

⁴⁷ This understanding of the term is not the pedestrian ‘yearning ambition’ or ‘pursuant hope’ but a dynamic created/Creator dialectic.

⁴⁸ My project depends entirely on the supernatural, particularly the *idea* of an Absolute being that functions as both origin and goal of all contingent beings. It is clear that in the present era there has been a suppression of supernatural agencies. The method that I employ here is something similar in fashion to the understanding of Plato’s ‘realm of change’ and those ‘perfect forms’ that the ‘visible’ harmonizes in and with. In a Christian sense, this is the tension of ‘nature and grace’. I am operating in a system where the latter is infused (appurtenance) into creation so as to not terminate with a collapse of the finite into the infinite or a crass absorption of the contingent into the non-contingent—two gifts as one. If it is expressed as gift in the self, “then what lurks in me from before myself is more than the human, horizontal other. It is rather the trace of a vertical donor. And it seems appropriate that this donor, ‘God’, who gives gifts to nothing, and so gives gifts to themselves in order to establish gifts, should create first of all a creature able reflexively to exist by giving this gift to herself in turn.”⁴⁸ Following that the realm of the supernatural (sacred) is not something super-added to the natural world; one does not ‘build’ on the other. I am not plainly employing *gratia non tollit naturam, sed perficit* but rather nuancing it to assert that the Absolute (grace) in contingent creation (nature) transcends into and through the natural, i.e., there is more of a unity of the two than some numerical distinction. One should understand the natural and created as “not a window but a lamp, and each unique created being radiates the [Absolute]” (Cf. John Milbank, “The Gift and the Given,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 23(2-3), May 2006, 445). In short, philosophy need not be non-theistic, but non-dogmatic.

well, instances of personal agency (free-will) will be left untreated though inferences may genuinely be drawn. The reader should also be cautioned that the illuminative and tacit epistemological approach, if not properly rendered in its ontological class, could be reduced by argument to sentiment and the subjective.⁴⁹ As to the corresponding literature on both contributing and competing epistemologies and values of love, I will draw only from a sampling deemed necessary to exposit my specific claim. This theoretical project is intended to aim at the secular philosophical readership,⁵⁰ and although there is clearly an element of mystical theistic philosophy applied, my approach is generally within the parameters of the Western philosophical method.⁵¹

Theoretical attributes of the study

The interrelation ontology inherent of the appurtenance (*idea of being*) will be associatively framed with a ‘manifested solidarity’. This two-fold accord forms both personhood (*personagenesis*) and draws Itself out to others through a passive harmonic claim on the ‘other’.⁵²

The Problem and Its Form

The focus of this study lies within the progression of the Absolute in the created as *idea of being*. As a universal whole, this unity overcomes any collective relent relative to an experiential bias that has been either too idiosyncratic to develop a universal thesis or proved incapable of satisfying the spectrum of human judgments found in varied experience. Revolving around the form love occupies within the human person, the research terminates with love manifesting the quality of

⁴⁹ Here, subjective is meant more in the contemporary colloquial sense of a rationally-based personal opinion.

⁵⁰ Though leaning heavily on a theistic epistemological structure, specifically Christian, I ask that the resulting analysis be rendered by the project’s interior consistency.

⁵¹ Though if left at that it would be misleading to connote that this project is in some way antagonistic to Eastern thought. Besides of the obvious leaning of Christian Eastern Orthodox ontologies, I think immediately of the ‘mystical intuitionism’ of Mulla Sadra.

⁵² As the newborn claims a love from the mother by virtue of proximity and like-being.

personhood as realized—personagenesis—followed by this *a priori* as given via the Absolute in whom the person receives as sharer and in return orients this origin with others, that is, solidarity.

Love is at once the most sought after of ideas and, in terms of consensus, the least understood. Three deficiencies contribute to this misunderstanding. The first is the equivocation of the term, which yields differing types and disunity. The second is the necessitation of some prior knowledge of the object on which love is predicated. The third, considered ontologically, is the sheer lack of articulation in terms of love's relation to being and the origin of this love.

The notion of love varies. It is something one does, one desires, one falls into, one hopes for, one lives and dies for, what happens to oneself, that which all should do, and what brings people together. For the human person, the idea of love as a term falls into two broad categories. It can be understood as a *good that compels*—the inclination towards a value in the other or other good, whether altruistic, utilitarian, duty-based, and so on. Not mutually exclusive, but love is also found to be a *good that one desires*—the pull to the other or other good, whether biological, aesthetical, and so on. This has historically led to a classification where types of love signify these variant goods.

The contemporary pursuit of these goods of love deposit some types as unattainable ideals (*agape* as the Absolute, *storge* in the filial expression) where some gradation is accepted. They love like their God. They love their family as themselves. Other types are determined by a value in the other or other good (*eros* towards the Absolute, *philia* where the other is another I) where the value is susceptible to an evaluation determined by desire. In a pedestrian sense, the former has culminated as evidences of self-denial gauged by sincerity—how well one loves God or family. With the latter, either *eros* has been identified nearly exclusively with physical intimacy, or *philia* has adopted a broad web of sympathy based on a perceived likeness.

Beyond equivocation, the one who loves must love what they know in or of the other person or thing. Perhaps this knowing is unarticulated, yet there is always some x that is to be loved in or of the other. One does not love what one does not or cannot know. It may even be held that one loves the other(s) to the degree one has knowledge of the other(s). The idea of a person unknown might be loved, but not a particular unknown person. One may even love the unknown of God (apophatic), but it is the unknowableness as an idea of God which is known and likewise loved. One does not, in the present framework—dare I say cannot—love a God that is not known at all.

Where love has been considered ontologically, the theist posits this love as part of one's being though held as an inner force or compelling love. The secularist explains it as some physiological signaling which too is part of one's being, an empathic drive or neurological impetus. The theist, however, offers nothing but a general sense of this love as something natural for the human person to act with and by. Ontologically the secularist views this love as an analogical modality posited as something particular to human expression or identified as an evolutionary advance. In all instances, the origin is left vague and the target determined by value.

The research problem follows from these deficiencies. It is directed towards the human person's unmasking of personagenesis conveyed as the infinite appurtenance of the Absolute, presented as the human person being where the shared other is realized in solidarity. If it is love as given to the human person, how does each given love manifest universally the claim of realized personhood, solidified within a person who receives as a sharer yet orients to its origin through others? This ontological idea of being as love (with Rosmini's epistemological last abstraction) purports to love and know something *a priori*. How does this *a priori* appurtenance present itself as the form that love occupies within the human person while remaining as the seemingly paradoxical harmonization and passive readiness for solidarity with the other?

Love is popularly measured by an element of desire, an instance of motivation, and almost universally an end or goal for the human person. This has traditionally developed an understanding of love which ranges from the romantic to the divine, from the ego-centered to the transcendent, and from the imposing to the liberating. One criterion of the problem in this investigation is how these variances can be legitimately recognized as experiences—absorbed and not obliterated as real—and yet without yielding to relative subjectivity continue to pertain to all humans. The study must speak of love as a universal whole, overcoming subjective experiential bias without sacrificing a proposal capable of satisfying the spectrum of human judgments. One way to unite such divergent accounts of love is to identify the exemplar and lay out the variants in relation to that form. In a typical taxonomy, if *agape* is held as the exemplar then the form of drawing towards is called *eros*, a variant of the exemplar. If *agape* is displayed as some semblance to friendship then *storge*, or when appearing as filial love called *philia*. In each expression, what love is in actuality remains the ideal, and the types are distinct but remain on some spectrum by what they hold proper to *agape*. An issue then is to avoid simply arriving at another sub-part to the genus of love, or a reworking of the exemplar.

The body of research is speculative in nature, oriented towards love as an epistemological enterprise that reveals personogenesis and unveils the innate realization of the other. The research question is constituted by what way love is given to the contingent (created) from the subsistent (Uncreated), as an ontological appurtenance where the Absolute is drawn through each and others as a cosmic return. Love is the created's harmony of the self-attraction of the Absolute. Love is the origin of being. Love is. This love is an ontological core, sustaining the person and, through persons as other, manifesting itself in an interdependent solidarity. Love is the universal *I*. Relationally, it is the mutual sustenance of one being to another through the Ideal Being. This love

involves the whole of the cosmos, a return of the very creation that through love was brought into being and has imbued all creation with being. The claim is a socio-cultural syzygetic relation of the Absolute (Love as Being), with each person (being as Love), with all persons (beings with Love).

The term *person* gained ontological status within a Christian framework. During the fourth century in connection with the discussions concerning the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, the Cappadocian Fathers for the first time in the history of Greek thought identified the term πρόσωπον with that of *hypostasis* (ὑπόστασις), a term used more or less as equivalent—or at times identical—with οὐσία or substance.⁵³ Coupled later with von Balthasar’s convertibility of love and being,⁵⁴ this *person-being* and *love-being* begins to fuse. This coupling permits a migration for love from a category of affective expression to even beyond the good of self and others. Without conflation of the subsistent and contingent, the subsistent Absolute is not simply One who loves but is the ontological existence of love. The conversion of the Johannine *God is love* becomes *Love is God*. Ontological issues necessarily arise in how the unity of Love within the subsistent Absolute is preserved interiorly (perichoretic communion), and how this Love-relationality extends to contingent beings while preserving the natures of each (created/uncreated alterity). Without this dissimilitude, any proposed union of the two collapses into a Spinozan pantheism (exaggerated immanence), or each other remains an inaccessible transcendent (exaggerated apophaticism). The claim that the uncreated Absolute is love and that created man is love leaves an ontological dilemma that cannot be resolved simply by appeal to *all is in God* (panentheism), Thomistic analogical commonality (*ratio entis*), or even Teilhard de Chardin’s being-in-love-with-God that

⁵³John Zizioulas, “An Ontology of Love: A Patristic Reading of Dietrich von Hildebrand’s *The Nature of Love*.” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 91, No. 4, 2017, 555.

⁵⁴This meshes with the Johannine assertion that ‘God is love’.

points to a harmonic future event. Each of these reveals shortcomings. Pantheism lacks otherness. The analogical commonality lacks concordance. Chardin offers no firm ontological resolution prior to the ultimate consummation of man and the Absolute. The ontological framing of person is necessary.

Through a sampling of the major representative proponents, the study critically evaluates the significant varietal epistemologies as foundational to the research question. After presenting the core of their historical and theoretical contribution, an analysis and historical survey of the types of *knowing* delineates the variances of each from the present claim of love as an epistemology by virtue of its ontological appurtenance. The investigation is then repeated in terms of the philosophies of love and the types of *loving*, resulting in the way-of-one-love. In each respective examination, both *love* and *knowing* are shown to be convertible with being as such. Once that is considered, the demonstration turns to the mutual convertibility of *love* and *knowing* themselves, culminating in an aspect of personhood as being-with-other and each in and with the other as beings-with-us—solidarity.

To demonstrate this speculative claim, the study shows at the level of experience⁵⁵ how the theoretical attributes find their place in and as life-events, both intrapersonal disclosures (theophanic evinces) and manifestations of solidarity (syzygetic relations). This resulting *love-being* is then disclosed as an eventful form. Love always originates and emerges from another. This love maintains a constitutive dual unity (beings; beings-with-other; beings-with-Other) and common harmony in and with *esse* as a sign of the Absolute. Finally, this love seeks the Other(s)

⁵⁵This experience is tied to subjectivity. Not the modern opinion-based modality, but that Kantian ‘subject’ of experience where each idea and experience are that of the subject. In this way, even the subjective experience retains objectivity.

throughout its historical existence to behold in freedom the Origin from which everything comes, in totality.⁵⁶

The original contribution of this study unifies the idea of love as a single concept while accounting for what is considered the taxonomies or derivatives. It does so by bypassing love's proximate object(s) and permitting the framework to overcome love's categorization. It avoids the identity of love as solely directed to the source as an object of desire or goal. The idea of love is to be equated with the idea of being in order to promote not simply the capacity to absorb any expression into a one-way-of-love, but to ground love as ultimately residing in each being as an appurtenance of the Absolute. The research is constructed to solve the specific problem of love delineated into kinds sorted on a spectrum ranging from a hermeneutic of experience to an absolute ideal. By grounding love not only as the reality of one's nature, but rescuing it from a paradigm that posits it as an act of the will or some resultant faculty of mind, love's objectivity is ensured (from ideal to idea of being) and human subjectivity gains epistemological grounding.

The study contributes to the field of love and ontology by placing love outside of the rational and affective as a harmony in and with the Absolute. In praxis, this development has export to questions such as how a pre-rational child, mentally deficient individual, or unconscious or unborn human can properly love another by the simple fact of their existing being. It would be difficult for such a finding not to be of value to the philosophical academy and to offer some practical benefits in fostering a conversation on human dignity to the world community. Though the focus remains on the human person, all created being will in some manner gradiate harmoniously in and with this Being of the Absolute. The research enumerates possible implications, including by expansion to what degree or in what manner the proportion of harmony

⁵⁶ Cf. López, 608. Note that I have borrowed López' rationale allowing adjustments pertinent to this particular study.

follows the value of non-human contingent being. Since the value of the Absolute does not wane by expression, and since dignity is founded on the possession of the appurtenance, the implication for issues involving the polis is obvious. Conditions of justice, and in particular for this research solidarity, become enumerable implications. Personhood is that irreducible display of love that saturates being, fostering an irreducible subject. This personogenesis begins with a passivity of receptivity—the love of another passing into the person. There arises from this being a vertical transcendence, where *love as being precedes doing (esse sequitur agere)*. One's self-identity projects to the other as a deep solidarity. The other becomes, or overcomes, the realm of subsistence and is drawn into relation passively yet harmoniously, as the ontological status of each being becomes mutually sustaining.

Three questions organize what follows. The first asks whether Antonio Rosmini's idea of being as an appurtenance of the Absolute is a sufficient foundation for the objective origin of thought, and whether it as a tacit and experiential epistemological system results in a verifiable certainty approving of the convertibility of being and knowing. Knowledge is predicated by the level of credibility it affords. The epistemological hinge has revolved around certainty, both bracketed and determined by the degree of falsifiability the particular certainty entitles the knower to make any discovery known. Knowledge is knowledge only if it has export both for the sake of transfer and independent verification. This aim necessitates an objective epistemology. Two concerns remain—the origin of thought, and the method that terminates in knowledge. According to the finding of Rosmini, it is the ontological appurtenance of the Divine Absolute that provides the firmest foundation for the origin of thought, and those tacit experiential evinces vindicate the resulting knowledge. This consequent knowledge is convertible with the ontological idea of being—each, without sacrificing any real distinction, becomes mutual.

The second question asks whether the ontological appurtenance of the Absolute in the human person is the origin of love, and in what way the human person harmonizes when this Divine-implant⁵⁷ is roused by moments of alt-love exposures affirming the convertibility of being and love. It is cumbersome for the concept of love to separate from a subjective personal value. Inherited schemas of love have placed it on a metric determined by the directed object—it becomes defined by what it is purported to do. Love as love is dependent not on mere subjective criteria but is determined by the type identified by its end and along a spectrum (emotive to ideal) consistent with that particular value. Two concerns emerge—the origin of love, and the modality that determines the subsistence of love. Extending the ontological appurtenance of the Divine Absolute to the human person's being provides the origin of love as a native yet foreign ontological foundation, and the culminating one-way-of-love as being(s) drawn back to the Absolute results as love's manifestation in theophanic evinces, in moments of alt-love. This consequent love is convertible with the ontological idea of being. Without sacrificing any real distinction the convertibility of love and being is thus affirmed.

The third question asks in what way the innate idea of being can be love, and how this love is convertible with the foundational appurtenance that leads to knowledge—whether it remains a meaningful statement that love is a way of knowing. The idea of *knowing* has its variances. To the extent that one may accept it as a heterogeneous concept, there is little reason to doubt the empirical and falsifiable knowing. Once beyond the biological and personal physical safety, a lesser certainty is ironically favored for such ideas as joy and hope. Here there is a leaning towards intuition as assurances of the heart. Love is envisioned in multifaceted forms and approaches, in classical and academic philosophical inquiries and certainly in the pedestrian mind as experiential. It retains a

⁵⁷ The term 'implant' is problematic but sufficient to convey the meaning at this point.

universal appeal as that of a power and to an extent a thing discovered. Obstacles develop in the pattern of constructing a framework where knowledge can be derived from love. Love is thought affective and therefore not in the realm of certainty, and the only relational paradigm of knowing and loving is that the latter may result from the former, which prejudices it to the province of habit and heart. With the inclusion of the ontological appurtenance, two things surface in response. The origin of love is convertible not with the process of knowing but with the prerequisite and primary foundation of knowledge—an elevation of credulity. And though the process of both knowing and loving may err in method, the notion that love cannot be discounted as irrational is as certain as knowing could never be relegated to mere subjectivity.

Terms and definitions

In this subsection, I will provide parameters for the following terms: love, knowledge, coverability, *being/Being*, *idea of being/Ideal being*, the Absolute, along with personhood/*personagenesis*.

Love

In short, Love *is*. Love is the origin of *being* which in that regard *is* being. I will define love as the created being's harmonic embodiment of the Absolute's self-attraction. This love is the ontological core, sustaining the person and through each person(s) as 'other', love manifests itself in an interdependent solidarity. Love is the universal 'I'. It is an encounter with the Divine essence (appurtenance) by which that which is proper to the Absolute's essence, gravitating back to the source. Relationally, it is the mutual sustenance of one being to another through the Ideal Being. This love involves the whole of the contingent cosmos; a return of the very creation which through love which in creation was brought *into* being, and has endued all creation with being thus attracting this *being* towards consummation.

Knowledge

Love mobilizes the mind towards the ‘other’. The Absolute is Love. For the created/contingent (to put it in Augustinian terms), this knowledge is first knowledge of things created and then of the ‘evening knowledge’⁵⁸ of being in and of the Absolute as the origin through which all things are held in tension. This knowledge can be divided into ‘acquired’ and ‘innate’, and the latter further into the knowledge of a thing of itself, of a cause of its effect, and of an effect of its cause. Between the ‘being’ and the ‘being known’ there is an intermediary of experiential knowledge or a ‘knowledge of presence’.⁵⁹ Knowledge thus understood in this proposal is that of innate origin presented to *being* in experience.

Convertibility

Convertibility is the interchangeability of two or more ideas in the presence of a real distinction, i.e., each is distinct but mutually predicated. A traditional example is *quiddity* and existence. What a thing is and that it exists are not ‘two things joined’ but separated for examination. Another way to understand convertibility is that where one is found (essence) so too the other is found (exists); this ‘sameness in reality’ is a necessarily condition. This is not to imply that one is predicated of the other, for if the predicate is not in the subject there can be no convertibility. To understand this in Aristotelian terms, that which is accidental is not converted with being; Aquinas would add that convertible ideas (he does use that term) are the same in reality except for a distinction in sense.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ “Knowledge of the primordial being of things is called morning knowledge; and this is according as things exist in the Word. But their knowledge of the very being of the thing created, as it stands in its own nature, is termed evening knowledge.” Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q.58, a.6, co.

⁵⁹ Cf. Reza Akbarian, *Islamic Philosophy; Mulla Sadra and the Quest of ‘Being’* (Bloomington, IL” Xlibris Publishing, 2009), 147ff.

⁶⁰ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q.5, a.1.

And that ‘sense’ does not allow an understanding of a sharing of essence. I will utilize convertibility as that which is coextensive.⁶¹

Being and *being*

The term *being* is an instantiation of ‘what is’; where anything that is not ‘this being’ is only ‘that being’ in and through ‘this being’. The answer, as Heidegger would assert, is already in the question. First some distinctions: the term *Being* (*Sein*) as used by Heidegger is that which a thing is, or in his terminology, “Being means this and that”⁶² and following his thought, only Dasein (the human being or the ‘in the world there being’) is capable of such an inquiry into being (understood as entities) that to determine *being* in itself is akin to nothingness where being is not an entity. His discourse was to avoid the ontological conflation of Being and *being* which may appear to be a Heideggerian critique of this dissertation’s ontology. I will not reconstruct his project and neither attempt to support nor discredit it, though the hermeneutic of this proposal does not conflict with the ‘experiential being’ that could be derived from Dasein.

Yet aside from that, if being is applied to all that *is*, and the Absolute *is* then some way of discussing being ‘bi-directionally’ must be achieved. If I remain with ‘being’ as analogy and univocity; both have some import into my investigation with a nod to the latter.^{63 64} Being is not exterior or transformative of the person into something which they are not for that would not make it prior or immutable. This does not mean that being cannot and does not reveal itself; it may present itself as hierarchical evaluations made in observations. But that would speak to the

⁶¹ Traditionally, this would be understood as applied to transcendentals, i.e., that which is not predicated of a genus. I would add a distinction (Duns Scotus’ notion) that being is that last and final abstraction.

⁶² Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, 143.

⁶³ I will offer a subsection in the third chapter considering the import of Duns Scotus’ view of univocity of being, and how it reconciles issues of relation between the contingent and non-contingent.

⁶⁴ Desmond’s addition of being as ‘metaxological’ would affirm otherness and togetherness. His entire project would make a sensible addendum to my dissertation, and find many like avenues to accentuate my proposal.

intelligibility of *being*, not its quiddity. Nonetheless related, they have acquired universal *being* into the existence (concepts, interior/exterior, sensations, etc.). When referencing Heidegger, I will attempt to stay true to the nuanced meaning Being and being. As I move into discussion love *Being* will signify the Absolute and *being* the created. The use of beings will represent relationality of being.

Idea of being (Ideal being)

These Rosminian terms are of the indeterminate innate; origin of ideas and source of knowledge. Where “Plato, Leibniz, and Kant admitted far too many innate ideas, i.e., all ideas are innate for Plato, only the ‘traces’ of ideas are innate for Leibniz, and for Kant the fourteen categories are innate”,⁶⁵ Rosmini posits there is but one. It is the foundation of judgment, but *being* is entirely indeterminate. As a Divine appurtenance (foreign yet native) this being communicates to the object of pure intention (ideas of others as being). I will treat love and *ideal being* as one, and extend it to all being determined by what I term the *syzygetic* relation. This is not foreign to a Heideggerian notion of ‘being as being’ as it always must exist as “this indeterminate preunderstanding of the expression of ‘being’ [though] unoriented and vague is *still an understanding*.”⁶⁶

The Absolute

The Infinite, the Another (*e-venire*) given to man by which he discovers his unknown origin, which is *of the Origin*. The Absolute is the *Logos*, understood as both ‘event’ and ‘word’ (John 1:1.14).⁶⁷

The Absolute entails nothing outside of itself, yet there remains a radical alterity between this Non-

⁶⁵ Cf. Antonio Belsito, Ed., *Rosmini Today at the Springs of Knowledge: A Presentation of Rosmini’s Epistemology* (Salt Lake City, UT: Alpha International Enterprises, 2016), 98.

⁶⁶ Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, 45.

⁶⁷ Cf. López, 592, 604.

contingent and the contingent. This is not Heidegger's ontotheology where being as 'ultimate' and being as 'intelligible' are conflated and the Absolute is reduced to the 'First Cause'. Though implicit here is the equally Heideggerian concept of the two-fold manner of being, both in its universality and in the Absolute.

Within man, this Ideal Being is to be understood as distinct entirely from Hegel's highest evolution of the spirit or mind; in this schema the Absolute is a Person. It was on that last point by which I hesitated employing this term, but find its non-dogmatic connotation useful provided the relational tone is preserved rather than an ontology collapsing into "either an impossible schizophrenia of logos and mythos, or else a faith-content reduced to a set of fideistic assertions."⁶⁸

Personhood/*Personagenesis*

Personhood is that irreducible display of love that saturates being. In terms of love, proximity, and presence, personhood is a term that is communicable in how it generates otherness. Primarily personhood is that which is 'given in being' unqualified, and simultaneously a 'being that is given'. There is no 'I' that is not present in and with a 'we'.

Personagenesis is not the 'becoming a person' if that implies some origin distinct from being. I intend to utilize the term rather as the realization that begins with a passivity that forms in and with the receptivity of love from another. It is a self-determining vertical transcendence⁶⁹ where there is no instance of contingent person(s) autonomous or unrelated to the Absolute, but the person is also never subsumed into that relation.

⁶⁸ Milbank, *Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason*, 297.

⁶⁹ Cf. Connor, 44-45.

II. Epistemological Review

*What about loving? Here I make my discovery: love exists; it alone cannot be separated from me. I love; I exist—this is certain.
~what Descartes should have said*

The overarching schematic for this entire chapter centers on the convertibility of ‘being and knowing’. My first order in that goal is to inaugurate how those two ideas are coupled, and as they are necessarily conjoined to describe their conversion. I will then move onto the idea of ‘knowing’, and across two sections work out the notion of truth, belief, and justification as a foundation for knowledge. To stave off immediate concerns, I will address various strains of epistemic skepticism. Then I will endeavor to offer concise yet thorough explanatory treatises on the major schools of epistemology (Rationalism, Empiricism, Tacit, Divine Illumination, and notable outliers), presenting them as inherited traditions that form worldviews both private and public. The epistemological system of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati is the capstone to that effort.

I will then return to ‘being and knowing’, reintroducing their inseparability and begin to speak of their ‘joining’ as an active harmonizing where I present and repurpose Heidegger’s Dasein with the aid of both Parmenides and Duns Scotus. Keeping with the ontological grounding of ‘knowing and being’ as an act, I will move from the notion of inseparability again to convertibility. In this second treatment of that notion, I will use Voegelin to overcome a lacuna in Aristotle’s ontology and to satisfy concerns with Heidegger’s ontotheology. Prior to addressing it more fully in Chapter III, I will offer a glimpse of the ‘way out’ utilizing Dionysius the Areopagite, along with some cursory summary remarks as a means to tie together some points.

With the convertible coupling of being and knowing, the latter will be ascertained through what is colloquially referred to as the Justified True Belief⁷⁰ theory (henceforth, JTB), where I will supplant the element of justification with that of certainty, i.e., justification will relinquish its role to the quality of certainty. The ‘why’ of justification will yield to the ‘it is’ of certainty, where being and truth are posited as two ideas fundamentally conjoined necessarily which in the presence of the *idea of being* satisfies certitude.

Finally, in regard to being; I will show being as an ‘existing subject’ but not simply a subject which exists; being as a ‘participatory subject’ but not simply a subject that participates. It will be demonstrated as possessing a *noetic* grounding of the temporal where humanity’s shared being is evidenced as an intersubjective harmonization. Where and when the being is cultivated relative to the Absolute, this ‘pure *nous*’ transcends the grounding as the primal form of being and does not simply recognize the ‘other’ as another, but as one’s own shared being, each discovered together as ‘persons’. I will use Antonio Rosmini’s notion of *being* expressed as the *idea of being*, presented as the last abstraction and origin of certainty in true-belief.

Specifically, in this chapter I will begin by delineating the veracity of a judgment in terms of the JTB theory of knowledge by first demonstrating that (1) knowledge is possible. Though susceptible to skepticism and delusion, I will show that nonetheless a judgment may be formed to arrive at certainty which terminates in knowledge. Another postulate which will follow the assertion that knowledge is possible is that (2) this attainable knowledge is deceptive when and only when its constituted parts stand separate from each other. For instance, a judgment may be (a) believed but in reality, be false; or it may be both (b) believed and true; or (c) not believed and

⁷⁰ The Gettier case will be briefly addressed, and sufficiently rebutted as to not lay damage to the argument by which a true-belief falls prey to a lack of certainty and therefore knowledge becomes not possible. This will be accomplished by means of both John Turri’s response and a rejoinder by the mode of undoing the apparent dilemma as a paradox containing misapplied logic.

false; or (d) not believed but true, which in reality is a lack of ascent. To each of these scenarios (a-d) one may add the element of justified or not justified. But nonetheless only together in concert and never separate, can they determine certainty in a judgement and be accepted as “a firm and reasonable persuasion [of knowledge] which conforms to the truth.”⁷¹

Following then this groundwork of the JTB theory⁷² will be a brief treatment of the issue of skepticism from the Pyrrhonian and Humean schools. Following that will be a survey of the major inherited traditions and modern epistemological perspectives. Such will include a sampling from the Rationalists school (Descartes, Leibniz, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle), representatives of Empiricist theories (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume), with a mention of Popper’s Falsifiability, along with Kant who will be treated as an outlier. The epistemological categories of tacit and experiential knowledge will also be covered. Finally, while including some rebuttal remarks from Aquinas and Scotus to the Divine Illumination theories, Augustine’s view will open the thinking which for the purposes of this chapter culminate with the epistemological thought of Antonio Rosmini-Serbatini. To restrain that presentation from being grossly expansive, the review’s focus will (1) contain only the major movements, and (2) be designed towards illustrating both the presuppositional philosophical⁷³ commitments that lay inherent in each approach. In essence to intercept any defeating postulate in this dissertation’s own epistemological argument, by contrast then (3) my research will demonstrate, despite some scholar’s positions, that all epistemological frameworks

⁷¹ Antonio Rosmini, *The Origin of Thought: A New Essay on the Origin of Ideas, Vol. I*. Trans. and Ed. Terence Watson and Denis Cleary (Durham, UK: Rosmini House, 1987), Forward.

⁷² Any ‘fourth’ condition will be set aside in this presentation. That ‘condition’ varies though an absence of a ‘defeater proposition’ seems to be one most often cited. The condition of the ‘fourth’ element sets out to overcome the Gettier Problem, which as stated previously will be addressed via another means other than the addition of further conditions which extend beyond the three traditional elements of JTB.

⁷³ Or for that matter, theological underpinnings.

contain within them presuppositional⁷⁴ claims, and then in light of that this study's proposed epistemological approach may be more clearly delineated.

In that the concept of being is presented in the overall dissertation's argument as the middle term which links the ideas of knowing and love, there will be a brief presentation and coverage of being in each of the two propositional chapters. The concept of being will be offered presently relative to its epistemological linking to my argument. Then I will demonstrate ontology as a fundamental component understood in its varietal ways with one underlying principle elevated over others, i.e., I will argue that the comprehension of *being* marries experience and community. The goal is to illustrate that there is no ontological breach between the being-self and the world. Then, to the issue of knowing as it relies on the concept of being, the assertion of convertibility will be demonstrated, i.e., the inseparability of being and knowing will be evidenced, followed by concluding with an explication of Antonio Rosmini-Serbatì's concept of *ideal being*.

Truth and belief in knowing

To the first condition of knowledge, one can only 'know' what is true but what is true must have export beyond the subject. A falsity can be known to be false (a human person's life-span *is not* 500 years), but such a falsity cannot be known to be true (a human person's maximum life-span *is* 500 years): it can only be known to be false.⁷⁵ The second condition of belief is more contentious

⁷⁴ Rather than provide a list of those claims and a sampling presupposition, each will be addressed in the section which the epistemological claim is set forth, relevant to and in terms of the proper school.

⁷⁵ It seems counterintuitive, as one may claim knowledge of the falsity, but it is merely the 'truth' that derails the falsity which is known. Furthermore, a person may know what is untrue, but be mistaken in terms of fact, accuracy, or scope. But even according to that reality or 'untruth', what is 'known' by being thought to be true does not derail the point that falsehood is replaced by truth due to the search for *a* truth which can be known. Even to lie which speaks to "the difficulty and labour which men take in finding out of truth, or again that when it is found, [the truth] imposes upon men's thought" (cf. Francis Bacon, *The Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999), "On Truth", 3.) for even in the untrue lie there remains both a search for truth by the inquirer and a concealed known truth by the replier. To leave any claim of knowing to the condition of 'true' solely is thus not of service to genuine knowledge, but it remains a necessary criterion.

as one must parse the various nuanced strains of interpreting this term. Here belief will be accepted as an intentional ascent to the claim of truth as knowledge; it is an affirmation.⁷⁶ So, both truth and ascent (belief) are necessary criteria, yet remain insufficient in themselves as resultant genuine knowledge.

Justification of a true belief in knowing

In consideration of that, it is the criteria of 'knowing' whether false or otherwise that fails on the requirement of justification. This would be the case even under other conditions, i.e., if it were outright dismissed as 'not believable' or unacceptable due to the absence of 'faith' (denial of the super-natural) or lack of shared religious traditions (denial of the presupposing worldview).⁷⁷

⁷⁶ By application consider a human person's maximum life-span *is not* 500 years and one is intentionally claiming or affirming that knowledge posited as a 'true belief' (*P*), i.e., it is not *true* that a person's life-span is 500 years and it is *believed* to not be true. Likewise, it is accurate to conclude that one can have a belief that is false ($\neg P$). For instance, one can believe (intentional ascent to the claim) in the literalness of interpreting the Biblical passages from the Book of Genesis, where in that pre-historical *mythos* some individuals have recorded life spans that extended to 900 years or more as 'true'. Yet that would be classified as a false belief and does not meet the conditions of knowledge regardless of the intentions or affirmation of one who 'believes' it.

⁷⁷ To reiterate using this scenario, by simply beginning from an antecedent that anything revealed in a sacred text is historically in error, or conversely to succumb to the sophistry of a six-day creationist may both form an enduring non-belief or belief, but does not satisfy the justification as to certainty (though the level of affirmation may vary). So, it is over this third criteria of 'certainty' where the historical controversy of skepticism has arisen. The question then forms: how is one justified in saying they 'know' their belief is true or not true? The resultant proof of 'it' seems to be this third condition of *justification* in terms of one's true-belief. In each case, the falsity of the belief might be accurately stated as 'it is not true that life spans extend to 900 years', though the conclusion was drawn not from a reasoned response such as knowledge of the physiological conditions of the human person, but based rather on a *carte blanche* denial of any religious system. This would amount to a correct belief in *that* truth, but the veracity of the belief is no more secure as knowledge *via* that truth, then would be the reverse which would be an individual accepting it formed though a fundamental literalism based on some misconstrued notion of Biblical inerrancy. In either scenario, the belief was formed though some outright denial or thoughtless acceptance, and amounts to little more than a 'lucky guess' of a certain truth which was believed uncritically.

Inherited epistemological methodology

Presuppositional misleading is not exclusive to the arena of skeptical criteria.⁷⁸ In this section I will explicate the epistemological theories of the Rationalists, Empiricists, the falsifiability of Popper, Kant's Copernican revolution, tacit knowledge approaches, and Divine illumination theories. The focus will be twofold, (1) I will illustrate their inherent erroneous or misled assumption(s), and (2) state briefly and clearly Rosmini's superiority in his epistemological approach. The section culminates in a synthesized summary of Rosmini's innate *idea of being*.

Rationalist theories

Rationalism as a movement in the popular sense, arose with René Descartes in the 17th century, though purely as a method is ancient. Generally, it consists of formulating knowledge from intuited propositions whether arrived at innately or *via* some deductive process. From the rationalist perspective, methods such as experience, religious illumination, or emotional intuition hold no authoritative role as a source of knowledge. True to its name, rationalism generally speaking is the grasping of justification and truth primarily *via* reason.

René Descartes

Descartes as the 'founder' of the Modern Project, proposed a process of *knowing* following a methodology now identified by his own namesake—Cartesian doubt. The method is famously sloganized as *cogito ergo sum*. Though a misnomer, it was not particularly the 'thinking' which posited assurance, but the existence and ability of 'doubting'. I will address that first, and then in

⁷⁸ The angle (any angle) of divergence derived erroneously from the onset proportionately widens in error regardless of epistemological methodology. That is, the difference at the genesis results in considerable dissimilarities farther along the application of the method.

the form of a presuppositional error, offer Rosmini's critique of Descartes' seemingly uncritical acceptance of the notion of *existence*, i.e., the unexplained 'I-am'.

In an investigation of truth, by rooting out the doubt based on all the 'wrong opinions' Descartes had accumulated in philosophical experience, his method was directed by what he thought the single truth or *ground* of each thing. He had deduced that "the principles or first causes of all that is or can be in the world...[are] but from certain seeds of truths that are naturally in our souls."⁷⁹ *Knowing*, independent of external perception, preserved both the 'protection from deception' and the 'origin of this seed' by an "an idea [which] had been placed in [each person] by a nature truly more perfect...it was God."⁸⁰ If nothing else could be asserted, to *not* doubt *that* fact was not among them. Deception was not initiated by the Absolute, from whom which the 'real from the apparent' was preserved via Divine benevolence.⁸¹

Rosmini would respond that there would be no certainty of the 'doubting' if it were not for the preceding *idea of being* that even the 'knowledge of doubting' presupposes. If one is to claim that 'I think, therefore I exist' and by 'exist' presumably mean 'I-am', the "you must presuppose the knowledge that what thinks must exist. In the very first line and at the start of a philosophy one [would] take for granted the notion of *existence*, which needs to be explained."⁸² According to Rosmini, this was and is the question to settle concerning cognition. Simply stated, even if the

⁷⁹ René Descartes, *Discourse on Method*. Trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), Part VI, §64, p.36.

⁸⁰ Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, Part IV, §34, p.19.

⁸¹ It is noteworthy that Cartesian doubt does not extend to the existence of the Absolute, which he explicitly states in the beginning of *Meditations*. Nonetheless, there is an immediate symmetry in the use of Divine *idea* between Descartes and Rosmini, but for the former it is protective in nature, and with the latter it is the origin *in* and *of* being itself; thus, knowledge and certainty. Another divergence lies in the external 'real', which for Descartes can only result in a mind and body dualism. The external real was removed to eliminate doubt, but the primary pitfall was overlooked; that the advent of knowledge is not founded on the removal of certainty itself, which he reduced solely to the act of doubting.

⁸² Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol. 2, 356.

cogito itself is not a form of judgment, then along with even sensation, Cartesian doubt is expressed by the power of Rosmini's *idea of being*.

Gottfried Leibniz

In like spirit of the Divine safeguarding innate ideas,⁸³ Gottfried Leibniz prefaced his approach by couching this 'protective' principle of the Absolute in terms of an arranged monadic accord. What I intend to conclude here is that though Leibniz's theory of monads does offer a semblance of unity, or in what he refers to as an 'inner harmony', there is always lacking an origin of sensation where the body as it acts 'with' the person—its own monad—falls short of acting 'on' the person.

Leibniz's project began at that point that if the world is but a dream; a well-orchestrated. The order 'within the dream' is constituted by pre-programmed monads bearing the stamp of the Absolute, i.e., by virtue of their self-contained singularity they mirror the will of the Creator. These monads have a preestablished harmony within each as the 'universe entire'. One divergence from other Rationalists, and especially by Rosmini's account, is in the rejecting of the influence of the physical world that discounts observation with the physical as *the* initial encounter towards knowledge. In contrast to Descartes what 'was seen' was not doubted, but was an appearance or phenomena set in motion by the Christian God (the best of all worlds) with prescribed laws transmitted to reality by this monadic system.

The 'extended materialism' of Descartes, which could not be justified knowledge of the un-extended mind, was overcome with Leibniz's system. Though the necessary simplicity Leibniz held of being left composite materialism only with the *appearance* of being held 'together'.⁸⁴ To

⁸³ Though he rejected Cartesian substance and thus the dualism which follows.

⁸⁴ In many regards and in particular in the way I am presenting him here, Leibniz is an outlier of the Rationalist camp. Though epistemologically by his holding to innate ideas (contra *tabula rasa*)⁸⁴ he is preserved in this category. Remnants of this innateness are found in Noam Chomsky's language-based nativism.

have the property of a disposition that tends towards what he would phrase as necessary truths—those noncontingent truths derived from reason—are truths held as necessarily predicated of some equally essential cause. Reason for him, at the risk of oversimplification, is preserved by the inscribed harmony stamped with a perfection by the Absolute.

Rosmini's critique to Leibniz lay in the overreliance of the many machinations necessary for certainty. Rather than the many, Rosmini posits only one.⁸⁵ Rosmini concisely criticizes Leibniz stating:

Instead of being satisfied with the idea of a force acting on us and making us passive at the moment of corporeal sensation (a fact of consciousness), [Leibniz] imagined that body had to be a force acting not on us but only on itself through an internal energy, like all his other monads; body was a force acting in harmony with, but not on us. In this way, he removed the sole means for knowing the force, which is known only through observation of what is happening in us. The hypothesis that we ourselves form and develop within us some knowledge of the force is a gratuitous phantasy totally unsupported by observation, analogy or true intrinsic arguments.⁸⁶

Rather than attune to an assumption of a world where multiple unitary substances mix like bacterium in a petri dish, one can merely hold that all things originate from an Ideal being.

As a rationalist, Leibniz does maintain a sense of innate ideas. But for Rosmini" the teaching from the outside merely brings to life what was already in us...a principle's being rather generally accepted among men is a sign, not a demonstration, that it is innate."⁸⁷ His point being that 'knowing' is something accepted the instance it is heard, so the certainty as interior not based on any principle of harmony which ultimately results in some fragmentary structure of the world. Ultimately for Rosmini, rather the "first sentient principles, would not, indeed, be representatives of the universe in the sense which the monads of Leibniz were supposed to be [containing corporal

⁸⁵ This claim of course can be repeated contra many of the thinkers presented here.

⁸⁶ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol. 2. 234.

⁸⁷ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol. 1, §76.

as well as spiritual, but rather] the sensitive principles embrace only unlimited, unmeasured space, in which corporeal being subsist.”⁸⁸ According to this schema, how does one passively observe and experience any aspect of encounter without each existing subject as the origin?

Socrates and Plato

What I will offer after very briefly explaining their systems is that Plato didn't offer just too many forms on which knowledge was reliant, but multiplied them indefinitely. In addition to the multitude of forms, there is necessitated an ever-wider variation of what those forms relate to sensibly: this stems from Plato seeking an *a priori* rational knowledge. He understood that when one “sees the absolute and eternal and immutable [they] may be said to know, and not to have opinion only”⁸⁹ of the unchanging perfection of being evident in the forms. As these forms by necessity for Plato are eternal, it is in the ‘remembering’ that knowledge arises where in some impression of a preexistence, one comes to a present judgement. Why would one say that learning knowledge is possible, when in fact recalling is the only process?⁹⁰ Teaching knowledge then for Socrates sums up the apparent riddle of the relation between learning knowledge and recollection as compared to a ‘stirring up’ of the innate knowledge already possessed.⁹¹

⁸⁸ Rosmini, *The Philosophical System*, 283.

⁸⁹ Plato, *The Republic in The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I. trans B. Jowett (New York, NY: Random House, 1892), Book V, §479e, 744.

⁹⁰ Meno asks this of Socrates, as to why he *teaches* that men cannot learn but only recollect, and yet still quizzes him in how he can say that there is no teaching, but only recollection. Plato shares Socrates' doctrine of reminiscence and utilizing the ignorance of a slave boy, demonstrates this boy's preexisting knowledge of the area of a square. The properties of this square, in what is otherwise oblivious to him, are guided through inquiry. It is said of the boy, that “without any one teaching him he will recover his knowledge for himself, if he is only asked questions” (Plato, *Meno in The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I. trans B. Jowett (New York, NY: Random House, 1892), §85c, 365.) that will lead him to knowledge he already possesses. At last, when the examination is complete, the boy affirms the correct answer and Socrates for Plato is vindicated.

⁹¹ In reality the boy had formed knowledge, or better stated, he recognized a true judgment that preceded any internal deduction or exterior observation.

In short Rosmini thought Plato simply allotted for too many ‘origins’ in that each form possessed the ideal of the actual being. So, there originates a wide variety of forms and even wider variety of the sensible that must be derived from those. The similarity is in the recognition of some sensible perception that must then in turn derive from an engendered understanding in order for any cognition to occur. For Socrates the certainty though remains in the unreachable forms.

Aristotle

With Aristotle’s epistemological treatment I will address two primary concerns and offer the following conclusions. Aristotle (1) over relies on what he deems the ‘greater sense’ of vision which, in Rosmini’s view (and of course others), plants the ‘seed of deception’ leading to eventual idealism and skepticism. And (2) there is no satisfactory treatment of the ‘first principle’ of truth in terms of a cause, leading to an *ad infinitum* regression.

First the method of deducing a syllogistic judgment that follows from propositional statements presents itself as evidently true. He offers that “a deduction is a discourse in which, certain things being stated, something other than what is stated follows of necessity from their being so.”⁹²

But the source of his knowledge, and the study of all things, remains to be found in the universal *forms*. Unlike Plato, these forms are not self-existing and although perfect and simple, are accessible alone in the sensed particulars; knowledge *via* the forms begins with sensation. The distinction from Cartesian doubt lies in Aristotle’s trust of the sensual world as existent where knowledge is evidenced, i.e., certainty has correspondence with the sense experienced. Perhaps

⁹² Aristotle. *Prior Analytics* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. I, Ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 24b §19-24, 40.

that statement is insight into Aristotle's claim that "actual knowledge is identical with its object."⁹³ So the 'blank slate' of the human mind *takes* the common form that exists in the 'many' as the universal *abstracted* from sensed-experienced particulars. And *via* a process of intellection the concept is reasoned and knowledge achieved. The veracity of the 'knowing' then is relative to the mind's ability to separate the universal form from the particular matter; the universal is identical in all of its particular instances.

It is true that "although Aristotle made no contribution to the theory of cognition, or in any way made clear the mode of it, he saw, much more clearly than any of his predecessors had done, what was necessary in order to make cognition valid, viz., some first principle of truth presented directly to the mind."⁹⁴ This was not lost on Rosmini, who recognized in the absence of the appurtenance the backward reach could not be exhausted *ad infinitum*. With Rosmini's project the pantheistic materialism was superseded by the panentheistic immaterial.⁹⁵ What Rosmini takes of the Schoolmen who would accept reflexive 'knowing' of the particular through the universal is that they miss the single origin of this cognition, i.e., the *idea of being* which is the Absolute and *the Form*. Yet perhaps, as Rosmini points out, it is in Aristotle that the 'seed of deception' originated that lead to idealism and skepticism. Aristotle claimed that the "size and movement are common sensible qualities, and that our sense is deceived much more by these qualities than by the sensible qualities proper to each sense."⁹⁶ It is this 'greatest sense' which is most frequently found to be erroneous and thus misleading.

⁹³ Aristotle. *On the Soul* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. I, Ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), Book II, 430b §20, 684.

⁹⁴ Rosmini, *The Philosophical System*, xc.

⁹⁵ Aristotle's philosophy would put it thus: the formal cause (figure proposed) in the material cause (marble block) was 'pulled out' by the sculptor (efficient cause) for an intended purpose (final cause). The Schoolmen who both enculturated and 'baptized' Aristotle's causes would simply assert that as processes of change (knowing?).

⁹⁶ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol. 2, 425.

In summation of the Rationalists, they focused on the deductive process where methods of justification and truth(s) were either discovered or recollected (*anamnesis*) primarily *via* a reasoning process. Something was always necessary for the preservation of the validity of any truth claim, be it the perfect form in a preexistent state, or the Absolute offering some varied form of guided harmony or preservation from error. With the last example of Aristotle, I find a fair bridge to the next class of epistemologists which I will address—the Empiricists. In a real sense, Aristotle shares something with the Empiricist school who too began with the senses from a *tabula rasa*,⁹⁷ but unlike them the veracity of what is sensed must correspond to what may be rationally deduced.⁹⁸ The senses for Aristotle do not hold the last word on knowledge acquisition, such to be kept in mind as I move onto the epistemologists who rely steadily on such an origin of intuition.

Empiricist theories

With Empiricism there are global presuppositions; the provincial role of experience comes to the fore. Broadly speaking then knowledge is *a posteriori* originating *from* the external experiential world where innate knowledge is an obstacle to objective knowledge and certainty.⁹⁹ The subsequent study will be contained to the general presentation of what I deem the larger representative figures, specifically John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume.

⁹⁷ Cf. *De Anima*, II.1-2.

⁹⁸ It is interesting to note here that for Aristotle the soul (passive intellect) is nothing prior to ‘thinking’ and on that reason the soul is not something ‘mixed’ with the body. Cf. *De Anima*, II.4, §22-25.

⁹⁹ Even Aristotle’s propositional truths (as internal rationalizations) are subjected to the criteria of what can be observed. This does not imply that since the experience is objective, that there is some consensus as to how that experience is both grasped and understood.

John Locke

Upon review of John Locke's theory of knowledge, my analysis will conclude that his claim of the particular ideas coming directly from bodily sensation.¹⁰⁰ These occur without him ever explaining how as ideas they are primarily formed. He ultimately accepts the analytical from experience without the synthesis of the existence and sensible, making his project untenable.

Locke states various objections to any possibility of innate knowledge. Among them he claims that even if there are truths which all mankind ascents to prior to experience, this universal *a priori* knowledge proves nothing with certainty. The ascent (belief?) itself cannot be forwarded as actual knowledge. He states that what appears as "universal and a ready ascent, upon hearing and understanding the terms, is [granted] a mark of self-evidence; but self-evidence, depending not on innate impressions, but on something else."¹⁰¹ What the 'else' is, is of no consequence to illustrate what he claims as the error in any epistemology employing an *a priori* modality. He concludes further that the 'findings' could otherwise be given account through happenstance or correspondence. For Locke, the 'knowing' cannot be innate because it could be not known until proposed. The impression here with Locke is that if innate knowledge *sometimes* coincides with verifiable empirical truth, it is accidental and therefore unreliable.¹⁰²

One can see according to his schema the case of a false belief, be it true or not. The difference in fairness to Locke lies in the relation of those two ideas. Locke affirms the idea's relation to truth if it is "to signify nothing but the joining or separating of signs, as the things

¹⁰⁰ Which he deems as abstractions.

¹⁰¹ Locke, Ch I, §18, p.13.

¹⁰² This empirical approach offers some variation of intuition, but it is limited to the agreement or disagreement of existing ideas in the mind (from sense perception). An example for this Lockean concept would be that "the mind perceives that *white* is not *black*, or that a *circle* is not a *triangle*" (Locke, Book IV, Ch II, §1, p.228). So ultimately, knowledge in general is the correlation of ideas in the mind gained through the senses based on the perception of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas. But as he puts it, how does this differentiate the ideas of the wise man, or any individual replete with fanciful chimeras who simply happened to 'get it right' that *white* is not *black*?

signified by them, do agree or disagree one with another”¹⁰³ thus resultant in knowledge.¹⁰⁴ I would point out that it is evident for Locke how rationality is directly related (perhaps in tandem) to the empirically sensed world.

What remains presuppositional is Locke’s notion of real essences, or as he would put it, the ‘ideas of substance’. Any *ideas* that one has in the mind, as “being referred to real essences as to archetypes¹⁰⁵ which are unknown must be so far from being *adequate* that they cannot be supposed to be any representation of them at all.”¹⁰⁶ He means by this that these ‘essences’ of the mind may be supposed of the actual species of a thing, or nothing more than a symbolic representation of non-existing things.¹⁰⁷ The idea is relative only to the *form* in Locke’s view, and never penetrates to the actual *idea* of the substantial essence. Reality in this schema (*primary* qualities as extension and *secondary* qualities as accidental) fall short of being adequately explained.¹⁰⁸

Rosmini would side-step the critique of Locke who would likely affirm those charges, by reorienting the notion of being from the Lockean ‘actual being’ to the ‘ideal being’ which incorporates the possibility *as* being. Where Locke places knowledge of the external world arising contra the tenable notion of skepticism, Rosmini situates the ‘knowable’ in the sensory experience of the ‘actual being’. If ‘to know’ has any dependency on the nature of a thing then that underlying nature cannot be sensed and thus remains unknowable. Rosmini would contend that nothing then

¹⁰³ Locke, Book IV, Ch IV, §2, p.254 (emphasis in original).

¹⁰⁴ Whereas there may be a limited extent of knowledge based on this agreement or disagreement of ideas identified by signs, the system is not without its own veracity, and although any detailed debate of these Lockean ideas is outside the scope of mention here.

¹⁰⁵ Here Locke means by archetype: the perfect, adequate and the original.

¹⁰⁶ Locke, Book II, Ch XXXI, §6, p.162.

¹⁰⁷ Knowledge, at least in terms of substances, is necessarily being limited to the proper correlation between those ideas which are nominal and they remain unknowable.

¹⁰⁸ It is the critique of these ideas in particular where the Irish Bishop and philosopher George Berkeley takes Locke to task (that will be contended within the next section).

is really known. If for Locke the mind is affected through the sensory indirectly by the production of ideas, it is only “where this perception is, there is knowledge, and where it is not, though we may fancy, guess, or believe, yet we always come short of knowledge.”¹⁰⁹ ¹¹⁰ Perhaps what he calls knowledge by this connection of the sensory to the ideas is simply one of ‘knowing by agreement’, and the skepticism his theory promotes is both expected and accepted.

Yet Rosmini addresses the shortcomings of Locke directly. In the first instance Rosmini posits out that (1) all particular ideas possess at least the universal idea of *existence*, and this (2) existence is then combined with the sensible. This leads to the conclusion that (3) each of the first two are resultant of the operation of *synthesis* which is necessarily predicated on a (4) common notion which is not derived from sensation. Therefore, (5) in the operation of *analysis* the common idea is already in the particular. The issue for Locke then is that he (6) supposed the particular ideas came directly from the sensation (under the guise of abstractions) without ever explaining how these ideas were formed, accepting the analytical from experience without the synthesis of the existence and sensible.¹¹¹ Rosmini sees the Lockean project that left the existence of the body dependent on the existence of minds as ultimately ending in two ways: idealism or skepticism. I will address idealism first represented by Berkeley.

George Berkeley

In this treatment of Berkeley’s system, I will offer a brief epistemological overview and show that his resultant lack of certainty stems primarily from the idealist view that anything ‘exterior’ ultimately results in nothing other than epistemological skepticism, i.e., one cannot know what is

¹⁰⁹ Locke, Book IV, Ch. I, #2, p. 224.

¹¹⁰ The issue of how anything sensory can affect the mind *a priori* was not lost on Locke, and debates now and in his own time ensued...I will neither introduce them let alone attempt to settle them.

¹¹¹ Antonio Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol I, 52-53.

not known to be *there*. I will explain how the experience of a force distinct from the sensing agent demonstrates the shortcomings in Berkeley's system refutes his idealism.

George Berkeley as with Locke considered knowledge linked directly to the sensual world, with important distinctions. For Berkeley, Descartes' proposition that the senses could be deceived was duly noted, whereas Locke reasoned out (notice not by experience) that there were distinct qualities to a thing. He posited that what was essential are those 'primary qualities' which existed in the world independent of sensual observation. Then those aspects of a thing that are 'identifiable to the object' (what we normally associate, such as the color of a leaf or the sound of a screeching tire) he referred to as 'secondary qualities'. Both of these are experienced, but the idea of a tree is not dependent on the experience of the leaf's color, or that sensual encounter of a car necessarily predicated to 'secondary' sounds of screeching tires. The primary is complex, and the secondary is simple. Objective knowledge would not be found according to Locke in the secondary qualities, as facts are present in the primary and are measurable *via* experience which in turn are placed (written) onto the *tabula rasa* of the mind. Berkeley then questioned how the primary qualities could be known outside of the secondary and how the latter will evidently lead one to knowing the former.¹¹² Where Locke would argue that at least the 'figure' of the car and the tree's leaves are sufficient for knowledge, Berkeley¹¹³ understood the 'link' between the primary as not convincingly apparent for knowledge without the existence of the secondary; any intuitive 'knowing' as agreement between ideas seemed suspect.

¹¹² Not every tire will make a screeching noise, but it would be expected to do so when it spins fast on an asphalt substrate under normal conditions. And too, at least one identifiable aspect of a tree is the color of its foliage so it doesn't seem reasonable to conclude otherwise.

¹¹³ In the "First Dialogue" of George Berkeley's 1713 work *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, the fictional Hylas embodies the concepts of John Locke and the argument of Philonous (Berkeley). It is the point of the dialogue for Philonous to unveil the skepticism inherent in the primary/secondary qualities distinction, and to conclude that the material world simply does not exist outside of perception.

Following Locke's reasoning method to what Berkeley thought its logical conclusion, the primary is no more 'real' than the secondary "maintaining that the subject of sensible qualities is not something different from us, but ourselves."¹¹⁴ Berkeley questioned whether the idea of a thing (primary qualities) can be framed in the mind and the secondary perceived externally, would it be true that to conceive of a thing in one's own mind as thought become the proof of a thing's existence? And then to further ask if the secondary qualities that do so exist according to Locke be trusted perceptions. Berkeley posits that these qualities are more complex in their construction, so presenting the argument¹¹⁵ under the guise of Philonous he concludes that "the idea of a thing that [one] immediately perceives, neither sense nor reason informs [one] that it actually exists without the mind...it is only known to affect such with certain sensations of light and colors, etc."¹¹⁶ This obviously makes all of the material world suspect and is the basis of his immaterialism. It leaves the human person's perception prone to gross deception in the sensual experience.¹¹⁷

Antonio Rosmini systematically refuted Berkeley's claims of idealism beginning with (1) proofs of sensation¹¹⁸ and therefore the existence of bodies as the proximate cause (which he takes steps to assure is not confused with an ultimate cause, i.e., God) which experience feelings as facts. Then in these feelings, we (2) experience a force distinct from ourselves, yet at work with in us as (3) really existing. This 'conceived *ens*' is (4) not 'myself' as the sentient object or God, so

¹¹⁴ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol. 2, 167.

¹¹⁵ His conclusion is found in his *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*.

¹¹⁶ George Berkeley, *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*. Ed. Robert Merrihew Adams (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1979), 36.

¹¹⁷ Without certainty of the material reality, perception is all that remains (*esse est percipi*), and were it not for the perceptive mind of God who is always present and thus keeping this apparent illusion in suspension, nothing could exist with certainty. Descartes' representational knowledge which put forth that could so easily be deceived in perception is overcome.

¹¹⁸ I do not intend to diverge in this presentation in order to build his argument, but he makes the case that we perceive an energy as the origin of ideas, and perceive *in* it an *ens* (which is the cause of sensation) distinct from ourselves. Cf. §677.

therefore (5) the body is both a limited substance and proximate cause of our sensations and therefore necessarily exists.¹¹⁹

Berkeley's project was to overcome the Lockean type of system which by his calculation could *only* terminate in skepticism, i.e., if there is no certainty of the material objects perceived, then any connection between the ideas and the human person's observation is bound to linger in distrust.¹²⁰ But if the ideas *are* the reality of the perception, unlike Locke where the ideas 'proved' the reality, then certainty in knowledge is preserved, though at the expense of discounting the material world. Rosmini agreed with Berkeley's concern of the flawed Lockean system and too accepted it as ultimately terminating in skepticism. I will now present Hume's approach and then offer Rosmini's critique of his skepticism.

David Hume

The rejection, or at least what was thought the unreliability of the Rationalist's deductional metaphysics, becomes the basis for both the epistemology of David Hume and also the reason he was singled out in this study in regard to his skepticism. Hume understood those things outside of observation, particularly what is referred to in his system as 'mere operations of thought', as *ideas* which remain true by necessity, as opposed to Berkeley who mistook the proximate cause (sensation) for the ultimate cause (Absolute). Concerning Hume, I will explain his epistemological case and conclude by critique that he is not clear as to what constitutes the distinction between an operation and object of the mind. And ultimately to address the apparent paradox which he leaves unsettled, precisely that the origin of the 'thinking' he insists is instigated by the senses, forms an

¹¹⁹ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol. 2, 193-94.

¹²⁰ David Hume took that 'path'.

axiom outside of experience that logically cannot account for ‘proof’ or knowledge *via* the very experience he claims is solely responsible for knowledge.

For Hume then, what of the causal relation of these ideas to sensation, or what he referred to as ‘impressions’? Where the term *certainty* has been used in this study, it is relatable to Hume’s grasp of ‘*matters of fact*’. The divergence in Hume’s thought concerning that causal relation is that although in each instance of empirical experience one may be assured that ‘this’ followed ‘that’, it could not be asserted with certainty for any future event to claim ‘that’ will follow ‘this’.¹²¹ Hume posits then that all that is required for the process of understanding, is that in a claim such as asserting that ‘all bodies are extended’,¹²² is the need to observe or verify the inherent truth. Since the definition of a ‘body’ itself is contained in the truth of the *analytic* statement ‘body as extended’, it merely results in a tautology and hence no ‘new’ knowledge is acquired. But Hume claims this is not so with *synthetic* propositions where a thing may be predicated of the subject as additional knowledge.¹²³ This *synthesis* for Hume is real knowledge, and as such receives the label of ‘matter of fact’ and is not simply an understanding founded in or by a necessary statement of thought.

Where the skepticism arises is that since no ‘one person’ can observe all snow present, past, and future, to verify the claim of ‘being white’ the process of induction must be employed.¹²⁴

This is Hume’s way of taking an observed regularity and projecting it onto the unobserved. It is

¹²¹ In a sense, each *idea* is an autonomous occurrence, where not only is the Rationalist system thwarted (one cannot reason from the present idea to a future event), but the empirical arrangement of causality cannot be thought consistent based solely on the evidence of past observation, and therefore does not lead to certainty in understanding or knowing.

¹²² The example(s) from Immanuel Kant’s “Introduction”, Section IV of *Critique of Pure Reason* will be used directly for comparisons in regard to the analytic/synthetic, and *a priori/a posteriori* illustrations.

¹²³ For instance, to state that “All snow is white’ determines the truth value absent of any inherent observation.

¹²⁴ Unless snow’s color has been tainted by something other than the combination of moisture and sufficiently cold temperature, no individual has claimed to see accumulated snow other than what is observed as white.

held then, at least in generalities such as the ‘color of snow’ that what has been encountered following verifiable rules or patterns will continue to align with the present observed experience and therefore be held as true.

This system of Hume’s leaves ideas (mental processes) and knowledge (justified belief) at the mercy of that casual linking.¹²⁵ The idea forming through and by the sensation of the object/event is wholly dependent on the sensed external world.¹²⁶ In either case these ‘ideas’ are outside of one’s grasp demonstrating the necessary causal connection between the sensed ‘object’ and the ideas forms. For example Hume claims that “a blind man can form no notion of colours; a deaf man of sounds. Restore either of them that sense, in which he is deficient: by opening this new outlet for his sensations, you also open an inlet for the ideas.”¹²⁷

But in the same vein he discredits the process of induction. The linking of a casual relation is not a thing which brings certainty through reasoning alone. To say that by some natural observation, this or that can safely be predictive of a future concurrence is spurious and based on nothing more than an approval by custom, i.e., it happened before. “When the cause is presented, the mind, from habit, immediately passes from the conception and belief to the usual effect.”¹²⁸ This ‘fork’ of what can be known outside of experience (rationalism) and what requires experience (empiricism) remain in parallel. What can be rationally inferred but not evidently experienced

¹²⁵ Although they may be independent of any metaphysical claim of the external world.

¹²⁶ There is an epistemological issue afoot (Just to add, it’s one thing to assert the analytic ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ and affirm its truth, but it offers no real knowledge, and theoretically need not exist, unlike knowledge predicated of facts do require existence and therefore via experience can result in real knowledge) and he illustrates the veracity of that in asking what one makes of the individual with an ‘apt or slender mind’, or of the person whose senses are in some way deficient?

¹²⁷ Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Section II, 12.

¹²⁸ David Hume, *A Treatise on Human Nature*. Ed. Eric Steinberg (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 132.

leads simply to a skeptical position; belief is but a habit. Both the cause and the effect must be experienced, but have not the power of export.¹²⁹

With Hume then, Rosmini offers a few solid critiques—which it must be noted are not necessarily original. Briefly stated, the first is that the sensation Hume refers to is left unclear whether they are (1) operations of the mind, or (2) objects of the mind.¹³⁰ But secondly Rosmini has a more effective, and hence simpler refutation of Hume’s project. Since there are those things which we ‘think’ but are not provided by the senses, what accounts for their origin? He states that “we must go beyond the senses, not only to imagine as *necessary* the axiom, ‘Every effect must have its cause’, but even simply to imagine it as *possible* ...[where] the sceptical argument based upon the famous axiom, ‘All our knowledge comes from the senses’, is essentially self-contradictory.”¹³¹

Karl Popper’s falsifiability

Between Empiricism and Rationalism an alternative is found in the early 20th century with Karl Popper who situated knowledge with not what can be known but in what can be falsified. This placed knowledge not in the realm of certainty that can only be inconsistently demonstrated in experience, nor in what he found to be impossible proofs of rationalism, but by contrast what can be demonstrated to be ‘not known’.¹³² I will offer a synopsis of Popper’s system concluding falsifiability leaves an epistemological crisis trading truth for collaboration.

¹²⁹ This discharge of inductive reasoning and the skepticism towards inferential predications would be taken up again two centuries later by a philosopher of science who recognized the weakness of observed causality.

¹³⁰ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol. 2, 364.

¹³¹ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*. Vol I, 274-75.

¹³² In that way real knowledge is only possible within the limiting parameters of probability and contingency with the emphasis or aim in ferreting out what one ‘cannot know’.

His application of knowing lay strictly in relation to what he would deem ‘critical’ things.¹³³ What Popper deemed the ‘hard sciences’¹³⁴ absolute truth does indeed exist. The irony though, if one could call it that, is that the truth could not be affirmed absolutely. The possibility for falsification was always present and that remains an issue for knowledge acquisition, i.e., being ‘certain for only now’ or ‘in this instance’ is not really certainty. Popper held that one “must distinguish between truth, which is objective and absolute, and certainty, which is subjective.”¹³⁵ In this context truth can ultimately be known but there is no direct theory to achieve that knowing. What is left are either theories that have yet to be found erroneous (falsified) or the truth of the error in those theories already falsified.

Any application of Rosmini to Popper¹³⁶ would begin by critiquing that premise. Rosmini would look to the strength not of the finding, but of the founding. Admittedly a far cry from Hume’s self-contradiction of not being able to empirically prove a non-empirical necessary foundation of the proof, there is some similarity in Popper’s project in that his theory of falsification must rely on a non-falsifiable premise.¹³⁷ But it is consistent in regards to placing what ‘truth’ can be known as limited to not what can be confirmed experientially by direct

¹³³ Here is an example: being in close proximity and a contemporary to Sigmund Freud, Popper was dismissive of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory. Determining a present adult pathology traced back to an object or event in childhood could be equally and convincingly argued to produce the converse effect. It makes one immediately cognizant of Hume’s skepticism of causal induction. But with Freud, Popper saw the claim of human actions driven by some unconscious desire always falling short of being predictive. It was for him rather more akin to being retrospective and therefore founded on spurious ground (proving what method might have predicted yesterday’s winning lottery number), forming nothing but contradictory findings for future applications (does the application of that proof correctly pick tomorrow’s winning lottery number?), i.e., to say it bluntly, Freud’s claim is by Popper’s account pseudo-scientific.

¹³⁴ For example, quantum mechanics, general relativity, and such—he was also a contemporary of Einstein.

¹³⁵ John Horgan, “The Paradox of Karl Popper,” *Scientific American*, n.d., August 22, 2018, Accessed January 2019. This article was formed from Horgan’s interview in 1992 with Sir Karl Popper at his London home.

¹³⁶ Rosmini had died nearly a full fifty years prior.

¹³⁷ For instance, this results in his over-arching criticism of dogmatism which he understood by something as incontrovertibly true, known with certainty. This dogmatism he found repressive. But that again reveals the critique, which is noticeably paradoxical when such a dogmatic statement though critical, is hardly unfalsifiable and therefore inherently itself dogmatic and not premised *via* experience.

observation, but realistically only through falsification. Any claim in this schema is objectively normative even if temporary. What is of course possible is the constant growth of knowledge as errors are falsified and certainty is dialectically ferreted out.

Rosmini would seize that notion as the epistemological crisis. For Popper one does not strictly land on truth or certainty. Unfalsifiable statements may be corroborated or not corroborated, “but [one] can never simply say of a statement that it is as such, or in itself, ‘corroborated’ (in the way in which one may say that it is ‘true’). It can only be said it is corroborated with respect to some system of basic statements—a system accepted up to a particular point in time.”¹³⁸ That notion is a distinct break from past epistemologies. It might be proper to consider Popper’s system the advent of a philosophical ‘revolution’ in that there is something Kantian who with his own approach just under two centuries earlier altered the course of philosophical methods in his wake.

Immanuel Kant’s Copernican revolution

With Immanuel Kant, there is both a continuity and an outlier notion about his epistemology.¹³⁹ And as revolutionary as it was for Nicolaus Copernicus to invert the center of the physical universe in the 16th century, Immanuel Kant’s innovation was no less turbulent. He inverted the locus of the known world as (1) being built-up from the *tabula rasa* (Empiricism) or (2) submitting almost motionless to the *recollected* forms scrutinized in a mind that itself structures the reality of the

¹³⁸ Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (London, UK: Routledge Classics, 2002), 275.

¹³⁹ First, it flows directly out of the turbulent confluence of the opposing Rationalist and Empiricist philosophical traditions, not unlike Popper’s critical rationalism (falsifiability) though Kant’s project is in direct contradiction to Popper. Recall that with the Rationalists one can be *certain* of a thing without that certainty being predicated on the *existence* of that thing. How was that not lost as a critique of the Empiricists where either a distinction was made between a thing’s ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ qualities (Locke), or as demonstrating the inevitable consequence of such a separation (Berkeley)? It was not lost on Kant who famously inaugurated what has become to be known as the Copernican Turn.

world (variant of Rationalism). Yet with these epistemological systems there was a convergence with Popper. With Kant he “agrees that ‘the world as we know it is one’s interpretation of the observable facts in the light of theories that [the mind itself] invents’, i.e., he agrees with the ‘Copernican Turn’.”^{140,141} But contra the Rationalists, one issue of presupposition for Kant is that the metaphysical conditions are not part and parcel of the very experiences one has.¹⁴² Unsettled by what was inherited, Kant developed his own approach.

Kant’s synthetic *a priori*

Kant proposed the synthetic *a priori* proposition as a certain source of *real* knowledge. I will first explicate Kant’s system, and then use Rosmini’s critique to show that Kant’s innate forms are too many in quantity compromising unity, and does not properly address the origin of the forms when co-mingled with the material causes and laws that ensue.

First, Kant accepts that analytic propositions are knowledge, i.e., the statement that ‘all bodies are extended’ is certainly a true, justified, belief which is known *a priori*. But there is nothing new that one knows beyond the definition that has been constructed to contain the ‘already known’ proposed truth.¹⁴³ Kant considers that an analytic *a posteriori* is compromised by the

¹⁴⁰ Miloš Taliga, “Kant and Popper: Two Copernican Revolutions,” presented at *Immanuel Kant and the Tradition of Critical Philosophy*. Wisla, Poland. 2004.

¹⁴¹ Taliga in his presentation attributes another ‘Copernican Turn’ to Karl Popper as “he advocates a revolutionary opinion that scientific knowledge is possible even if its justification is impossible. Accordingly, scientific knowledge is only hypothetical: scientific theories are conjectures and will remain conjectures forever.” Taliga refers to Popper’s *Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography*. London: Routledge, 1993, Section 16, p. 51.

¹⁴² So, to be clear, the division for Kant from the Empiricists rests on the claim that as knowledge is sensed, the sense itself must be caused and that cause itself is not something which can be observed. For example, Kant claimed Hume “arrived at cognitions that lie far beyond the limits of all experience [but]...it never occurred to him that the understanding itself might, perhaps, by means of these conceptions be the author of the experience in which its objects were presented to.” Taliga in his presentation attributes another ‘Copernican Turn’ to Karl Popper as “he advocates a revolutionary opinion that scientific knowledge is possible even if its justification is impossible. Accordingly, scientific knowledge is only hypothetical: scientific theories are conjectures and will remain conjectures forever.” Taliga refers to Popper’s *Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography*. London: Routledge, 1993, Section 16, p. 51.

¹⁴³ This was covered with Hume who too tried to overcome that limitation.

contradictory nature of inherency and experience and therefore as such can be said of no proposition. For example, with the claim of ‘all bodies are heavy’ being asserted, the necessary is not ‘within’, so it would be necessary to *go outside* of the tautology into the realm of experience and observation, i.e., ‘all bodies are heavy’ could not be known *a priori*. He would ask how something new (heavy) be added prior to the experience confirming that ‘all bodies are heavy’?¹⁴⁴

With Kant in regard to synthetic *a priori* propositions, those statements appear to suffer from the same internal contradiction as analytic *a posteriori* statements, i.e., it is either new knowledge claimed prior to a future experience or claiming past knowledge that may be undone by a future experience. But Kant’s claim is that these *a priori* truth propositions do indeed extend beyond experience, and are therefore not ‘pinned down’ to that paradox. He offers here the proposal that synthetical judgments known *a priori* are ‘contained as principles’ and therefore known *prior* to experience, yet do indeed offer ‘new’ knowledge not to be undone by future experience. That claim was revolutionary.

To illustrate this point by example; consider that with Kant when one asserts the geometric principle that a “‘straight line between two points is the shortest,’ [it] is a synthetical proposition. For [the] concept of *straight*, contains no notion of *quantity*, but is merely *quantitative*. The concept of the *shortest* is therefore wholly an addition, and by no analysis can it be extracted from [the] conception of a straight line.”¹⁴⁵ Therefore the principle is known *a priori*.¹⁴⁶ This is the

¹⁴⁴ To be thorough though, in any claim of synthetic *a posteriori* knowledge according to induction it would be impossible to stake certainty as this ‘knowledge’. Any knowledge may be jettisoned by some future unknown discovery of a ‘body’ which is not heavy so this it is ultimately relative to future revision; i.e., inductive knowledge asserts probable knowledge. Following that alone one inevitably falls into Humean induction and thus uncertainty (skepticism?). Recall that this is precisely what caused Popper to find a ‘way out’ that ultimately traded certainty for falsifiability, and truth for corroboration.

¹⁴⁵ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction, Section V, p. 10 (emphasis in the original).

¹⁴⁶ He also offers other illustrations of his point: the unchanging quantity of matter; the ideas of action and reaction as equal in motion, etc.

‘Copernican Turn’ towards ‘new knowledge’ not gained from the ‘outside’, yet not simply ‘claimed truths’ inherent within the statement of expression (tautology). It offers credence that “though all one’s knowledge begins with experience, it by no means follows that all arises out of experience.”¹⁴⁷ Rather that experience combined with the various *a priori* concepts become the foundation of one’s judgment.¹⁴⁸

Rosmini systematically demonstrates the inadequacies of Kant. His first point is that (1) the *a priori*¹⁴⁹ conditions for both universal and necessary knowledge (by pure reason) were realized by philosophical schools prior. A less contentious but more obvious point is that (2) knowing *via* senses shows us *what is* but cannot show us *what must be*.¹⁵⁰ Not knowing more than *it happened*, leaves open the skepticism of Hume where future happenings cannot be necessarily thought to be so. This then leaves (3) *a posteriori* knowledge by experience of things contingent, which being inductive is neither necessary nor universal. By analogy Rosmini explains that even if “we have perceived six objects. We cannot extend our experience with our mind to a seventh object because we have not perceived it. Still less can we extend it to all existent beings, relative to which what we have perceived may be a tiny proportion”¹⁵¹ of that which is evident, yet unexperienced.

¹⁴⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 1.

¹⁴⁸ To further his point, Kant considers what is necessary to the ‘principle of contradiction’. This holds that of two contradictory propositions, one is necessarily false, i.e., to claim ‘A is not non-A’ as false is logically impossible. This holds true for a synthetic judgment, only if another equally held true synthetic judgment is accepted prior, which provides the necessary knowledge. In that these judgments are “not empirical, [but] because they carry along with them the conception of necessity, which cannot be given by experience” (Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 9), there are certain ideas (pure rational concepts) such as the mathematical principle of contradiction that must originate not ‘outside’ in experience, but rather *a priori* in the faculty of reason and therefore is an ‘innate, synthetic *a priori* truth’.

¹⁴⁹ Rosmini posits that *a priori* knowledge was for Descartes the only certain knowledge. And with Locke the universal (abstract idea) is known continually and eternally as true. Likewise, Leibniz derives cognitions from the mind and not sensually. Cf. *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Article 3.

¹⁵⁰ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol I, 261.

¹⁵¹ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol I, 264.

In usual fashion though Rosmini attacks not the minutia but prods at the supposition leading to what he sees as undergirding all other error. Here the issue is the quantity of categories necessary for Kant's system. In Rosmini's view the fragmentation is antithetical to the necessary *unity* of being required for certainty. Cognition for Kant requires the forms to act in accordance with the sensual matter, and this then is the knowledge of external objects.¹⁵² Kant for Rosmini falls into a 'fateful illusion' where too little is conceded as innate (forms) where without determining the laws (elements determining matter), the project fails. His categories remain simply modes of Rosmini's *idea of being* which are always the *many* rather than the *one*.

Now that I have addressed the major epistemological schools, I want to move beyond the synthetic *a priori* to another Kantian element of his logic that is rarely noted. There is a type of knowing that he calls the 'mother wit'. By it one may be led to understanding through rules or principles but there remains a faculty of judgment that "is a peculiar talent, which does not, and cannot require tuition, but only exercise. [It is of a] special quality, the want of which no scholastic discipline can compensate."¹⁵³ I accept this as a nod to implicit knowing and will use it as an appropriate lead-in to the following section on tacit knowledge. It narrows in on my thesis converging the epistemological qualities of love united with Rosmini's *idea of being*.

Tacit knowledge

Tacit knowledge popularly seems akin to opinion or a hunch. If 'tacit knowledge' is something believed and even true (coincidence), it seems to lack the principle of justification. But that is the

¹⁵² The Kantian forms are twelve, which comprise categories or pure concepts. Using the analogy of a prism Rosmini explains that "the white is broken down by the form of the prism which splits it up into seven colours. In the same way, the sensations in our spirit take on all the forms of our spirits itself and are transformed into external *entia* which then seem to be things distinct from us and totally independent" (Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol I, 322).

¹⁵³ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, 98.

bias Michael Polanyi argues against even if it is not exported easily to another human subject; i.e., it is implicitly known yet not empirically demonstrable. Yet the underlying premise of tacit knowledge holds that one should “start from the fact that we can know more than we can tell. [For example] Gestalt psychology has demonstrated that [one] may know a physiognomy¹⁵⁴ by integrating an awareness of its particulars without being able to identify those particulars.”¹⁵⁵ This ‘identifying’ of the awareness is seen not as some conclusion which followed a deductive, rational process, but rather an active shaping of experience that forms knowing without accounting for the origin. This type of ‘knowing’ will prove beneficial to support this dissertation’s thesis.¹⁵⁶

Experiential knowledge

I will show here that experiential knowledge, though considered implicitly known and therefore purely subjective, nonetheless qualifies as explicit knowledge even if such knowledge lacks articulation. From that I will further demonstrate how experiential knowledge applies to semiotic transfer and then connect this ‘transferable’ explicit knowledge with the realm of mystical (liturgical?) epistemology.¹⁵⁷

Consider for example the phenomena of chick-sexing. There’s an expertise necessary for distinguishing the male or female chicken hatchlings in the absence of any clear identification. The contemporary neuroscientist David Eagleman speaks of the training at the Zen-Nippon Chick

¹⁵⁴ Though it will not be explicated here, the case of facial recognition is a prominent example used to illustrate tacit knowledge. In brief, a familiar face may be identified from among thousands present in a crowd, yet why ‘that’ face could be ‘known’ with certitude as being familiar is not something easily expressed or communicated explicitly. The issue of false identification or ‘witness error’ does not necessarily ‘undo’ such certainty, as it is the inability to express what is understood without explicit expression that solicits the curiosity.

¹⁵⁵ Michael Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 4,6.

¹⁵⁶ More will be said of it in the section of ‘The inseparability of being and knowing’ that follows.

¹⁵⁷ Though not an accurate comparison to equate tacitly *knowing* to the colloquial ‘school of hard-knocks’ there is something with the *experience* attributed to such hard-knocks knowing in that knowledge can be ‘built up’ and ‘stored’. In both ‘hard-knocks’ and tacit, the ‘knowing’ evidences itself outside of verbal expression, i.e., not being able to ‘tell’ others exactly how to do something one knows.

Sexing School in Japan where the ability is nurtured *via* a trial-and-error feedback exercise. Rather than being empirically or rationally taught, the unconscious brain is conditioned by ‘masters’ who stand in proximity approving or disapproving of the trainee’s particular choices. Eventually the ‘trained’ person comes to possess the skill they could neither explain (by the possessor or another) nor, and this is interesting, pass along themselves *via* some objective cognitive education process, i.e., they were unable to simply show how it is done but can do it themselves. This type of ‘knowing’ can best be explained as an ineffable unconscious ‘picking up’ of information.¹⁵⁸

This ‘learned knowing’ can be classified as demonstrable knowledge. With this experiential ‘I will show you’ modality, the means are present where the properties transfer what *appears* only to be known implicitly but in fact is objective in the subject.¹⁵⁹ Yet this doesn’t discount the implicit knowledge that led to performing the activity properly initially. The suspicion only undoes the tie between explicit knowledge and the articulation of the knowing. Even if this knowledge does seem inherently implicit, it must not be understood as exclusively so.¹⁶⁰ This type can remain an authentic ‘knowing’ regardless of the ability or inability to properly articulate it expressively or to validate its transfer.

At this point, I explained how experiential knowledge, though considered implicitly known in spite of any lack of articulation, nonetheless qualifies as explicit knowledge. I will now show the demonstration is in the semiotic transfer.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. Eagleman, David. *Incognito: The Secret Lives of the Brain*. New York, NY: Vintage Books, 2012), 57-59.

¹⁵⁹ At this juncture, I’m leading into the presence of *a priori* knowledge connected to experience. The *idea of being* is foundational in this understanding for my thesis, and can at least be said to provide a sharable grasp of *the idea of being* that is demonstrable in experience. I realize this is an unsubstantiated assertion at this point, but am content to allow it as an introduction. And if left at that level it could merely be the transfer of ability under the guise of knowing and will not truly provide the receiver with knowledge, i.e., they have acquired the means to perform the task (received the ‘how’) without the ability to articulate the ‘why’. Would that indicate knowledge?

¹⁶⁰ I accept the term explicit provided it is understood to represent a ‘process of knowing’ *via* the connection of ‘strings’, i.e., symbols that are brought together meaningfully which can be evidently expressed in the way the signs themselves are transferred.

Semiotic transfer

Semiotic ‘transfer’ is founded on shared and interpretable symbolic language. Liturgy would certainly fall into this category, but the ritual can certainly be secular.¹⁶¹ These symbols contain ‘explicit’ knowledge, implicitly strung along—both in the subject. The implicit ‘stringing’ is explicitly discovered in particular contextual shared settings, as is all expressed human communication. The symbiotics may be predicated on ‘natural signs’¹⁶²—bread or water to quench thirst or advert hunger; an embraced hug; a guiding hand given to an elderly person, etc. All are strings connected explicitly to expressions where the transfer from subject to subject need not be explicitly stated.¹⁶³

An important analogy is given by the social epistemologist Harry Collins speaks of stings appearing as symbols in a calculator where they are communicated as mathematical language. He points out that “it is tempting to think and say that a calculator ‘does arithmetic,’ [but] the metaphysics of strings and language tells [one] that the calculator is merely transforming the strings”¹⁶⁴ that like both conventional and natural signs, are meaningful only to a knowing power where in fact they are ‘de-coded’. It requires a presuppositional reversal (unarticulated known?),

¹⁶¹ For instance, at the Arlington National Cemetery consider the solemnity portrayed in the signs and symbols of the Guard sentinel at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier: the impeccable uniform and immobile expression (respect and vigilance), the position of the rifle on the shoulder (alternated when changing direction so it remains between the crowd and the guarded tomb), the twenty-one steps and twenty-one second pause (military honor)—to just describe a few signals mutually transferable. Or in the Christian liturgical expression how the unseen is made seen: the celebrant’s entrance from ‘back to front’ (the Body entering an eternal now), the posture of the congregants (standing as attentive, kneeling as pious, sitting as receptive), the celebrant’s *orans* posture (pleading and prayer)—where the semiotic communication attempts to signify bridging the temporal and eternal. Regardless the signifier as representing something other than itself, is only capable to ‘string’ along the symbolic knowing to the degree it is relatable to another ‘knowing’ power who receives the shared thing ‘signified’.

¹⁶² Here I will define signs as natural when there *is* a natural correlation between the signifier (the sound, image, etc.) and the signified (concept), and conventional when there *is no* natural correlation between the signifier (the sound, image, etc.) and the signified (concept).

¹⁶³ In the same way with ‘conventional signs’ examples would include: awards as strings tied to achievements, or the way in which tokens of sentiment such as flowers imbue affection, to just name two. Even though the conventional signs do not necessarily embody the reality, they nonetheless have the power to attribute an artificial, but culturally relevant sign both shared and interpretable.

¹⁶⁴ H. M. Collins, *Tacit and Explicit Knowledge* (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2012), 70.

but these signifiers permit explicit knowledge to be gained tacitly in the signified. Polanyi proffers a notion that *wholly* explicit knowledge may seem ‘unthinkable’, but in fact “if one replaces the claim that ‘strings must be interpreted before they are meaningful’ and one forgets about the word ‘unthinkable,’¹⁶⁵ a level of mystery disappears: [there are in fact only] strings and interpreted strings”¹⁶⁶ with tacit knowledge essentially prior. Or as Collins would put it, the knowing is ‘in the background’ of these strings when in each instance the ‘transfer’ occurred, and missing was only the articulation of the knowledge conveyed.

This is all meant as an illustration of how one may literally ‘pursue’ a particular goal of knowledge—what is the sex of the chick hatchling—without strictly being able to identify the objective (means?) one is after—how the sex of the chick hatchling is explicitly determined. The pursuit of this ‘something’ appears known (this hatchling is a pullet or cockerel), yet lacking is the articulation to demonstrate it being known (I cannot say explicitly why this hatchling is a pullet or cockerel). Then the issue of ‘mystery’ Collins wanted to dislodge by depicting it as ‘thinkable’ can be more clearly illustrated in an epistemological context.¹⁶⁷

What I demonstrated is that in spite of any lack of articulation, the resultant signified nonetheless qualifies as explicit knowledge—what is unknown is the ‘why’. The demonstration of the ‘knowing’ is in the semiotic transfer achieved by removing the ‘unthinkable’ and leaving it as a string and/or an interpreted string. For my thesis, this connects explicit knowledge to an implicit expression.¹⁶⁸ But first I will further explicate Polanyi’s remarks on the application of this tacit

¹⁶⁵ Meaning to set it aside as a presupposition.

¹⁶⁶ Collins, 70.

¹⁶⁷ Polanyi would not contest the explicit strings, but with Collins hold to the necessary signals which are embedded implicitly (tacitly) in the interpreter that can make sense (meaning to de-code) the signals as an already-knowing power. This favors the unarticulated but desired end: I successfully separated the pullet from cockerels in a manner I cannot properly describe.

¹⁶⁸ I do think this lies within the realm of mystic epistemology, which would be another expressive term of my project.

knowledge by using the so-called Meno's Paradox to demonstrate his application method. This will allow me to further express the import of tacit knowledge into my project, eventually affirming Rosmini's *idea of being* as the origin and foundation of the semiotic meaning.

Polanyi on Meno's paradox

In the epistemological schema of Plato's recollection of forms, all knowledge is the 'remembering' of the soul's previous lived encounters. In that context the paradox comes from Meno questioning Socrates as to how he will know what he does not know, and once a thing is known how will it be determined that that is indeed the very thing which was previously unknown. Socrates recognizes this trap and responds to Meno, "You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he knows, or about that which he does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire."¹⁶⁹ In other words, if it is known, no enquiry is necessary, and if it is not known what one is looking for there is nothing to be discovered.

Meno thinks the argument is sound, but Socrates quickly points out it only *appears* as paradoxical until you realize that all enquiry and all learning is but recollecting.¹⁷⁰ Some have found this fallacious as asserting a premise that no problem arises if you know what it is you want to know.¹⁷¹ But the dilemma has two 'horns', the other being that if you do *not* know what you are looking for, then you cannot expect to find anything.¹⁷² The point by analogy with Meno's paradox

¹⁶⁹ Plato. *Meno* in *The Dialogues of Plato*, §80d, p.360.

¹⁷⁰ Though Meno's Paradox is often criticized as not true epistemological dilemma but an equivocation, it still provides the contrast for Polanyi's point to be made clear.

¹⁷¹ This is Michael Bradie's critique of Polanyi in using Meno's Paradox to assert the claim of tacit knowledge. Cf. Herbert A. Simon, "Bradie on Polanyi on the Meno Paradox," *Philosophy of Science*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Mar. 1976), 147.

¹⁷² Cf. Esther Lightcap Meek, *Contact with Reality: Michael Polanyi's Realism and Why It Matters* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2017), 42.

concerning the application of tacit knowledge is that (1) one may be quite aware of *what* knowledge is being sought as a truth even without a clear articulation of it as a goal, and there exists a firm belief that (2) some idea is present as to *what* is to be known, allowing for tacit knowledge to remain a firm justifiable possibility terminating in knowing.

Here I have applied tacit knowledge to the so-called Meno's Paradox as I proceed setting up Rosmini's *idea of being* as the origin and foundation of this epistemological tacit knowing by first considering the divine illumination theories of Augustine and then I will introduce the theory of Rosmini.

Divine illumination theories

I want to provide some cursory remarks as to the interplay or aversion of a revealed faith of those epistemological thinkers I have so far presented. The purpose is to illustrate that although they would not endorse a divine illumination theory, some sympathy to the divine (with notable exceptions¹⁷³) can be made, and any aversion to things 'spiritual' was formed by a principled attachment to the specific process(es) they put forth in regard to cognition and knowledge. In my explication, I will begin with the Ancients, and in a few paragraphs conclude with Polanyi.

Plato asserted a singularity and sovereignty to his notion of deity, and Aristotle held to the deductive reality of the unmovable first mover. These were not the later views held by *revealed* Medieval monotheism, though one can say as reasoned concepts they were 'natural' precursors (matter) that provided the rational basis for the 'supernatural' and formed an intellectual vindication of the Absolute.

¹⁷³ With David Hume, this great 'Saint David' made it an aspect of his life's goal to dismantle many of the arguments surrounding natural or revealed theology. He both opposed any notion of an 'afterlife', and understood the 'mental conscious' in the same way one would grasp the physical. Though Karl Popper's epistemological concept was aimed at scientific truth, his critical realism would place any hint of the Absolute, or anything within the realm of theology outside of the science purview.

As a devout Roman Catholic, René Descartes' belief in the Christian Deity is well known and his discussions of God's existence and perfection can be found in the *Meditations*. For him, this Christian God that was not simply 'Savior' but also the redeemer saving the human person from universal sensory deception. John Locke (a contemporary) was deeply religious with a strong personal Christian faith. But given his disposition as linked to the cultural frame in which he had lived, the focus of his faith manifested famously towards principled views of toleration. George Berkeley's God of infinite mental substance, supported and maintained his idealism; always premised by the ontological 'cause' of all sensory ideas.

Although Immanuel Kant's goal was of reaching to the 'limits of reason', neither he nor his system were hostile to faith. He held that it was *through* the pursuit of the Highest Good, where the immortal soul discovers its complete goodness and leads to ultimate happiness. Finally, with Michael Polanyi, though his work was oriented to the pursuit of scientific knowledge, his tacit theory of experiential knowledge led him to hold an understanding of the Christian God to be found in worship, works of corporal service, and Christian acts.

All things considered, whether complicit, adoptive, or antagonistic towards (or with) the reality of god, God, or the Christian faith, the supernatural did not form the 'source' of knowing. The means were purely 'natural'. Even if such 'natural' reasoning led one to discover or know the Absolute, Divine assistance was not critical or necessary as an epistemological foundation for cognitive knowledge. With that stated, I will begin the discussion with Augustine.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷⁴ Augustine states, "I will lead you on the same path that I followed in making my escape. God will be with us, and he will make us understand what we have believed. For we are well aware that we are at the stage described by the prophet, who says, 'Unless you believe, you will not understand'". Cf. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio*, Book I, §2.

Aurelius Augustine

Illumination epistemological theories consist of knowledge by way of the divine, where ‘supernaturally’ the mind is aided in some fashion prior to either sensory experience or induction (empiricism), analytical or syllogistic inquiry (rationalism), or experientially embodied (tacit). Here I will present Augustine’s cognitive method for overcoming the skepticism of illusionary sensual, as a means of knowing prior to one’s sensual experience ultimately cooperating with an inner light of which the bodily sense knows nothing.¹⁷⁵ I will also offer cursory remarks that Rosmini affords this great thinker, tying those conclusions into my thesis.

Not immune to theories of sensual corruption, with illumination there is also a split in terms of whether the unfolding is ‘once for all’ in each subject as a delivered capacity (an ‘unloading’ or transfer of knowledge), or some ‘ready assistance’ that perpetuates as an ongoing relation of the subject to the divine. Though associated primarily with Christianity, it is by no means something exclusive.¹⁷⁶ Not unlike Kant who was reacting to Hume, Augustine was responsive to the skepticism he himself inherited *via* the Academy.¹⁷⁷ Historically separate by nearly sixteen centuries Kant shares with Augustine a noticeable bridge of philosophical reactions to both (1) the skepticism of their present day, and (2) relative to their own system an understanding of knowledge as innate in origin.

¹⁷⁵ It is worth briefly noting that this knowledge did not culminate in the modern ‘turn towards the subject’ even if there are presuppositions in place. I’m not suggesting any strict parallel, only that some ‘in’ the subject did not ultimately result in ‘subjective’.

¹⁷⁶ In popular opinion this illumination has often become associated primarily with the concept of grace (*χάρις*). From a Christian standpoint it is accepted that if the Absolute exists, grace as ‘life in and with the Absolute’ accompanies contingent creation. In this exposition I will not determine the form of *χάρις*, or for that matter the relation of nature and grace. I will leave it at the notion that if grace is held as the relational contingency of the subject and divinity, it is well noted to be a governing factor in the overall locus of the relational knowledge as purported in this study. In Chapter Three, I will introduce the created/uncreated, energy/Essence distinction.

¹⁷⁷ It is noteworthy that for each, this challenge became the springboard for their respective epistemology.

Augustine facetiously thought “the philosophers known as the Academics were wiser than the rest, because they held that everything was a matter of doubt and asserted that man can know nothing for certain,”¹⁷⁸ and on that note be certain of more than most. If not tempered this logically leads to skepticism, but it also can provide a safeguard against certain types of deception.¹⁷⁹ Augustine found himself up against these ancient Academics who were “sceptical thinkers focused on the problem of sensation. [They held that if] the senses are passive, and they need to be such in order to receive impressions from external objects, can they not be effected (sic) by external conditions in such a way that they do not register these objects as they truly are?”¹⁸⁰ There is a similarity confronting doubt and searching for some solution, where Augustine shares a semblance of turning towards the subject. With Descartes, the mind within the subject could “bring forth the idea of God as it were the storehouse of [his] mind,”¹⁸¹ and then within the subject preserve all error and *only* by virtue of this God, confirm certainty. In Augustine’s system, the ‘way out’ lay not in what may be doubted,¹⁸² but what can be established as providing the power of preserving thought. For Augustine the answer was found in the human person as a conscious being.

The Sceptic cannot coherently claim that the power of appearance is universal for some objective content [that] must condition any appearance and be present to any mind that beholds and judges it [i.e., that objective content must be present *a priori* to the sense perception and not reside in the universal appearance]. Thus having

¹⁷⁸ Augustine. *Confessions*, Book V, §10, p.104.

¹⁷⁹ In Augustine’s case, as this being his psychological persuasion it advantaged him by fostering his subsequent dissolution¹⁷⁹ with the influential gnostic-like Manichaeans.¹⁷⁹ I mention this knowing how such philosophical and ideological holds on the person affect subsequent thinking and rationale—to a certain degree, we are all historically regulated. Augustine slowly ferreted out the distinction between rhetorical skill and the often-baseless uniformed fictional accounts he encountered with the Manichaean bishop, Faustus of Mileve. He speaks of this in his *Confessions* Book V, §8 complaining, “The keen interest which I had in the Manichaean doctrines was checked by this experience, and my confidence in the other teachers of the sect was further diminished when I say that Faustus, of whom they spoke so much, was obviously unable to settle the numerous problems which troubled me.”

¹⁸⁰ Bernard Wills, “Ancient Skepticism and the *Contra Acedemicos* Of St. Augustine.” *Animus* 4 (1999), 108.

¹⁸¹ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*. Trans. Donald A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1998), IV, §67, p. 91.

¹⁸² Some will contest this, but in Descartes’ correspondence with Mersenne in 1637 (25 v.) he points out after having received some of Augustine’s writings that to him it seems St. Augustine is not linking ‘I think’ to ‘I exist’ in quite the same way of he himself both uses and intends the meaning to be held and applied.

shown the Sceptical position to be incapable of a coherent statement, Augustine can then proceed to a positive phenomenology of consciousness; that is, he can show what knowledge is inherent in the structure of any subjective experience and thus demonstrate that the Sceptical denial of knowledge is impossible and contradictory above all because we are inescapably knowers, if we exist as self-conscious beings at all. Thus, he demonstrates what any and every one of us must at any time know.¹⁸³

And what ‘one of us must at any time know’, is ‘known’ regardless of the impression from the external object.¹⁸⁴ One can witness here a canonizing of Platonic-like *ideas*.¹⁸⁵

It is worth noting that with Augustine it is not a matter of validating certainty of the knowing *in* and *through* for what later with Descartes became doubting the sensual, i.e., the soul is only a passive agent of the subject receiving the sensation (knowledge?). Rather “the obvious conclusion from what Augustine says in reference to sensation is that the soul is in no way subjected as matter to a bodily agency. Augustine is forced by his *a priori* principles—i.e., the Platonic philosophy adopting an ‘active’ theory of sensation.”^{186 187}

For Augustine within these necessary categories for human reasoning, knowledge is internal and found in that “illumination as something that is available to all rational minds, the atheistic

¹⁸³ Wills, 122-23.

¹⁸⁴ Both Augustine and Descartes provide no basis for the sensualism that ensues in contemporary understandings in both the fields of morality and knowledge.

¹⁸⁵ Though not as in Plato’s system of self-existent forms. Yet in either case, they nonetheless present themselves to the human person’s consciousness prior to sensation.

¹⁸⁶ Terry L Miethe, “Augustine’s Theory of Sense Knowledge.” *JETS* 22/3 (September 1979) 260-61.

¹⁸⁷ In his work *On Free Choice of the Will*, Augustine leans on analogy for explication, as is the case with many *a priori* metaphysicians. Utilizing mathematics to make his point, Augustine states that even if doubt and skepticism admittingly affect the senses, those un-sensed truths such as the belief that ‘three plus seven equals ten’ (this is the point Evodius makes—Augustine’s fictional interlocutor), is an incorruptible knowable truth in that it is not susceptible to bodily senses. Explaining himself further, Augustine points out that these numbers are *multiples* of ‘one’, as is the case also with all material objects which are never truly simple or ‘one’ in themselves. He says that because *one* “could not enumerate so many parts unless we had some knowledge of what *one* is... [and if no person] perceives *one* by the bodily sense, then [no person] perceives *any number* by that sense” (Augustine. *On Free Choice of the Will*. Trans. Thomas William (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), Book II, §8, p.4) so it must be intra-subjective. On the origins of such knowledge Augustine concludes that “where [each] did learn that this order extends to all of them ...[it is] seen by an inner light of which the bodily sense knows nothing” (Augustine. *On Free Choice of the Will*, Book II, §8, p.46).

mathematician as well as the pious farmer measuring a field.”¹⁸⁸ His cognitive method to overcome the skepticism of illusionary sensual knowledge was not a Cartesian ‘turn to the subject’ but the means was prior to the sensual experience “to help you see that you see.”¹⁸⁹

Rosmini’s system meshes nicely with aspects of Augustinian epistemology. Rosmini understands the *idea of being* as the foundation of knowledge, and as the ‘thinker knows that they think’ there is a clear demarcation between the intersubjectivity of the idea and the sensed existing object in the world. He is clear to state that “we cannot say, therefore, that our ideas, *per se*, invest fully and grasp the really existing object. But we believe that, by means of them, we invest the object and grasp it fully when we refer such ideas to really existing *entia* experienced by us.”¹⁹⁰ Though the idea and the actual thing are not identical, even in the process of overcoming skepticism of what is known of the actual thing, care must be taken or one would simply fall into the opposite error of infallibility. To conclude that the idea and the existence are perfectly grasped by way of the *idea of being* not only presents a danger of presenting infallible knowledge, but it may obliterate the subject into a passive extension, i.e., the perfect knowledge is indeed innate and within the subject, but it is not the subject’s grasp of the existing thing only a grasp of the existing thing within the subject.

What I have completed here is to explicate Augustine’s cognitive method for overcoming the skepticism of illusionary sensual knowledge. Further I illustrated how his ‘turn towards the subject’ shared a similar impetus with Descartes, yet diverged in the divine role of preservation to affirm illumination. Yet, his system of knowing retained the notion of coming to fruition prior to

¹⁸⁸ John M. Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized*. Cambridge (UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 77.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. *De Trinitate*, Book XI, §12.

¹⁹⁰ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas, Vol I*, 532.

sensual experience *via* a cooperation with *the* inner light. I then afforded the testimony of Rosmini to demonstrate the alterity of idea and existing object.¹⁹¹

Antonio Rosmini-Serbati

In this section I will elucidate the epistemic system of Antonio Rosmini. His thought will receive further treatment in Chapter III, but his grasp of illumination is rather unique comparative to Augustine's approach. Illuminative thought for Rosmini is not some 'constant interior steering' or 'impulses of reflection', but rather as an ever-present appurtenance residing as the origin of *idea*.

In this section I will demonstrate that (1) judgments based on predication do not speak to the origin of the abstraction. Then as an element of the particular, (2) the idea (universal) does not originate in sensation (externally) which will also lead to the conclusion that (3) the formation of a judgement is never brought to fruition *via* judgments, because the knowing and sensation happen prior.¹⁹² It will follow then that there (4) remains something that without which all of this cannot be thought—the last abstraction; the Rosminian *idea of being*. This being cannot be properly produced by the subject judging—a being unaware of causation? And finally, it will be asserted that the (5) convertibility of knowing and being is essentially and necessarily true.

Let's begin with a couple premises: (1) no judgment may be rendered void of some *idea*, any (2) predication is an idea separate and relational to the subject to which it refers. It matters not if one is to say, 'the book is open' or 'the sky is blue', had not the ideas of 'open' and 'blue' possessed the application of a universal idea prior to the predication. This is hardly contentious, but the judgment which leads to knowledge here is determined by these existing ideas or concepts

¹⁹¹ Thomas Aminius and Duns Scotus provide objections to Divine Illumination as an epistemological theory. I both present those, and resolve each in Appendix A.

¹⁹² An objection might be raised that there exists some *simultaneous* arrival of the idea, sensation, and judgment at the moment of perception. But even this does not speak of the origin of this innate idea.

and how they are presented to the mind.¹⁹³ Judgments are then formed from the placement of these predicates and subjects into some relational proposition. But neither these judgments or abstractions answer the ‘origin’ of the idea of ‘open’ or ‘blue’.

It is worth a paragraph to show Rosmini’s objection to both the traditional use of universals and the nominal denial that they only appear in particulars as each pertains to judgments. For instance, in disregarding universals, if one is to take all things unessential and isolate ‘it’ until nothing except that which represents ‘blue’ and ‘only blue’ remains, how would what be common to all ‘blue’ (the universal blue) remain identified from any particular instance of how the sky presently is ‘blue’ (the abstracted blue)? Or in other words, how does what is proper to the particular abstracted ‘blue’ in the sky remain meaningfully communicated when one says ‘the sky is blue’ in the sense that the universal ‘blue’ will retain meaning? Rosmini argues that traditionally the idea of ‘blue’ as the common quality (which all will recognize *as* blue) and the idea of particular qualities (which all will recognize *as this or that* blue) forms this composite. He sees an internal contradiction when affirming that the universal (which the mind *does not* have) has been ‘detected’ from the particular (which the mind sensed and so now *does* have). He responds that “in fact, if the idea did not contain these two elements, [one] could neither divide the idea as [one did], nor find the elements there, nor concentrate on one element rather than another.”¹⁹⁴ In other words, in one instance the claim is that (1) the universal is determined from the particular, and must be simply accepted that the universal is an element of the particular. Conversely, if the particular is a

¹⁹³ Typically, this is concerning a level of abstraction (Scotus and Aquinas) where the idea of ‘open’ is abstracted from the subject ‘book, and ‘blue’ from ‘sky’.

¹⁹⁴ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas, Vol I, 47.*

deduction *via* the senses, the claim must be held that (2) the particular cannot originate in the sensation.¹⁹⁵

Aquinas or Aristotle for instance hold that the particular instance is sensed but the universal is abstracted by the intellect. Rosmini holds that neither “abstracting universals from particulars (the acting intellect, *intellectus agens*) while intuiting them after abstracting them (possible intellect, *intellectus possibilis*) ...clearly explains the intrinsic difference between the operation of intellect and sensing”¹⁹⁶ of the already existing ideas observed. Rosmini concludes that “it is obviously impossible to explain the *formation* of all universal ideas through *judgments* by that account. One must suppose that some universal idea pre-exists all judgments in human beings enabling the judgment to form, and through those formed judgments, gradually to form all other ideas.¹⁹⁷ If the *it* doesn’t exist independent of the human mind nor is *it* abstracted from the sensed particular then Rosmini posits that there must be some primitive idea which *contains* the universal idea (*it*) for judgment prior. He refers to this conclusion as ‘the origin of thought’, the *idea of being*, or as he oft puts it, the Ideal being.

In Antonio Rosmini-Serbati’s system, this ‘knowing’ is tied to *being* in a similar way that ‘touching, feeling, and hearing’ is tied to sensation (a modification within the person).¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁵ To restate, when one identifies some common element from the observed particular *via* the senses, the particulars are assumed (sensed) from the common and what is sensed is thought to be an element of the common. To recognize the common from the particulars, it is assumed the common *is* an element of the particular. Rosmini finds the judgment is only fixed on the common characteristic which one is already seeking. Yet to those who accept the presence of universals (not as a separate existing reality but yet present in the particular), it would seem they avoided this inner contradiction. Rosmini still interprets this traditional method of abstraction as an unresolved difficulty.

¹⁹⁶ Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas, Vol I*, 198.

¹⁹⁷ Cf. Antonio Rosmini, *The Origin of Thought*, 6-7.

¹⁹⁸ Another illustration would be that a term (the concept of ‘blue’) is the private internal concept that stands opposed to the public external symbol (the word ‘blue’) and all of this is in degree a perfection or exemplar of the actual substance (what ‘blue’ is). This knowing and sensation presupposes a judgement, say of determining that the ‘sky is blue’ where the universality of blue can equally be applied to ‘blue suede shoes’. Both the idea of knowing and sensing ‘sky’ or ‘suede shoes’ and of ‘blue’ preexist prior to the judgment of linking the predicate with the subject, i.e., are always present with(in) the innate *idea of being*.

With its perfection tied to its subsistence, and accepting that both the idea¹⁹⁹ and the judgment stand apart (each clearly not being the other), the actual judgment forms only from a present idea from which nothing without that idea can be thought. The *idea of being* is original; it is the last abstraction and the origin of all thought. Here is how Rosmini's illustrates the 'last abstraction'...

Take the concrete idea of a particular person, Maurice. Now when [one] takes away from Maurice what is particular and individual to him, [one] is left with what is common to human beings. Next, by a second abstraction, remove the human elements such as reason and freedom, and now [one] has a more general idea, that of an animal. Abstracting animal qualities [one is] left with a body that has vegetable life without feeling. After this [one] takes away all physical organization and vegetable life, fixing the attention on what is common to minerals; [one's] idea is now that of something material. Finally [then] withdraw [one's] attention from what is proper to matter; [one's] idea is now of anything that exists. But during this process of abstraction, [one's] mind has dealt with something, and has never ceased thinking; it has always had the idea as an object of its action, although this idea has become consistently more universal until [the] mind arrived at the most universal of all ideas, the *idea of being*.²⁰⁰

Rosmini's point is clear. That at some depth of abstraction, there is an absolute floor and the abstraction terminated is this *idea of being*.

There no longer remains an object *beyond* upon which to fix the gaze of thought in its absence. If it were possible for even this foundation to vanish all thinking and therefore knowing would cease. Without *being*, there is *no-thing*. This *idea of being* is therefore necessary, and singularly so. It is simple, without either extension or the possibility of division. This conclusion to Rosmini's modality seems sound, so from this reasoning he then moves to the origin of this *idea*

¹⁹⁹ Kant states in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, "Virtue and wisdom in their perfect purity, are ideas. But the wise man of the Stoics is an ideal, that is to say, a human being existing only in thought, and in complete conformity with the idea of wisdom. As the idea proves a rule, so the ideal serves as an *archetype* for the perfect and complete determination of the copy." (cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1990), Ch. III, p. 319).

²⁰⁰ Rosmini, *The Origin of Thought*, 14.

of being which is worked out in variety of articles of address. Briefly stated his argument works through the possibilities of origin.

First, he considers the role of sensation and asks if something external could originate this *being*. Understanding a sensation as a modification which is itself not a cause but a response, and that a sensation is a production of a thing in another, an external thing sensed is impossible as an origin. Whether the perception here is sensitive (subjective) or intellective (extra-subjective), each is merely capable of analyzing the ‘blue’ of the ‘sky is blue’ where the knowledge of blue is made intellectually known by the sensitive judgment of the ‘sky is blue’. Rosmini’s point throughout this is simple; “it is difficult to separate sense-perception from intellective perception because, as reasoning beings, one habitually makes the second follow immediately on the first,”²⁰¹ thus linking each in a way that makes them indistinguishable. The idea of ‘blue’ then without the sensation remains an unknown entity and can only be ‘known’ through the primitive and prior innate *idea* and nothing external.

Secondly, quite confident that this *idea* does not originate externally, he asks if it is inaugurated with the recognition of one’s own existence. He refers to this as the *feeling of oneself* or what is typically considered the Lockean reflection (noticing one’s own mental processes). This by his reckoning is not dissimilar from external sensation in that it remains a sensation, a mere modification albeit an intellective one. Recognizing one’s own existence he thinks “comes about through an act by which [one] considers their own feeling as a *being* with the same impartiality

²⁰¹ Rosmini, *The Origin of Thought*, 17.

with which [one] would consider anything else.”²⁰² ²⁰³ He continues that neither external stimuli nor internal recognition is *the* sensation and cannot be *the* idea.

Recognizing an objection at this point, Rosmini postulates that this idea may be created at the *moment* of perceiving or sensing. This may move the idea’s origin to the person’s innate nature, but how still is *it* produced? What is the origin? If one is to hold such a position, he concludes that the two choices would be that it is either (1) an actual property of the soul and determined by some physical law, or the process emanates from (2) an ‘outside’ being whether that be a god, God, or some unrecognizable power supranatural to the individual. Though his demonstrations against this proposal in his articles are nuanced and thorough, it is enough to offer here that they distill down to asking how it is an individual person would not be aware of such a causation. Even if it be natural to the person, would not one sense the ‘change’ as there must be present some reaction to the natural idea as there is in all external sensations? If the individual person (subject) senses the *idea of being* (object), can the mind see what it produces? What produced the object initially? Rosmini explains that it is precisely the *idea of being* which must necessarily preexist, because “the subject cannot produce it of itself. A subject if particular, contingent and real, like all bodies and sensation deriving from them; the *idea of being* is universal, necessary and possible. In a word, they are opposites: a subject is *subject*, the idea is *object*.”²⁰⁴

He begins to propose that this *idea* is both innate, and beyond the powers of any finite being, i.e., it cannot originate exteriorly or be a production of the very being wherein it is found. If that is true, it follows that this idea is always present, from the moment of existence of the human

²⁰² Rosmini, *The Origin of Thought*, 27.

²⁰³ Simple enough; this internal sensation, in that it shares as an attribute with the external sensations an object outside the *idea of being* (‘blue’ or ‘self’), is a consideration of the perceived world that can easily confuse the actual *idea of being* with the feeling that simply constitutes that perception *via* sensation.

²⁰⁴ Rosmini, *The Origin of Thought*, 37.

person, regardless of whether or not one is continually aware of its presence. It need not be sensed, but does not originate at some point after existence, though admittedly it is difficult to be aware of its continual presence. Rosmini attributes that dearth of awareness of presence to either an insufficient focus on what ‘happens’ interiorly when the idea is met with a stimulus, or it could be simply that it is not easy to discover this innate idea by abstraction. Most individuals seek the origin of Ideal being in the ideas they already have (bodies), which is by its nature a deceptive process of abstraction. In short, it is no easy task to isolate the innate idea from the varied sensations presented to it, external or intellective. Through either the abandonment of the arduous process of abstraction, or to terminate the discovery because of dullness of mind where an ‘accident’ or ‘mode of being’ is falsely accepted as the terminal entity, the innate *idea of being* is left unrealized.

The foundational framework adopted by Rosmini is unique in its approach, but certainly what is *the* determinative factor is the veracity of the presuppositional claim and the claim’s apprehension to the overall internal consistency. With Rosmini if the *being* is the groundwork wherein all else originates from or is added to, then his last abstraction of the *idea of being* (Ideal being) is no less primitive and epistemologically *the* originating factor. Rosmini’s *origin* brings one closest to the very *being* for which upon all knowledge rests, and the conjoining of being and knowing seems not simply obvious, but essential in that it precedes judgment, free from skepticism and deception.²⁰⁵

²⁰⁵ The object of my presentation here on Rosmini was to demonstrate the lucidity of his *idea of being* as the sole origin of thought. As for the realization of *a posteriori* reasoning, as he follows Kant’s aspects of form (sourced in the mind) and matter (sensed world). The variance is in Rosmini substituting the *idea of being* for the former which is held as innate but not ‘of the mind’. The judgment is rendered only when the indeterminate idea is brought to bear on the sensation via a process of ‘intellective perception’. The form is not in the particular, but rather in the original idea.

I have demonstrated that (1) any universal abstraction is not founded on predicated judgments. I also showed that in as much as (2) the particular contains an element of the idea, the idea that originates innately and not externally. Then terminated in the formation of a reasoning (3) the knowing and sensation are prior to any judgments.²⁰⁶ It then can only be (4) the last abstraction, or for Rosmini the *idea of being* that is both the necessary means and foundation of knowing based on the (5) convertibility of knowing and being.

²⁰⁶ Even the notion of a simultaneous idea, sensation, and judgment never properly addresses any origin of this innate idea

III. Being and knowing

To love, or not to be, that is the question.

~what Hamlet should have said.

The objective of this section is to confirm *being* and *knowing* as convertible ideas understood as interchangeability in the presence of a real distinction.²⁰⁷ It is an important premise which will be coupled with the convertibility of *being* and *love*. As intertwined ideas there can be no being which is not one, and that which both *is* and *is one* has *being* necessarily (consequentially then one).²⁰⁸ This '*being and knowing*' I will add to the inventory of the couplings 'being and oneness' and 'being and truth'. The latter is not simply the transcendental idea of truth as convertible with being, but exists within the epistemological category of knowing that encompasses truth as one elemental factor.²⁰⁹ In this section I will (1) state my concept of the 'being-knower while (2) relating it to an active harmony as it relates to my thesis of personogenesis and solidarity. To support my theory, I will briefly (3) deal with Parmenides' concept of being, along with (4) promoting Heidegger's use of Parmenides. Finally, in this section on 'being and knowing'²¹⁰ I will (5) repurpose the concept of Dasein, and end with a (6) treatment of Scotus' notion of *haecceitas* as it lends credence to the notion of the metaphysics I propose.

²⁰⁷ For instance, if one is to hold the convertibility of being and oneness (*ens et unum convertuntur*), it is accepted that where there is being there is also oneness, though the latter is the term which signifies the undividedness of that which *is* being. Within this comparison, oneness is not strictly predicated nor identical to being (hence the distinction).

²⁰⁸ Another example of the composite present in this concept of convertibility is being and truth, which has since Medieval times been found to follow each other as essential predicates of shared properties. In brief then, convertibility is to posit that where two ideas are fundamentally conjoined, though distinctly remain inseparable are mutually inalterable, and therefore convertible. For all intents and purposes, being and knowing are indivisible where neither is an accidental property of the other.

²⁰⁹ To mark that I will reverse the order speaking of the prior foundational *being* as sequentially primary in order to knowing.

²¹⁰ One of the final goals of this dissertation is to connect Rosmini's *idea of being* with love as manifested in (1) the advent of personhood and (2) realization of the other.

Active harmonization

Here as I establish the inseparability of being and knowing (knower) as the being-knower, I will present (1) the notion of active harmonization representing a structure that encompasses (a) the essence of each being-knower (primary individuation) in (b) a firm modality with all created existence (differentiated solidarity). This will illustrate that from (2) the onset to full realization, originality of being is both retained and (3) revealed in the mystery of the last abstraction.

Being in the ‘actual’ is not the ‘thing’ observed in the act, nor can it be leveled to the actual existence of a thing.²¹¹ Being is an ‘existing subject’ but not simply a subject which exists. Being is a ‘participatory subject’ but not simply a subject that participates. If this *noetic* grounding or self-awareness of essence(s) of humanity where such as a harmonization with others in existence, being would offer some sequence that can be measured (a literal unfolding rather than so only from the perspective of observation). Or perhaps the *personagenesis*²¹² would be identified equally with that which followed sequentially as ‘a *being-knower* from existence to harmonization’. In this case, “*noesis* cannot do more than lift into the light of consciousness the material structure of relation contained in the reality of the knowledge of harmonization. Where there is no active harmonization, there can be no rational consciousness that could be differentiated”²¹³ from the real existence of primary being to participatory being.

There is an individuation in this being yet each characteristic of being remains original. In terms of an Aristotelean ‘mover’ the primal being-knower is the full-stop and all else *processes*

²¹¹ So as not to be reduced to an ontological flattening as ‘this thing in act’. In humanity, being is the ‘knowing subject’ but not simply a subject which knows.

²¹² I will explicate this onset of personhood fuller in Section V.4.i.

²¹³ Eric Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, Trans. and ed. Gerhart Niemeyer (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978), 187.

from that which it is like; for each “comes into being out of something synonymous”²¹⁴ or colloquially put for the *noetic*, participatory and existence are primaries originating from that which they are named alike—they share being with the last abstraction. Each instance of this being loses nothing of its originality as it forms the whole of being. In and for all characteristics, any harmonization “in being...is not a partial involvement of man (sic); he is engaged with the whole of his existence, for [harmonization] is existence itself.”²¹⁵ This, or these instances of being equate in similarity to Voegelin’s ‘noetic exegesis’ where the realities of each retain form and individuality prior to consciousness of their function, i.e., harmonization retains authenticity prior to being aware of its own character, as does existence. The knowing-as-knower (self-awareness if one can use such a term analogously here in the sense of ‘knowing that one knows’) coincides with their subsidiary relation and real existence.

Each of the latter elements (knowing, existing, and harmonization) are constitutive of this being-knower in terms of appearing (as revealed) in the last abstraction—the *idea* of an idea. This being is not “an objective property of cognitive entities but a mystery in which [all] are immersed as [each] finitely enacts it. It is not something [to] take hold of by an act of propositional assent but a life that longs for and gives to [each] in the tensional experience of a seeking and being drawn”²¹⁶ to the other.²¹⁷

In this section I presented (1) an encompassing structure that formulates the notion of active harmonization. The resultant factor then is that (a) the essence of each being-knower retains

²¹⁴ Cf. Aristotle. *Metaphysics* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. II, Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton (NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), Book VII, 1070a4-5, p.1690.

²¹⁵ Eugene Webb, *Philosophers of Consciousness: Polanyi, Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard, Kierkegaard* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1988), 97.

²¹⁶ Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, 107.

²¹⁷ There is every bit of Marcel’s notion of mystery (embedded with) rather than problem (in front of) surfacing here; that which is not separate from the very fusion of existing and harmonization ‘in and with’ the being-knower is found whole in the last abstraction.

individuation while existing in and with (b) a modality of differentiated solidarity *with* (relational to all created existence). Finally, (2) originality of being is both retained from the onset to full realization terminating in a (3) mystery revealed as the last abstraction.

Being and Parmenides' *Way of Truth*

Utilizing Parmenides' *Way of Truth*, I will establish that (1) the observation of *being* is akin to a co-embeddedness that presents as impossible 'not to be'. And for Parmenides, that which (2) 'It is' *is* being, and that which 'It is not' *is* an impossible reduction. The colloquial term to resolve this notion is the qualifier 'real' as in 'real being', where this (3) *real being* is all that one can know.

There is nothing of this last abstraction to 'observe' externally,²¹⁸ where the knower does not know it knows as something 'outside'. Nor can or does being and knowing present themselves as components to be observed apart from that by which each is moved-with (cascaded-within). What one is involved 'in and with' cannot be solved by observation and analysis as it has risen above any scrutiny which can terminate in examination. *Being* is the common property and remains firmly in mystery (co-embeddedness),²¹⁹ therefore this being as mystery is universal in that 'being' is 'all' things, and 'all in things'. In the poem *Way of Truth*, Parmenides of Elea offers the reliance of such thought as it relates to truth and knowing; It reads...

Come now, I will tell thee - and do thou hearken to my saying and carry it away - the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely, that *It is*, and that it is

²¹⁸ That is not to say that such a historical expression though not concrete and static, as the subject is always in interpretation of an objective past continually in the present experience which can be rendered deductively. An objective historical analysis or thought and being is discovered, and often rediscovered and even corrected in its subsequent interpretations. Kierkegaard said that "although the world-historical is something past, as material for cognitive observation it is incomplete." In that way, knowledge is always of the past and comes to the being as a preview to the condition of what can be associated with what *is* as a rectifying discover. Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscripts to Philosophical Fragments*, Vol I. Eds. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 150.

²¹⁹ In *Hamlet*, the Shakespearean line 'to be or not to be' is not the 'question' in an ontological sense because the latter is non-comprehensible as a non-being which cannot *be* something that's *not*.

impossible for anything not to be, is the way of conviction, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that *It is not*, and that something must needs not be, - that, I tell thee, is a wholly untrustworthy path. For you cannot know what is not - that is impossible - nor utter it.²²⁰

To even say being is 'in' all things is problematic and a reduction of mystery, for how might something be *in* that which it *is*?

To state this plainly, in contemporary discussion sometimes the qualifier *real* is attached to the term *being* to form *real being*; though that can be problematic. Any clarity of a term such (as *real*) resides in the receiver alone. Here *real being* must not simply be heard as 'existing' but more akin to 'exemplar'.²²¹ This becomes clear in the *Way of Truth* as he exposts *being* joined to *knowing* stating firmly that each "is the same thing that can be thought and that can be."²²² In short, one does not 'think' of non-being or no-thing, but only of 'to be' (*einai*).

Utilizing the short verse from Parmenides' *Way of Truth*, I established both that (1) the being as co-embeddedness leaves any notion of 'not to be' an epistemic impossibility. This results in the two-fold conclusion that (2) there is an impossible reduction resultant as 'It is not' and (3) the 'It is' *is* being (real being) remains the only possible knower that can be known.

Martin Heidegger on Parmenides²²³

In this section I begin by (1) identifying the reduction of being understood wherein Heidegger raised the notion that there can be an absence of being which surfaces as a non-reality. Then (2) this formed *idea of being*²²⁴ in allowing being to be present in the widest sense permits this

²²⁰ Parmenides, "Poem of Parmenides," Fragments II.

²²¹ That aside, Parmenides goes farther in terms of this *being*, in relation to truth as knowing. He sought out to elucidate the concept of the mutual correspondence of both being and truth-knowing.

²²² Parmenides, "Poem of Parmenides," Fragments III.

²²³ Martin Heidegger leaned on Parmenides' thesis of the inseparability of thought and being.

²²⁴ This is not the Rosminian *idea of being*, but rather the idea which is *being*.

‘presence’ (or absence) as (3) an event that can lead to (3a) a pre-metaphysical thinking where the once-thought self-contained real being ‘there’²²⁵ in the event (3b) finds meaning in the Da-sein as ‘being-the-there’.

The Parmenidean insight of the *einai* does not confidently terminate as to what being *is* expressed as the ideal being, i.e., what precisely *is* the ‘to be’ as the *idea of being*? One can assign attributes to this *being* such as immutability and simpleness, which are elements contained in and with the ideal being. And though this *ideal being* is not the Platonic ‘other’ existing reality where this being resides distinct but together in terms of an infinite oneness,²²⁶ it can and often easily does, to borrow a Heideggerian notion, lead to a pre-metaphysical thinking.

Many have claimed with Heidegger that one enters an ontological juggling act as he oscillates through affirmation and nihilation related to being. Others with equal veracity claim he facilitates the return to the ontological inquiry of Being overall as both a seminal and positive oversaturation bestowal of meaningful insight.^{227 228} Heidegger asserts that in the absence of being (as *esse*), there is non-reality where no-thing *is*. It is this nothingness for Heidegger²²⁹ that *being* becomes salvaged as an ontological distinction contra the *something* which cannot be *nothing*. In what schema could a thing’s *esse* form the ‘what’ rather than having derived from the grounding

²²⁵ Read ‘there’ as *Da*.

²²⁶ Aristotle argues against Parmenides concept of being as to the potentiality of *one* or the actuality of *one*. He sees Parmenides’ view as vague and along with Melissus concept of being finds their arguments used to prove not entirely difficult to expose. Cf. Physics, 185b 26-186a10.

²²⁷ Martin Heidegger uses the term ‘Being’ to mean *Sein*, and one often represents it with a capital ‘B’ to distinguish it from ‘being’ which in turn is often intended to represent ‘entities’. This Being is not the Absolute for Heidegger,

²²⁸ But that debate does not bear on the point here, where the advantage to latching on to the useful parts of each philosophical contributions can be employed to forward my central thesis, i.e., I make no defense to using what I deem will work provided I have not un-created the concept in the process.

²²⁹ Where in dialogue with Jean-Paul Sartre’s reversal of the *cogito* (where ‘existence precedes the essence’ of what *is being*).

of the ‘to be’ being in itself?²³⁰ Parmenides’ thesis presents itself as indispensable in the agreement for the human person that “thought is identical with its being, for there is nothing beside being...since in this [one finds] an advance into the region of the ideal as observable.”²³¹

It must be noted that in a mortal state to the individual’s senses *being* is ‘there’ and can be ‘not there’ at any given moment.²³² Being in this sense appears to be relative to the viewing (and sensing) mortal person. But therein “lies Parmenides’ fundamental discovery. For the pure and simple apprehending of intelligibility as such that inherently belongs to all specific acts of awareness—perceiving, imagining, remembering, or anticipating something—*there is only presence* in the widest possible sense.”²³³ If this being is intelligible as a meaningful event, then accordingly the nothing of an event is contrary to that intelligibility.

Then it follows that the ‘to be’ as *being* is that ‘which is’ present, and not that ‘which is not’ present, but differs from an ‘event’ in terms of the latter sharing the similarity to a platform upon which this reality as the presence occurs. In Heideggerian terms as “metaphysics thinks of presence as an absolutely self-contained and self-sufficient *state*, an *event* entails a difference between the open place or scene in which meaningfulness takes place—the *Da*, the ‘there,’ of *Dasein* as ‘being-there’.”²³⁴ It is *in* this *Dasein*²³⁵ that a fundamental description of ‘to be’ arises. I will treat the unfolding of the discover of this *Dasein* next.

²³⁰ One should notice a departure here from the Aristotelean grasp of being as *ousia* which aligns with ‘being’ in general, i.e., ‘this’ thing of ‘that’ thing. Nonetheless with Heidegger, in this regard he finds Parmenides as the proto-philosopher.

²³¹ Jussi Backman, “Unity in Crisis: Protometaphysical and Postmetaphysical Decisions” in *Politics of the One: Concepts of the One and the Many in Contemporary Thought*, Ed. Artemy Magun (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 94.

²³² Consider that the sky may be blue, but blue cannot be predicated of the sky at all particular instances.

²³³ Backman, 100.

²³⁴ Backman, 107.

²³⁵ For Heidegger, this *Dasein* is the ‘mode’ of Being in the world as encompassed from the human perspective.

Proposed in this section was Heidegger's notion (1) that there can be an absence of being which surfaces as a non-reality. Following the thought of Parmenides' thesis of the inseparability of thought and being, I moved to state that (2) the formed *idea of being* allows being to be present whereas (3) an event both 'present' or 'absent' will lead to (3a) self-contained real being (pre-metaphysical thinking) as the event finally (3b) discovers the Da-sein as being-the-there.

The 'who' of Dasein

To address the unfolding discovery of this Dasein I will show that (1) there is never an aloneness in the world, as that would constitute an annihilation of Dasein. That notion was part of (a) Heidegger's project to overcome the enclosed Aristotelian metaphysics where one's being is dissected to be known and intended to move the (b) view of Being to an unfolding event of discovery.

There's something in the structure of the human person as *Dasein* that is discovered existentially (a being with)—only to be uncovered as a 'who' opposed to a 'what'—where the person is otherwise contrived to the level of a 'thing'. This notion extends to both 'self' and 'others' in or out of the presence of another being. The Being-alone which carries this 'objectify being' if it becomes the gaze of inspection (asking what is this being?) and thereby remains deficient as becoming the being-thing examined. For "only so far as one's own Dasein has the essential structure of Being-with, is it Dasein—with and encounterable for Others."²³⁶ This Being-with is Being, always present, not simply ontologically 'there' among others.

By distinction contrast how the "Aristotelian substance ontology ushered in the 'metaphysics of presence that Heidegger sought to move beyond.... [for whom] Dasein has no

²³⁶ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1963), Part I, Ch. 4, §120, p. 157.

fixed *essence*,²³⁷ or no particular ‘what’ that it essentially is. Dasein is a *project*, it *has* its being ‘to be’ and is always a ‘who’²³⁸ and never the static ‘it’. In this schema any metaphysical²³⁹ exercise would otherwise tend to forget Being is the springboard of study and with which the presumption of essence cannot be dissected from the reality of being’s existence. That which exists *is*; in *the* essence that is discovered and therefore is the ‘to be’.

The Being is the structure behind and within this all; it presents itself as unconcealed. As a ‘revealed’ this issuing forth from ‘being to being’ as the existence of Being also assumes the role of disclosure (a self-disclosure) that understood in that way is a *becoming*.²⁴⁰ No Being is separate and “the Being of the ‘there’ receives its constitution through understanding and through the character of understanding as projection only because it is what it becomes (or alternatively, does not become), can it say to itself ‘Become what you are’²⁴¹ as a discloser of *being* realizing itself in existence.

This section affirmed that with Being as Dasein (1) there is never an aloneness in the world, as that was part of (a) Heidegger’s project to overcome the enclosed Aristotelian metaphysics where one’s being is dissected to be known. I then shared a (b) view of Being as an unfolding discoverable event. This should clearly have demarcated itself from Sartre’s proposal of being as ‘existence prior to essence’ but firmly direct one’s thought contrarily to ‘existence in essence’. But existence of ‘to be’ is not plural, even if relational and interdependent. Not resolved though is how

²³⁷ There is much which can be said on this concerning to whether or not for Heidegger existence truly precedes essence, as would Sartre’s claim of Heidegger. Even if Heidegger posited that essence is found in existence, it doesn’t necessitate that formulation.

²³⁸ Philip Tonner, “*Haecceitas* and the Question of Being: Heidegger and Duns Scotus,” *Kritike*, Vol. Two, No. 2 (December 2008), 150.

²³⁹ As an ontological grounding.

²⁴⁰ And then without contradiction it may be stated as an ‘essence in existence’ provided all the former parameters are maintained.

²⁴¹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Part I, Ch. 5, §145-46, p, 186.

‘this being’ is individuated from ‘that being’ so that one can confidently address as an entity ‘this being’ or ‘that being’ without isolation or objectification of being.

On individuation—Scotus’ *haecceitas*

In this brief section I will follow (1) Heidegger’s return to Scotus as a means to overcome the lacuna in Aristotle’s notion of individuation.²⁴² Using the Scotist (2) notion of *haecceity* I can move beyond some common element that resides ‘after being’ affirming ‘this person’ or ‘that person’ as (a) universally connected (formally) but (b) separate (really identical). This will allow me, as it did Scotus, (2) to retain and remain with what was proper to each Being (thisness), without it subtracting from the unity of the formal whole thus preserving solidarity.

Aristotle’s metaphysics offered a presence of essence which left the universality of all ‘mankind’ intact, but the notion of ‘this person’ as being-shared for Aristotle falls into one of the ‘other’ nine categories and those individuations remains ‘outside’ the being of ‘this or that’ person.²⁴³ What Heidegger recognized in Aristotle’s lacuna was satisfied by his own concept of Dasein. But for Duns Scotus²⁴⁴ the argument of ‘this person’ was encapsulated by the principle of *haecceitas*; the impetus from which Heidegger began his investigation.

This term *haecceity* of Scotus’ (*thisness*) differentiates this being from that being while preserving the unity and contains Aristotelian categories as something not added but present *in* being (an Aristotelian transcendental). Though *haecceity* is not without its own ambiguities as something expressed as *this* and not *that* held together and made distinct by the mysterious *this*, it

²⁴² Here I am referring to the concept of *ousia* about which Aristotle situated the concept of being.

²⁴³ There are dozens of varietal ways to appropriate the individuality of being, and countless versions within those demarcated premises.

²⁴⁴ From which Heidegger’s concept sprung.

nonetheless moves beyond the Aristotelean and Thomistic²⁴⁵ individuating elements of matter and substantial matter respectively. For Heidegger and Scotus, being is both ‘more containing’ and importantly, a univocal *thisness*.

Though I am not using univocal in quite the same way William Desmond did speaking of the first of his fourfold senses of being, there remains a way in which “the univocal sense is inseparable from the mindfulness of sound *common sense*.”²⁴⁶ It is conventional in its application, and there appears something intuitive of Scotus’ formal distinctions which are proper to the identity of a thing’s nature, to individuate one of a like-kind from another of a like-kind. By this schema two individuals will possess *being* as what actually is “two really identical but formally distinct “essential aspects”: namely, its kind (human) and its individuating ‘*haecceity*.’ Any particular thing’s *haecceity* is unique to it as there can be many”²⁴⁷ of any particular kind but no more than a single instance of a person. The strength of this concept is that this *Being* preserves unity and can formally be expressed as one without each (the kind or *haecceity*) shedding that which is proper to individuation. This is where Heidegger’s *Dasein* found its origination.

Here I have shown how Scotus provided the means to overcome Aristotle’s wanting notion of individuation by the (2) notion of *haecceity*²⁴⁸ where both ‘this person’ or ‘that person’ is affirmed (a) in a formal relation while retaining (b) a real distinct identity. The resultant factor was

²⁴⁵ Which interestingly enough, when Aquinas was to speak of the individuation of immaterial persons such as Angelic beings, they by necessity were held as individual species each with their own form.

²⁴⁶ William Desmond, *Being and Between* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1995), 48.

²⁴⁷ Tonner, 153.

²⁴⁸ Heidegger said of Scotus that “his striking individuality as a thinker characterizes him in general as having unmistakably modern traits. He has a more extensive and accurate nearness (*Haeceitas*) to real life, to its manifoldness and possible tensions than the scholastics before him . . . he knows how to turn . . . from the fullness of life to the abstract world of mathematics” (Cf. Heidegger’s *Duns Scotus’ Theory of the Categories and of Meaning*, trans. H. Robbins (Chicago, IL: De Paul University Press, 1978), 15.

then (2) to be able to retain what is proper to each Being (thisness) while not voiding the unity from the whole.

Transcendental knowing and ontological truth

I will start off this section by (1) presenting the being-knower as an ‘un-concealer’ of both world and self. Then, as there is no knowledge ‘outside’ this existent being, each being-knower is not simply an unconcealedness of truth, but rather (2) the liturgical reality as the truth of being which is brought to consciousness. This (3) re-collecting (*anamnesis*) becomes a grounding from ‘being-divine’ to ‘being-world’, and creates the space for the revealing of being and knowing as inseparable.

Knowledge—not just of, but in and from this being—recoils from the unconcealment of being to itself. It resides in this *ideal being* as in front of the sensual world as prior. Put into a Heideggerian expression this being as ‘knowing subject’ is not as “externally ascertainable as, say, bodily properties are, [but] inasmuch as knowing belongs to these entities and is not some external characteristic, it must be ‘inside’...[where] this knowing subject comes out of its inner ‘sphere’ into one which is ‘other and external.’”²⁴⁹ Therefore this Being is in the world as a ‘knower’ where some measuring intellect is present to ascertain this ‘knower’ who knows, i.e., the un-concealed being-knower.

Knowledge then has no relation outside of *being* and each being has no existence outside of another *Being* in the world. Every *being* that is determined to know, or to be known, must arrive at this knowing ‘outside’ of the knowing self-being—the appurtenance. If “it seems evident that therewith nothing is added to the existent, [then] every existent must *be* ‘in truth’ and it must ‘in

²⁴⁹ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Part I, Ch. 2, §60, p. 87.

truth' be *that* which it is.”²⁵⁰ This is transcendent knowing and forming an ontological truth (*alētheia*) terminates in the claim; ‘I am a revealed existent known being’.

Act of knowing and being

I first will propose (1) the being-knower as an ‘un-concealer’ of both world and self, intending to connect to the idea that there is no knowledge ‘outside’ this existent being. Then in this un-concealing there is a truth which manifests a (2) liturgical reality where both truth of being are brought to consciousness. This is (3) *anamnesis* which grounds each ‘being-divine’ to ‘being-world’ and inevitably reveals the inseparability of being and knowing.

With Voegelin’s *in truth* there is that self-interpretation of existence as something occurring within being. Aroused by some discomfort²⁵¹ one attunes to the direction of knowing based on like natures. i.e., the latching onto clues that reveal it as a kind or a *this*.²⁵² This is the return to what Voegelin refers to as the ‘ground’—that foundational and immutable structure of being’s consciousness. It is the absolute evidence (as *alētheia*) which by its nature results in the tacit flow of knowing from the apparent to the evident.²⁵³

This recollection is an *anamnesis* of past experiences and interpreted *being*. Perhaps it is useful in presenting the knowing process as “an indwelling: that is, a utilization of a framework for unfolding [one’s] understanding in accordance with the indications and standards imposed by

²⁵⁰ Edith Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, in *The Collected Works of Edith Stein*, IX (Washington, DC: ICS Publications, 2002), Part IV, §10, p.295.

²⁵¹ Even when the project of knowledge itself is not on track and the object of the known appears vague or illusive.

²⁵² For example, as intuited signals arouse being and the ‘in truth’ becomes a ‘lived truth’ or the uncovered (*alētheia*).

²⁵³ This of course is not the Platonic-like recollection brought about not as a re-occurrence, but a revealing what is known; the unconscious to the conscious.

the framework”²⁵⁴ of this being in relation. The *alētheia* becomes a fused reality—the ground of being. This knowing (*noetic*) as desire “is the movement toward the ground that is being moved by the ground. In this movement the divine ground of being is illuminated as the ground of man and world.”²⁵⁵ This grounding of ‘being and knowing’ is forged in the unity akin to the distinction between the ‘is’ and the ‘is not’. Aristotle²⁵⁶ spoke of “claiming that besides the existent, nothing non-existent exists, thinking that the existent is of necessity one and that nothing else exists.”²⁵⁷ The *existent* for Parmenides (as in Voegelin) *is* and *knows*, where the *act of knowing* becomes (unveiled) and is the *being* doing the act.

The point here is to affirm (1) the being-knower as an ‘un-concealer’ of both world and self. There is no knowledge ‘outside’ this existent being (unconcealedness of truth) yet it manifests as a (2) liturgical reality where both truth of being are brought to consciousness. Then (3) *anamnesis* is where each ‘being-divine’ grounds to ‘being-world’ revealing the inseparability of being and knowing.

The convertibility of being and knowing

To claim inseparability doesn’t lead necessarily to convertibility. So, in this section I will present (1) the notion that being (be-ing)²⁵⁸ cannot, not be known (there is no non-be-ing). Then from that,

²⁵⁴ Michael Polanyi, *Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi*,” Ed. Marjorie Grene (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1969),134.

²⁵⁵ Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, 183.

²⁵⁶ Who recognized in those ancients, at least from his perspective, as those who thought of the universe as a single entity (Parmenides chief among them).

²⁵⁷ Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, Book I, 986b27-29, p. 1560.

²⁵⁸ I am using Edith Stein’s written terminology here. She uses Absolute Being as ‘pure act’, being as signifies more than can enter into its knowledge (something of the infinite), and ‘be-ing’ as the knowing person whom knows themselves.

this discovery is an exclamatory *Is* where the conversion of being and knowing are confidently affirmed, where then there is both (a) a re-collecting and re-unveiling.²⁵⁹

Utilizing a Voegelin²⁶⁰ conceptual framework in order to overcome this ‘study of being’ (*ousia*), which in reality cannot be studied without the reduction to a ‘what’ (the resistance of objectification), I will explain that (2) the *Is* must retain the double meaning of *aletheia* as reality and truth. Then by overcoming Aristotle’s mitigated use of *aletheia* (as mental acts) where both being and reality reside together as a panentheistic expression, I will offer as a conclusion that it is from that (3) eternal sphere where any void of *Is* finds satisfaction.

I will also then (4) address any Heideggerian concern of the Absolute swallowing Being as being, and the limits of that transcendence he thought would encapsulate the Eternal; collapsing Being—temporal, with being—transcendental. As an aside, (5) I will discount Marion’s attempt to avert idolatry by removing the Absolute from the category of being. And finally, to hold onto part of Heidegger’s project, (6) I will repurpose Dasein (as there is no no-being).²⁶¹

Then whatever Heidegger found attractive in Parmenides’ didactic poem, in similar fashion Voegelin too ferrets out in that Pre-Socratic conclusion that not only are knowing and being inseparable, but there is no being that doesn’t think so indeed the thinking is an identical process with the thinking being’—this is being’s vision (be-ing). Though Parmenides had perceived of this *nous* (knowing the real) more as a visionary attribute of being and reserved “the name *logos*”²⁶² to the faculty of analyzing the content of the vision, he concentrated the preanalytical content of his

²⁵⁹ I intend to revisit this notion of ‘convertibility of being and knowing’ in Section IV.f.ii when I address the ‘convertibility of loving and being’. In the connection I am making between Rosmini’s *idea of being* as a necessary epistemological appurtenance for foundational thought, readdressing this will reinforce the traversing of ‘knowing’ to ‘loving’ in terms of that *idea of being*.

²⁶⁰ I will address the import of Voegelin immediately following this section’s introduction.

²⁶¹ I will take seriously Heidegger’s concerns for the conflation of Being with the Absolute, which I will address in the following section.

²⁶² For Voegelin, the term *logos* becomes the structure of thought’ a realization of the *nous*.

vision in the nonpropositional exclamation *Is!* The experience was so intense that it tended toward the identification of *nous* and being”²⁶³ where each was more central to the being than the *logos* was to itself. In some regard here is a return, literally, to Voegelin’s *anamnesis*. This is not the repositioning of an event, whether conscious or otherwise. The knowing exclamation of the *Is* and ‘to be’ are not simply concurrent, but converted. Then in and with this *anamnesis*²⁶⁴ there is some structure of the ‘real’ which is in fact a recovery of truth—the known being as *Is*.

Voegelin—*anamnesis* and *aletheia*

Aletheia is the knowing as “truth; that which is ‘unhidden’ or ‘uncovered.’ For Voegelin, [the *aletheia* is] especially a ‘lived’ truth, an existential truth, the experienced manifestness of ‘existential consciousness’ [which presents itself as] equivalent to *episteme*.”²⁶⁵ Here the connection between truth and knowing is fused. United to *aletheia* as the ‘one true reality’ *anamnesis* is the vestige which brings the being into consciousness—the import of *idea of being* as and with be-ing.

The search for *being* concurs at the point of determining what a thing *is* and again the consideration is what it means *to be*.²⁶⁶ Difficulties arise in that this *ousia* most certainly becomes

²⁶³ Eric Voegelin, *Order and History*, I:I in *Anamnesis*, 93.

²⁶⁴ And this *anamnesis* is the bringing into consciousness of the being-in-the-world; a re-presenting of the ‘knowing being’ (be-ing) where “in the rapture of the vision the knower and the known would fuse into the one true reality (*aletheia*), only to be separated again when the *logos* becomes active in exploring the experience and in finding the suitable language symbols for its expression” (Voegelin, *Order and History*, 93) in that which is created; the infinite surging in the finite. What may appear as a conflation of terms, *anamnesis* and *aletheia*, or truth (re-collected) and knowing (re-unveiled), rather become proper modalities of the field of being itself. They present themselves as tensions of singular oneness and are ordered to the mystery of origins—what will come to be realized in my project as *personagenesis*.

²⁶⁵ Webb, Eugene. *Eric Voegelin: Philosopher of History*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2015), 277.

²⁶⁶ Plato’s forms preserved the universal while denying the authenticity of the particular. Aristotle preserved the universal yet faltered with individuation where there was no ‘substantial’ matter, i.e., what of an immaterial being? In the attempt to preserve the primary being over and against any of the other modalities, *being* was necessarily equated with substance. He stated plainly that to ask, “what is being, is just the question, what is substance [*ousia*]?” (Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, Book VII, 1027b4-5, p. 1624).

the object studied. Rather than affirming ‘this is being’ it is posited as ‘what is this being?’ and any examination tied to the latter becomes objectified being. The ‘*Is*’ or ‘to be’ remains resistant to such scrutiny—thus retains subjectivity. It is obvious that even the ‘*Is*’ or ‘to be’ must be spoken about, as in dialectical fashion to obtain meaning, but the element of mystery does not permit encapsulating the totality of being. In a very real sense being is not subjugated to possession. If that were not so, then as Voegelin claims otherwise “the reality of the primary experience, under the pressure of the *noetic* experience, which dissociates the cosmos in to the world and its ground, all ‘things’ that Aristotle calls *ousia* are then objectivized according to the model of things in the world.”²⁶⁷ Rather my project insists that the ‘*Is*’ and ‘to be’ are not simply another ‘thing’ in the world, but retain the double meaning of *aletheia*, i.e., reality and truth.

Aristotle and Eternal Being

For Aristotle the term *aletheia* tended towards the recognition of mental acts. If left at that, *both* being and what is proposed here as knowing (truth) would be merely ‘in relation’ and not strictly said to be convertible. For Aristotle convertibility of being was paired with unity, in that “it makes no difference whether that which is, be referred as to being or as to unity. For even if they are not the same but different, they are convertible; for that which is one is also somehow being, and that which is being is one.”²⁶⁸

With the inclusion of the Absolute as an eternal Being which (1) Heidegger was attempting to overcome, yet (2) is arguably required metaphysically, my project allows for that which is contingent to exist in the Being as an ontological implant (*idea of being*) of the Noncontingent

²⁶⁷ Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, 161. (Emphasis mine).

²⁶⁸ Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, Book XI, 1061a15-18, p. 1676.

(Absolute). This *is* the ‘something’ which allows nothing “exempt from its ontological might [which] *without* or *dependent of* there could be neither being nor not-being.”²⁶⁹

Premised for convertible being and knowing there must appear a causal factor that is both independent and necessarily existent. Where and how would this being exist as suspended otherwise? The question is what mind would hold being and knowing in tension, if not some *outside-being* (eternal?).

This is evidenced, in part, by considering that, if no human beings were alive, there would still be existent states of affairs, even though they would not be in any relation of truth with any minds. When the truth relation ceases to hold, the corresponding existent state of affairs does not cease. Consider now what happens when we presuppose the necessary existence of an eternal Being, to whose mind all existent things necessarily stand in a relation of truth. It is easy to see that the distinction between the existent thing and the truth that represents it becomes, at most, an intensional one; and the causal relation between truth and being becomes much less clear— existence seems to depend as much upon the thing’s relation to the mind of the [Absolute] as the truth of the matter depends on the existence of the thing²⁷⁰ in and of itself.

As with Parmenides’ mythological ontology, where the gods must exist, the Absolute here fills the void of the finite, nonpropositional exclamation of *Is*.

Heideggerian ontotheology

The suspension of being *in* and *by* the Absolute, (if one recalls Heidegger’s critique of Hegel’s Absolute as a mere remnant—not properly distinguishing between *being* as entities and *Being*), does not dispel either concerns or cautions of the relationality the Absolute may seem to absorb of be-ing (Dasein).²⁷¹ Heidegger understood that “there is some way in which Dasein understands

²⁶⁹ Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, Part III, §12, p.106. Also, in and according to this schema then the Absolute *contains* all being, i.e., both being and all reality take up residence in a shared space (expressed as panentheism).

²⁷⁰ Gerol C. Petruzella, “Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Convertibility of Truth and Being.” *Philosophical Writings Journal* of Durham University. No. 31, Spring 2006, 41.

²⁷¹ In consideration to this project, would it be falling prey to the very metaphysical vestige Heidegger meant to overcome? Am I promoting a schema that proposes a fundamental ontology where the Dasein is simply one entity (Being) among entities (being)?

itself in its Being, and to some degree it does so explicitly. It is peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed to it[self]”²⁷² as a determining character of existence.

The Absolute is the means of that disclosure of *self* to the *being-self*.

This formulation of Being in relation to the Absolute presupposes as a solution which Heidegger’s (onto-theological) metaphysics interpreted as an ahistorical error.²⁷³ His ‘overcoming’ of the Absolute’s relation to Being is a presuppositional dismissal and not one of necessity for his project and it becomes especially foreign to the system this dissertation proposes.

That means there is not something there to capture *of this Being*, as the Dasein is always a ‘there being’. It should not be lost that this Dasein is a Being that questions, and that questioning is not exclusive to the finite and temporal.²⁷⁴ It is this authentic and autonomous ‘choosing Dasein’ (be-ing) which is endowed with properties proper to itself, but not self-originating, therefore remaining contingent on the Absolute as the ontological implant *in* the human person (Ideal being).^{275 276}

²⁷² Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Part I, Ch. 3, §12, p. 32.

²⁷³ Though he famously stated, ‘only a god alone will save the world’, he thought it best to allow Nietzsche’s God to remain dead and buried. In other words, clearly that Christian God (Absolute) is not *the* Being. But there was a presupposition afoot in his relation to and understanding of the Eternal Divine, in that the notion of divine transcendence for Heidegger appears somewhat fickle. Just in considering Heidegger’s notion of “‘transcendence,’ that is, a “standing out” (*ekstatisches*) of what is ‘standing in’ (*Innesteher*) the world, one may wonder whether there is really anything like transcendence in Heidegger at all, certainly in any traditional sense” (George J. Seidel, “Heidegger’s Last God and the Schelling Connection.” *Laval théologique et philosophique*, 55(1), 87) that can be construed as *Divine* transcendence.

²⁷⁴ As a matter of fact, argued logically Dasein cannot terminate in the finite and temporal. In some sense, why not simply hold that the Absolute becomes and is *the* suspension of Being? It would not be objectified as an analyzed Being, if the ‘Other’ were native to the ‘*Is*’.

²⁷⁵ Heidegger would immediately retort that if that were so, then the Absolute as the *causa sui* Being would once again return to the hermeneutic idolatry of the onto-theology he was attempting to vanquish. But there are ways to achieve the metaphysical objective of preserving the Absolute, which admittedly was not Heidegger’s intent, without sacrificing the authentic transcendence he thought would be forfeited if interpreted as a ‘collapse’ of Being with *being*.

²⁷⁶ One optional method to mention, though I will not directly employ it here because of its limiting export of the Absolute to created being(s), is that of the Roman Catholic phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion. His proposal was that *being* is a category predicated literally from the being’s perspective and therefore an illegitimate identification to place *on* the Divine Absolute. Taking to heart Heidegger’s concern that the reduction of God to *being* is idolatrous, Marion attempts to rescue God’s distinctness from simply appearing as one Being or being among other beings. This

Repurposed Dasein

The Heideggerian determination of Being from being arises from asking why there are beings at all, i.e., why is there not ‘no being’ (nothing) and what is the ground (fundamental basis) of this being rather than nothing? When one hears Heidegger state that “‘*nothing is without ground*’ [one] should hear ‘Nothing *is* without *ground*’, the ‘ringing’ together of the ‘is’ and ‘ground’. In hearing ‘*Nothing is without ground*’, [the] emphasis is on ‘thing’ (being) and ‘without’, but not on ‘ground’.”²⁷⁷ The reason and distinction for this import is to rescue being *via* an understanding of its contrary nothingness, which *cannot be* and *allows* Being as the necessary foundation of consciousness to come to the fore.

Heidegger’s concern to overcome the ontotheological conflation of Being and the Absolute (God), he argues...

Being and God are not identical and I would never attempt to think the essence of God by means of Being. Some among you perhaps know that I come from theology, that I still guard an old love for it and that I am not without a certain understanding of it. If I were yet to write a theology—to which I sometimes feel inclined—then the word Being would not occur in it. Faith does not need the thought of Being. When faith has recourse to this thought, it is no longer faith. This is what Luther understood. Even within his own church this seems to be forgotten. One could not be more reserved than I before every attempt to employ Being to think theologically in what way God is God. Of Being, there is nothing to expect. I believe that Being can never be thought as the ground and essence of God, but that nevertheless the experience of God and his manifestedness, to the extent that the latter

concern is present even if the Absolute as Being would differ by infinite degree among many created beings. In brief, for Marion *being* as a category is imposed on the transcendent Deity by created beings. Marion held that God as Absolute is prior to any metaphysical categorization of being, and if so constrained, God loses the reality of the icon and is reduced to that of an idol. Therefore, reflecting the title of Marion’s work, the Divine Absolute is a ‘God without being’. And as a further critique of the German philosopher, he thinks Heidegger did not go far enough by simply un-identifying ‘God as Absolute and created being’. Disconnecting the Absolute from Being merely allows the human being’s gaze to be absorbed by the God-idol. Many salutary remarks could be made of Marion’s approach, particularly the precedence it gives to love and gift which form a representation of the Absolute’s nature apart from any association, or prior that is both *to* and *of* the Absolute as Being. Though that would be a meaningful side analysis, it simply is beyond the scope of this study to work out the relationship of that to this schema. I mention Marion’s notion here, not simply to recognize it as an alternative, but to state that the preservation of either Being or the Absolute’s immanence is taken, in my view, at the expense of the univocal nature of the innate appurtenance with the Absolute, and thus a distinct type of transcendence of ‘God-and-world’. In short, there are other paths to follow; univocal fears are unwarranted, even less idolatrous.

²⁷⁷ Xiaojiang Han, “Is Being a ‘Screen’ of God?” *Res Cogitans*, No. 5, vol. 1, (2008), 94.

can indeed meet man, flashes in the dimension of Being, which in no way signifies that Being might be regarded as a possible predicate for God. On this point one would have to establish completely new distinctions and delimitations.²⁷⁸

How then can this ground become equated with God and not some mere condition of the Absolute, while yet finding itself preserved from Heidegger's idolatry?²⁷⁹ Dionysius dissolves such tension (escape?).

My goal in this section is to present that the (1) being that *cannot* be known, i.e., the *Is* affirms the conversion of being and knowing, is both a re-collecting and re-unveiling. The point of using a Voegelin conceptual framework was to avoid any hint of being to be reduced to an objectified 'what' as (2) the *Is* always retains *aletheia* as both full reality and eternal truth. What then may appear pantheistic is a transcendent panentheism expression which allows (3) eternal sphere to enter and fulfil any void of *Is*. After I (4) addressed any Heideggerian concern of the Absolute swallowing Being as being, and (5) discounting Marion's attempt to remove the Absolute from the category of being, I proceeded to (6) repurpose the *no non-being* Dasein. Finally, as I took seriously his concerns for the conflation of Being with the Absolute, I will now introduce the modality of God's self-disclosure of Absolute Being with Being. I suggest that the two should be spoken of together, while retaining a non-contingent/contingent relation.

Dionysius the Areopagite and the way out

I will first (1) offer the imagery of Dionysius to elucidate Stein's directional flow of being from the Absolute to and through be-ing as a return to the Absolute. With this schema, (2) there is no Being outside of the relational Absolute. The idolatry (Marion) and consumption of Being in the

²⁷⁸ Cf. Heidegger, *Seminare*, in *Gesamtausgabe* 15, Klostermann Vittorio GmbH, 2005, pp. 436-37, in Xiaoqiang Han, "Is Being a 'Screen' of God?" *Res Cogitans*, No. 5, vol. 1, (2008), 94.

²⁷⁹ Or Jean-Luc Marion's absorbing gaze?

Absolute (Heidegger) only appear in isolation to this foreign separation; *idea of being* is both the source of ‘being’ and ‘knowing’; being-knower remains in relation to others and Other.²⁸⁰

The ‘way out’ lies in the meaning of the Absolute’s self-disclosure or manifestation in the world of God’s Being.²⁸¹ There is a two-fold operation present, the meaning found in anything that is ‘not-not known’ and the epistemological notion of *idea of being* as something ‘outside’ yet native to Being. There should be a sense of the bridge formed here between being and Being, and that of Being and Absolute—Rosmini’s project allows that.

The fifth century philosopher Dionysius the Areopagite offers insight into crossing this ontological chasm of Being and being while preserving the identity of each.²⁸² With Dionysius there is an ebb and a flow as an issuing forth and a ‘calling’ back; a drawing from and a guided reply all or which originates with the Absolute as a movement to and from (return by) created Being. Dionysius draws this imagery from a verse found in the Book of Qoheleth, a fourth century B.C. text from the Tanakh that reads, “All streams run to the sea, but the sea is not full; to the place where the streams flow, there they flow again.”²⁸³ Edith Stein contended that in regards to ways of knowing the “flowing should be taken first as the *order of being*: every be-ing issues from [the Absolute] as from the First and returns again. *Iterum fluere*²⁸⁴ (flowing forth again) after reuniting

²⁸⁰ Though I will make no attempt to thoroughly resolve the present conflict of unity and alterity of the Absolute and Being, or the grasping of the former by the latter, in this short section it is worth presenting the *sign* of dissolving the tension.

²⁸¹ In revisiting the preparation laid prior in this examination of knowledge and being, the potentiality that lies in beings as relational to the Absolute is not entirely unlike the shades of a color (turquoise) in relation to the purity of its kind (exemplar blue), i.e., does not the grasping of a color’s shade penetrate (point) into the essence of the exemplar? Of course, this is an analogical expression but remains relevant in disclosing the relation if one recalls earlier Edith Stein’s contention that “the words are meaningful only if [one] knows *something* about it” (Stein, *Knowledge and Faith*, 66-67). Here I am claiming that knowing something of ‘turquoise’ implies to know something of ‘blue’. I would suggest its *being* points to and reveals blue, neither conflating the two, nor absorbing the gaze of the exemplar.

²⁸² And yet maintaining the veracity of a univocal approbation of Being and Absolute.

²⁸³ Quo. 1:7, RSV-CE.

²⁸⁴ The full phrase reference here is “*Ad locum unde exeunt flumina revertuntur ut iterum fluant*” [the streams return to the emplace whence they have issued to again flow forth], translation is Stein’s.

implies not a separation but an inclining to what lies below in order to raise it up.”²⁸⁵ In the same way that Being is only Being in relation to all being, Being is only Being in relation to the Absolute. What appears as a possible conflation (Heideggerian/Marion idolatry) only appears so when one is isolated from the other. The Absolute is the Ideal of Being, present in the *idea of being* that becomes a foundation of knowledge (being-knower) and relationally shared as being with other and Other.

Here I briefly offered first (1) Stein’s directional flow of being from the Absolute to and through be-ing as a return to the Absolute using the imagery of Dionysius. My overarching point was that (2) there can be no Being outside of the relational Absolute as both the *idea of being* is the source of ‘being’ and ‘knowing’, and the relational connection of and to others, in accord with the Other.

Summary Remarks

There is a Platonic taste to this imagery, yet with ‘the Areopagite’ the ideal is not a realization of any *real* that is inaccessible to being. Within the Absolute, as opposed to the realm of Forms, being is not simply the provision of an access or reflection but a ‘sharing’ of exemplars.^{286 287} The meaningfulness of the Being-One is in the self-disclosure as this Absolute Being is both made known and knowable as a modification in the Being (be-ing). Heidegger’s grounding becomes for Rosmini the absolute floor, i.e., the final abstraction. This Ideal *being* as an appurtenance²⁸⁸

²⁸⁵ Stein, *Knowledge and Faith*, 85.

²⁸⁶ I will gravitate away from the term ‘sharing’, and introduce the concept of harmonization.

²⁸⁷ In the Hebrew Book of Exodus, after Moses’ theophany he enquired as to the name of this ‘God of the fathers’ and the reply, which is sometimes translated as ‘I am who I am’, could also be understood for the purpose here as ‘I am the Being One’.

²⁸⁸ A deification as one should understand that relation.

becomes the point where no longer ‘something other’ remains as an object upon which to fix the gaze of thought in its absence.

The notion of Dasein as an ever-present ‘there being’ is retained and what was determined exclusive to the finite and temporal find termination (and transcendence with) the infinite and eternal. It appears as a melding where “the metaphysical search for unity, understood in light of [how things hold together, in their being at all], is simply a turning towards, a love of transcendence.”²⁸⁹

With Rosmini then, if *being* is the groundwork wherein all else originates from or is added on to, then his last abstraction of the *idea of being* (Ideal being) is no less primitive, and epistemologically orients as *the* originating factor in the same way Being was for Heidegger.²⁹⁰ The distinction remains that with Rosmini’s system one may retain confidence that this *idea* does not originate internally²⁹¹ as the appurtenance of the internal being indeed is the External Being *iterum fluere* (flowing forth again) only to return. Both ‘locations’ are proper to the Absolute and originate as a meaningful source “in which man lives according to his nature as the theoantropic entity in a liturgical world. It is not time as represented by history, nor space as represented by creation, nor the logic of fallen man”²⁹² but where the created is united with the Uncreated. Being and knowing have not just a shared horizon, nor can they be simply said to be inseparable; they are indistinguishable as Absolute in Being—a univocity with alterity.

²⁸⁹ William Desmond, *Being and Between*, 52.

²⁹⁰ This *idea of being* retains necessity and singularly where Being forms as a predication and idea both separate and relational to the subject in which it refers and literally resides.

²⁹¹ Obviously, the Absolute is external to the be-ing, but the *idea of being* is a native feature of the be-ing and the knower-being has this Ideal being as an internal being.

²⁹² Archimandrite Vasileios, *Hymn of Entry* (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2011), 67.

Conclusion

This entire chapter centered on the convertibility of ‘being and knowing’. I began coupling the ideas, speaking of them as conjoined for a prelude to the future idea of conversion. Then after speaking of the notion of ‘knowing’, I introduced the JTB theory as foundational for knowledge. Some various strains of epistemic skepticism were covered prior to delineating the inherited epistemological traditions of Rationalism, Empiricism, Tacit knowledge, Divine Illumination, Kant, and Popper. The epistemological system of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati served as the capstone to that section.

I then returned to ‘being and knowing’ as not simply inseparable but conjoined as an active harmonization. That section included Heidegger’s Dasein with a brief treatment of Parmenides and Scotus. Following that I forwarded the thought of inseparability to convertibility using the notions of Voegelin to overcome what I identified as defective in Aristotle’s ontology and the ontotheology of Heidegger. In cursory fashion, Dionysius the Areopagite was briefly proposed as the ‘way out’ to resolve identified tensions. I will now flow from this being with the idea of ‘knowing to love’ as the *idea of being*.

IV. Schemas of Love

Meno, it seems to me that being is present to those who have it by share of the divine.

~what Socrates should have said.

In the prologue to this section, I will chart ‘being and love’ from the initial grasp of love understood by the dominant Western culture.²⁹³ I will then address two comparative views; that of Martin Heidegger and Dietrich von Hildebrand. In the following section, I will present my overall objectives for this chapter.

It is common to philosophically locate love as a value category. The relation of the merits and parameters of ‘love as value’ as they relate to *being* is merely a considering factor—not ontological. I am referring to Love in this regard as it inhabits a modality where it (colloquial love) becomes interpreted and studied.²⁹⁴

In consideration of the philosophical assessments of love expressed by Dietrich von Hildebrand and Martin Heidegger, first take into account that with Hildebrand, “he knew nothing of the Heideggerian aversion for value... [but rather] value was a primitive datum, an *Urgegebenheit*.²⁹⁵ It can only be known through itself; it can be no more defined in terms of other things than being can be so defined.”²⁹⁶ But for Heidegger the source of this aversion lay in the “so-called ‘primal science [*Urgegebenheit*]’ and its obsession is with what turned out to be

²⁹³ This is what I accept as the most common/pedestrian manner of understanding such love, admittedly the claim is left at the point of plausible assertions momentarily. My rational verification will follow elsewhere in this chapter.

²⁹⁴ There is always some ‘value’ it measures and one may only love what is interpreted as being impregnated with desired value(s). Can one love what they do not choose? I will argue this affirmatively, in that love is passive in the sense of harmonization.

²⁹⁵ *Urgegebenheit* can be translated as ‘that which is given’.

²⁹⁶ J.J. Drummond and Embree Lester, *Phenomenological Approaches to Moral Philosophy: A Handbook* (Contributions to Phenomenology) (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 480.

‘inauthentic problems’²⁹⁷ which did not fit within his project designed to overcome a neo-Kantian inheritance. With the analysis of Hildebrand, *value* was a discoverable ‘thing’ that impregnated Being with some goodness and as such, brought pleasure and delight—value *to* subject. While with Heidegger the value was a culturally invested ‘thing’ into the Being and is found to “have its sole ultimate ontological source in [one’s] previously laying down the actuality of ‘things’ as the fundamental stratum,”²⁹⁸ where it terminates in pleasure and delight—value *from* subject.

There are two primary reasons to address this. First, I want to be clear that my focus is not a direct ethical claim on the idea of love. My springing off from value philosophy is only intended to propose a need for (1) the re-locating (a genuine return of) the idea of love from value to that of its innate ontological status *of* the human person. Also, it must be understood that I am ultimately (2) linking love to an epistemic foundation (divine/tacit) natively present in being itself (appurtenance). I accept that this ‘good’ and ‘pleasure’ are not entirely separate entities, for “if the good is eudaemonistic, always a matter of pleasure, it is equally and reciprocally true that pleasure is always a matter of encountering the objectively good—the “ethical” good.”²⁹⁹

If it is true “that moral good and bad are known not just through the intellect, but also through one’s moral character, and that only the morally virtuous person has real knowledge of moral good and bad,”³⁰⁰ then the meaning of ‘love as value’ surfaces as a ‘moral attitude’ manifesting itself as *real* more so for the being in tune with that ‘experienced value’ recognized *as* love. By way of analogy if love is re-located in its ontological presence and not just known in expression or observation (only the individual attuned to that reality has *real* knowledge of ‘love

²⁹⁷ Ingo Farin, “Heidegger’s Critique of Value Philosophy.” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*. 29(3), Oct. 1998, 280.

²⁹⁸ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §100, p.134.

²⁹⁹ John Milbank, “The Soul of Reciprocity Part Two: Reciprocity Granted,” 499.

³⁰⁰ Drummond and Lester, 480.

as being’), then the ontological value of love surfaces as an ‘ontological attitude’ manifesting itself as *real* more so for the being in tune with that ‘experienced value’.³⁰¹

In this prologue section, I have briefly outlined two takes on situating love as a value category in conjunction with the presentation of Heidegger’s and von Hildebrand’s analysis. Both views present a crucial claim to my aspect of Love, in that Heidegger demonstrates the deficiency of seeing Love purely as a value category, as well as von Hildebrand’s presentation of Love as sort of apparent value. This lays the groundwork for my re-situation of Love in the human person.

As in the previous chapter when I showed that being and knowing did not just have shared horizons but were equally indistinguishable as Absolute in Being (the native source of the Divine in the finite), this chapter will now mirror that schema, but *interchanging* ‘loving’ for ‘knowing’ in relation to being. I will assert the *idea of love* as native to the human person present in the Divine appurtenance whereas although love possesses an epistemic quality and remains convertible with knowing it, is never reduced to the same plane, i.e., love and knowing may share convertibility, but love is preeminent.

Objectives on “Being and Love”

In Chapter II on ‘Epistemological Review’ one of the undercurrents was to move the conversation from ‘how one knows’ in terms of specific truths (which obviously is critical) to the origin of any thought possible in itself, i.e., that without which the ‘knowing’ of specific truths could not be known. Here then in Chapter IV on ‘Schemas of Love’, I have a similar overarching goal. Once I

³⁰¹ But encompassed in this premise is the necessity for a ‘willingness to see’ that bridges the experience (Heidegger) and value (Hillenbrand) as respective aspects of love. To borrow a phrasing from the latter, my approach can be understood along the lines of presenting a ‘reverence’ that opens itself up to a readiness where the contribution of both experience and value are appropriated. But value and experience are found as evinces of the ontological presence of the Absolute as the *idea of being* in particular events that lead to knowledge of oneself and the other(s).

address love in terms of types, expressions, etc., I will then move onto an ontological orientation of the ‘nature of love’. But not unlike Rosmini’s foundational *idea of being* that takes the seat of knowledge to its ontological core, here too I intend to transverse the notion of the ‘nature of love’ and ontologically reposition it in relation to the *idea of being* properly expressed not as the ‘nature of love’, but as ‘love as nature’.

Convertibility of love and being

In this subsection, I will begin by setting up the parameters which differentiate my inquiry into the convertibility of ‘love and being’ from ‘being and knowing’. I will then proceed to point out two hazards crucial to avoid in my integral analysis. Establishing the parameters for which I will have to fit my answer, I then will look at the relational differences between the convertibility of ‘knowing and being’ and ‘being and loving’, specifically in terms of the later by what I identify as *a* major hurdle in allowing my project to move forward.

Also, as was my goal with being and knowing, the objective of this subsection is to likewise confirm *being* and *loving* as convertible ideas.³⁰² The inherent risk for this event is two-fold. First, the ‘pole’ of initial concern is that it becomes convenient (1) to encompass too much that situates the identity of the ‘love event’ to a sphere of both activity and substance, i.e., the reduction ‘down to’ a collection of matter and moments that has patterns of sharing with and in the Absolute. The opposite pole of the hazard, attractive in its lack of complicity, jeopardizes that (2) necessary

³⁰² I do not intend to simply reiterate the treatment on convertibility as it was discussed in a previous chapter. But for the sake of continuity, I will restate that convertibility is to be understood as interchangeability in the presence of a real distinction. For instance, if one is to hold the convertibility of being and oneness (*ens et unum convertuntur*), it is accepted that where there is being there is also oneness, though the latter is the term which signifies the undividedness of that which *is* being. Within this comparison, oneness is not strictly predicated nor is it identical to being, therefore this applies to love and being in like fashion. Recall that previously I offered convertibility to be understood in terms of the ‘interchangeability in the presence of a real distinction’. As critical as that distinction was for that conversion, in this case of ‘love and being’ that undividedness *with* the other breaks down. The language becomes difficult to parse, as would be the case in terms of a liturgical event (the bracketing of an experience), which is precisely the case now.

encompassing reality that is a singular ‘love’ and ‘Being’, whose barely approachable imminence as Absolute is collapsed into ‘the event’ by such a degree that one no longer encounters person(s) in the same locus who themselves likewise bear the mark of this love.³⁰³

There is an ontological hurdle to overcome as Heidegger’s notion of ‘presence at hand’ (vivid mindfulness) has gained an erosive effect in regard to this idea for the contemporary discussion. The human person (here let us understand *them* as Dasein) is not limited to “a living thing whose Being is essentially determined by the potentiality of discourse”³⁰⁴ as mere possible ways ‘to be’ (*existentia*) that cements essence to existence. In contrast here then “presence is not merely a symbolic construction over against ontology, but that the created order provides key reference points and a preparation for the *Absolute*, positing a very ‘real’ primordial presence within Dasein that mediates the convertibility of Being and love.”³⁰⁵ There must arise some medium of articulation to communicate this ‘event’.³⁰⁶ Rather than was strictly the case with ‘Knowing and Being’, with the convertibility of ‘Love and Being’ together, each *appearing* as gift is not simply the ‘present-at-hand’ for Dasein, but a ‘present-in-and-with’ spoken of in the sense of *the gift* which is observable, yet not located in a particular moment.

In this subsection, I have demonstrated the distinctions in character between the convertibility of ‘being and knowing’ and between ‘being and loving’. I then explained the various distinctions

³⁰³ Those then are the parameters, where some ‘space’ must be created that can allow the Absolute to be ‘love in all ways’, complete and imminent, yet encompassing the other boundary of the spectrum where the ‘created’ finds “in the experience of a great love, that the whole world is gathered up in the I-Thou relation, and everything that happens becomes an event *within* the ambit of this relation” (Cf. Romano Guardini, *L’essenza del cristianesimo* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 1993), 12; in Livio Melina’s *The Epiphany of Love: Toward a Theological Understanding of Christian Action* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B Eerdmans Publishing, 2010), 158. [Emphasis mine]). But this fundamental orbit of the Absolute (otherwise as unapproachable—how does one draw near without the overwhelming gravitational pull obliterating individual identity?) must in some way allow *Is* to be absorbed into the *I-Thou* creation (and vice versa), so that one gains access to the necessary event of love—can this now be spoken of as pure gift?

³⁰⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, §25, p.47. Note: This phrase of course is Heidegger’s definition of Dasein.

³⁰⁵ Connor Sweeney, *Sacramental Presence after Heidegger: Onto-theology, Sacraments, and the Mother’s Smile* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2015), 238.

³⁰⁶ The ‘rhetorical move’ I alluded to in the first section is a developed way to communicate this experience beyond written articulation.

which result in the notion of love as it moves to an ontological basis, in that it is at risk of losing its experiential immanence.

The value of *a* love

In this section I will address love understood as *value* and the complications that consequently arise from holding that view. When speaking of any idea as a value, it is immediately conceived either as (1) determinative of a point plotted upon some gradient or a hierarchical arrangement ordered by that value. In other words, value is always relative to *something's* value that takes the place of a standard, and the distance from that standard determines the value. But there is also the necessary dynamic of (2) the source of the value, whether it is (2a) imbued by some characteristic that is appraised to be valued—my love bestowed to ‘give *something* value’, or be it some (2b) intrinsically discovered characteristic to be valued—my love bestowed is ‘given to *something* of value’.³⁰⁷ In other words, “if *x* loves *y* then *x* wants to be with *y* and detects some benefit, etc., and *x* has these wants (or at least some of them) because *x* believes *y* has some determinate characteristics in virtue of which *x* thinks it worthwhile to benefit and be with *y*.”³⁰⁸ And when that determinate characteristic is not motivated by the benefit of pleasure or gain, it is rightfully preserved by the Kantian dictum of not using another as a means to an end; *x* ‘loves’ this *y* as an end in themselves. The motivation may vary of course, as in that “one [may] give, not out of altruism, but to be given more: *do ut des*. Not *totally* dissimilar, but nonetheless different, since

³⁰⁷ In both scenarios a teleological approach is operative. It need not be crass utilitarianism (though that would also fall within the domain of movement towards a value), but at its simplest the teleology is either benevolent or disinterested.

³⁰⁸ Gabriele Taylor, “Love” in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Vol. 76, 1975, (147-64), 157. Note: I did replace any use of ‘they’ with *x* to carry through the thought clearly.

the ‘more’ consists in accumulated honour and prestige, and not in wealth.”³⁰⁹ But in either/each case, this would not discount a benefit of pleasure or gain as an effect from the teleological termination of the love of *x* for *y*—I will address that in the following subsection as a ‘value response’ to love.

Rather than work out an argument demonstrating the judgment lapses and dubious claim of either (2a) the imbued or (2b) the bestowed nature of value, I offer here a critique of a foundational misconception that undermines both. If the value is ascribed or fixed, the stubborn question is to ask what would suffice as (1) the standard for this point plotted (gradient) or hierarchy (ordering) arrangement or schema in terms of determining such a value? The standard is left vague, perhaps somewhat ethereal, and then regardless of the standard one is immediately confronted with necessarily permitting type(s) of lesser loves that are valued in relation to the distance from that standard. If the standard *is* attainable for the contingent being, then anything less (1a) is not really love (at least some lesser type). If the standard *is not* attainable for the contingent being, then any harmonization (1b) would necessitate the conversation back to one of analogy, and likewise not really be love (just something like love). My *prima face* case is to reject (1a) as insufficiently representative of any connection to the *idea of being*. Likewise, I will also claim (1b) as incompatible with my presentation of love’s convertibility with being, in that the analogous relation that results in necessarily reducing the *idea of being* to something *not real* relative to the Absolute.

Even if those points are not thoroughly convincing, there is still a clearer issue. If one argues that there is a type of love (exemplar? *agape*?) which can be the standard for either the (2a) imbued or (2b) bestowed nature of value as a value, then at the very least *that* love itself cannot

³⁰⁹ John Milbank, “Can a Gift Be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic.” *Modern Theology* 11:1. January 1995, 127.

logically be (1) a *type* as no standard can be held as its *own* standard, i.e., therefore *agape* cannot be a *type* of love. If it (*agape*) is a standard then (2) it cannot be reduced down to a value, because a value cannot measure itself, i.e., *agape* as love is not a *value*.³¹⁰

In this section, I identified the hurdles and complications which arise when love is treated merely as a *value*. I ultimately proposed the conclusion that the only way to reach an understanding of genuine love is to move beyond any encounter of a perceived standard—ultimately to the realm of Person in which no types are present, and that Person is not a standard or exemplar but love Itself.

Love as a value response

In the following section I will further contend with the concept of love assuming a value. Here I will be speaking primarily to the role it plays as a value response which ultimately terminates by reducing love to its most outward signs. I will explain how this develops into situations that result only in the mimicking (outward appearance) of love.

Emanating from the various relational aspects of love there are powerful effects that illicit a response on the part of the loved to the *something* loved. When the signifier (the response itself) becomes conflated with the *idea of love*, and that ‘return’ is determined as a value (the level of response), then love (as loving) takes on the notion of a value response itself where love is

³¹⁰ Here is an illustration demonstrating the internal contraction of that dilemma: when Protagoras claimed that “Man is the measure of all things” (Aristotle. *Metaphysics*, XI.6, §1062^b14-21, p.1678), two outcomes are evident. By one interpretation, this statement claims the very measure of that which the thing is, *is* the measure of *the* thing being measured. This would be akin to claiming a yardstick is the measure of all yardsticks. Or another understanding is that if the ‘measure of measures’ *appears* correct (some standard *must* be determined)—then the claim possesses no nature of a standard altogether because of its relative quality. On that last point, Aristotle remarked to this very claim of Protagoras’ that if “that which seems to each man assuredly is...and that which appears to each man is the measure” (*Metaphysics*, XI.6, §1062^b14-21, p.1678) then the ‘measure of man’ will rise to nothing greater than the *appearance* of measure. Put into the context of my argument, if that which *seems* to be love is certainly love, then each *perception* of love takes the place of the measure, meaning that there is no measure and therefore in the same way that ‘no man can be the measure of man’, so to ‘no love can be the measure of love’. This measure (love) is nothing more than the *appearance* of the measure, a type (of love) erroneously held.

conflated *with* the response. This is inevitable if love remains in the realm of act, because as a verb love does something, i.e., it gives or receives, reacts or responds.

The individual conclusion according to this schema is that love *is/becomes* the value perceived, i.e., if love is a value, then what one values is contingent on certain criteria. At this juncture it is proper to conclude that the characteristics (criteria) which are associated with the ‘love as value’ become mistaken for the ‘real’. This perceived ‘real’ then is either (1) the effect that love has on the individual or (2) the responses—elicited or unelicited—that the individual experiences. In either modality, when the value itself is “identified with love [they] are in fact independent responses that love merely unleashes. They are the sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction that we feel for another person when our emotional defenses toward them have been disarmed.”³¹¹ The resultant perception then is that (1) love is under the guise of sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction, or that (2) love is present only when accompanied by sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction. Then to answer the question as to what qualifies as criterion, the response is the semblance of effects or experienced responses that *appear* as the reality of love.

This concept of love tethered to effects and responses becomes further complicated as it cannot be applied evenly in the absence of the standard that I demonstrated becomes *something* predicated on perception. That is not to deny that there is not a substrate of basic dignity afforded to all human persons.³¹² But based on the fact the perceived value as the standard is proportional to the love (which again is why it has popularly been thought of as types), the teleology of this ‘love’ manifesting as sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction can only achieve

³¹¹ J. David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion.” *Ethics* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), Vol. 109, No. 2 (January 1999), 361.

³¹² As an extended web of ‘sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction’.

proportionality in light of the value that ‘delivers’ the response, i.e., the ‘more’ the web of sympathy, the greater factoring of love, etc. This modality though elicits a two-fold distribution of one’s love. It will ultimately either terminate in (1) mutual egoism, or (2) mutual propagation. For my point to hold I need to expand each in order to convey the connection of the error assessing ‘love as a value response’.

Mutual egoism can be found as a product with either (1a) bestowed value or (1b) intrinsic value. Regardless both negate the reality of love during the process of the conscious or subconscious use of the other.³¹³ Whether bestowed or intrinsic, mutual egoism is x tending towards the ‘given’ or ‘discovered’ value sought for in y , as y reciprocates in the manner of returning the value ‘given’ or ‘discovered’ in and back towards x .³¹⁴ Since this delicate balance is based on fluctuating perceptions, “when nothing is left of the harmony, love will be no more, in either the persons or between them, it will not be an objective reality, for there is no objective [standard] to ensure its existence.”³¹⁵

The second of the two-fold distribution of one’s love, (2) mutual propagation, is more deceptive in falling short of representing the conditions of genuine ‘real’ love. And this ‘mutual propagation’ too can be found as a product with either (2a) bestowed value or (2b) intrinsic value. Though to an extent that intrinsic value becomes an aspect in the process of mutual propagation. I want to first explain what is meant by mutual propagation. In the case of (1) x and y seeking sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction, for each other, I argued that could not be sustained.

³¹³ I will carry this thought further in my historical treatment under the subsection ‘Return to the Ego’, as Freud turned love into the reaction to a stimulus which was determined to discover satisfaction.

³¹⁴ In short, each gains a value given by the other that results in some harmonizing of egos, each as giver/receiver. But, as no standard extends beyond the ‘agreed upon’ sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction, the signaling of those qualifying criteria (here perceived of love) will persist only until there is a reduction of the harmony of either x or y .

³¹⁵ Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 1993), 39.

Here in this case (2) there is admittedly an element of increase for x and y in terms of sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction, of which neither may have been capable of independently. So, x helped y be better at or increase in sympathy, empathy, fascination, and attraction, and the vice versa.³¹⁶

Admittedly there is the element of change that occurs under the auspices of love ‘in and with other beings’ and it would result in a misnomer if ‘improving’ in and with the other were reductively equated with a utilitarian egoism. That is why I am addressed this separately. But the higher ideal of mutual propagation is not void of subjective criteria to support the mutual closeness that brings about the increase. There is still an element of reciprocity, albeit perhaps asymmetrical, where the “love is picked out as such by the justificatory completeness of its analysis, with personal evaluations taken as needed to support its characteristic desire: the desire to be *with* another person.”³¹⁷ That ‘evaluating’ speaks to the conditional status of this ‘mutual propagation’ as an *extra-ego* concept of love.

The ‘effects’ will continue to be the affirming condition(s) of the value that has not escaped presentation as either the (1) determinative of a point plotted upon some gradient, or a capturing of the (2) source of the value. As from the onset of this chapter I have claimed that any value is always relative to *something*’s value which when it takes the place of a standard, only the distance from that standard will be held as determinative.³¹⁸

³¹⁶ At first glance, this seems to overcome the issue with mutual egoism, and would colloquially be stated as resulting in a win-win arrangement, i.e., the love between x and y was propagated further together, where otherwise it would have never been possibly achieved separately.

³¹⁷ Patricia S Greenspan, *Emotions and Reasons: An Inquiry into Emotional Justification* (Florence, KY: Taylor & Francis/Routledge, 1988), 55. Greenspan deals with this issue under the heading of ‘attachment-love’. (Emphasis in the original).

³¹⁸ If left at this juncture, the malaise of any certainty or objectivity in regards to the nature of love³¹⁸ would be analogously the equivalent mental disquiet of epistemological skepticism—is there not some evidently shared skepticism in the question of love as value? I am leaving it at ‘nature of love’ at this juncture, though I fully am working towards the ‘certainty’ that is found solely in ‘love as a nature.’

In this section I dealt with further complications arising from love as a value, and showcased several instances in which the commonly held ‘value’ of love would seem to be fulfilled. Yet according to that schema the relations between the participants are still courted by their *ego*, rather than an authentic ontological relation. In the following section I will move towards an understanding which does present an arrangement of love that holds to a sense of definiteness and surety. Prior to offering my synopsis on the inherited schemas of love, next I will provide some preliminary remarks as to the aspects of love that *can* offer certainty and objectivity—a sign of the ‘way out’.

Value and objectivity

In this section I continue define my departure from ‘love as value’ as a viable criterion. In pointing out aspects needed to be jettisoned for adopting a non-value understanding of love, I will identify and consider the caveats which will be important to recognize as necessary girders of my thesis in this continued analysis.

Two distinct criteria are necessary in harboring certainty and objectivity as a standard capable to overcome the value-laden auspices of love as an idea. The first is to (1) jettison any ‘market’ criteria that enables the value theory of love to exist. The second is to (2) dialectically work through schemas of love, ferreting out the error(s) that might allow the devolving into some subjective standard of love’s relative value. My project here, equating the *idea of being* with love is to initially overcome any (1) market criteria, then use the path ferreted through (2) defects in traditional modalities of love to locate the authentic ‘source’. This will be a movement from value

to source, and then from source to the *idea of being*. The overriding proposal of this entire chapter is to reveal ‘love as a nature’.³¹⁹

By market criteria (1) I am speaking about any fungibility determinative of love. In regard to ‘love as a value’ my argument is there will inevitably be some semblance of a measured exchange. The nearer to equitable the perceived exchange would be seen the less discrepancy there would be in the value imbalance of love between *x* and *y*. It would seem reasonable to assume that the further one has moved from ‘mutual egoism’ (collecting from the other) to ‘mutual approbation’ (collecting with the other) that the analysis of exchange would wane. This is what makes ‘growing together’ appear a sensible way to determine value as shared. Though ‘mutual approbation’ would obviously be more enduring, it cannot ultimately escape the deliberation of the ‘scales’ that will measure the ‘increase of the love (good)’ in each. Like mutual egoism this too endures until the symmetry has been broken. So ultimately the inevitable endurance of ‘mutual approbation’ over ‘mutual egoism’ will never rise beyond the proportion to the evaluation of the perceived balance between *x* and *y*.

Then in terms of definitional criteria, (2) the initial glaring obstacle of no ‘outside’ standard is inherently difficult in any approach of providing a definition—what is the genus and what is the specific difference?³²⁰ This definitional difficulty is not only present in the irreducible *knowing* of

³¹⁹ I purposefully have inverted this proposition at this point, from the ‘nature of love’ to ‘love as a nature’. That ‘love as a nature’ ultimately will be identified with the Divine appurtenance.

³²⁰ A definition, by definition, discriminates, i.e., it is *this*, and not *that*, because of *this*. But another quality of a definition is that it does not simply bracket out *this* or *that*, it contains *this* or *that* and then by virtue of that captures any meaning (nature?) of *this* or *that* outside of which it is not *this* but *that*. Further in this case, placing the idea of love in a realm of ‘mystery’ (Marcel) dooms the project from the onset. It would be akin to attempting to bracket what *is* the *person* Aristotle. In such attempts, there is something of the idea which no term cannot contain, i.e., when the word ‘love’ is unable to express an idea sublime, the ‘lover’ turns to poetry, art, and lyric. Another example: it has been said that the grasping of liturgy needs less of liturgists and more of those skills from artists and poets. So too in this case the unveiling (*aletheia*) of the idea of love requires more of the efforts of ‘idea painting’ and ‘crafted prose’ than the technical descriptions of metaphysicians to unveil its essence (This will be my thesis’ use of literary encounters towards the tacit experience of ‘alt-love’ moments in hopes of a reader’s rhetorical movement). And that fact alone speaks to the import of art and poetry’s ability to capture not just its essence, but its universality “insofar as this can be seen as pointing toward the intimate universal in the singularity of the work...[as there surfaces

the idea of love, but too in that this idea of love as a category moves altogether beyond being tethered to irreducible *knowing* (any particular ‘type’ of knowing), and is in itself an epistemic foundation, i.e., love *is* itself a way of knowing. With that, there is now apparently a two-fold obstacle when working through the varietal definitions of love. But if we set aside the proposal of the epistemic grounding for the moment, one is still left with the impossibility of bracketing any idea *per se*. Before displaying the general schemas and tendering their contrasts, one further point to be made about the aforementioned difficulties of proposing a definition in terms of adhering to the standard/less value-based love which I have been addressing thus far in this chapter.³²¹

In this section I identified and discussed the key aspects which are necessary to move beyond conceiving love as a value. These caveats primarily involved the necessity of a standard for what constitutes love, and the inability of a technical definition to properly capture such a sublime, yet universal concept. In the next section, I will consider and critique varied schemas for

a] dialectical immanence that collapses the difference of transcendence” (William Desmond, *The Intimate Universal: The Hidden Porosity Among Religion, Art, Philosophy, and Politics* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2016), 85) in that what the term lacked in potency, the poem relates in mystery.

³²¹ To expand on that last point, consider an example of Aquinas using Aristotle’s notion of love and friendship demonstrating the necessity of a standard, even if I find difficulty in that standard being captured by a definition. With Aristotle, the concept of friendship and love are intertwined. This friendship/love (with others) is predicated on a friendship/love (with oneself). Aristotle connects the ‘other/self’ dynamic in that “the marks by which friendships are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man’s relations to himself. For men think a friend is one who wishes and does what is good, or seems so, for the sake of his friend” (Aristotle. *Nicomachean Ethics* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, Vol. II, Ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1166^a1-3, p.1843). Here one determines a ‘good’, holds to it for oneself and then too for the sake of the friend. Applying that last premise of Aristotle, Aquinas articulated this self-good in the concept of love to be defined as ‘willing the good of the other’. This definition encapsulates the notion of self-love in that “a man is not a friend to himself, but something more than a friend, since friendship implies union (Dionysius says that ‘love is a unitive force’) whereas a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another” (Cf. Aquinas, ST II-II, q25, a4, co.). So, in the case of Aristotle and Aquinas, the nature of love is not simply predicated on a relation of ‘self and others’ which is usually the takeaway, but rather that in each of these instances the definition is hinged necessarily on what is considered the *good* which is sought for by both ‘self and others’. The ‘good’ is central to their idea of ‘love’. For Aristotle the ‘good’ was connected to what might be held as the highest goal for living. His concept of this goal (*eudaimonia*) was related to the rational part of the soul in accordance with virtue, and as a complete good (self-sufficient) was “defined as that which when isolated makes life desirable and lacking in nothing; and such [then] is thought what happiness is to be” (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097^b15-16, p.1734). Much debate can be put to the effort of determining the universality of that good.

understanding love leading into my introduction of the *idea of love* molded from Rosmini's *idea of being*.

Inherited schemas of love

I will present a basic overview of each system and then proceed to expose the flaws or shortcomings of each of the schemas. In the course of each description, I will highlight those aspects contained within which remain resourceful elements that do evidently pointing towards *love as being*. Even with those instances (the few) that have connected love and being, the lacuna in their schemas suffered from the same type of deficiencies previous thinkers fell short of in connecting the *idea of being* to the foundation of knowledge.³²² My premise is that in the way Rosmini's *idea of being* is foundationally necessary for all knowing (the 'I' in 'I know'), love as the origin of being in the *idea of being* where love is properly expressed as the 'I' in 'I love' is necessary for all loving. As this love is connected to the Absolute as the appurtenance of the 'I', so too it follows that 'Love is' where the 'created I' has but the power to harmonize with the Absolute in being seeking the Absolute.

Love is unquestionably thought the most ubiquitous idea the human species has pondered. In general, the ideas include: religious love has assumed the role of an act(s) as an expressed love in accord with both law and nature (feed the destitute); or the sublimity of thought(s) that falls in line with a proposed truth (forgiveness of an offense); a pantheistic manifestation which has likened love to some type of disinterested cosmic force; a harmonic solidarity encompassing all

³²² What I mean is that the reason 'love as a nature' has never been sought is that *the* last abstraction has not been sought—something else was always left unaccounted, and therefore what followed was not predicated on anything certain. There is quite simply a parallel epistemological inadequacy that until discovered and apprehended (which is my defense for the lengthy survey of epistemological schemas), the defects of the *idea of love* will both endure and remain entrenched. Unless love is understood and seized as the 'native' source of being, nothing but surrogates will surface and endure, i.e., partial reflections of any aspects of the *idea of love* remain idle and dormant to the extent the *idea of being* remains concealed or unseen.

being (mindfulness of environment—one with nature, etc.); psychologically associated with esteem; relationality some degree of acceptance as it parlays back and forth between a romantic notion (one ‘falls in love’) or some level of contingent commitment (one ‘remains in love’); philosophically it can be oriented by intention, benefit, function, attachment to the senses, or relational expression.³²³ I intend to risk an accurate oversimplification of the following descriptions of each of the ‘schools’ and ‘thinkers’ to the degree required to explicate my point(s).³²⁴

Classicalist theories

In Plato’s “Speech of Phaedrus”, Socrates speaks of the gods breathing into the souls of men their ‘own nature infused into the lover’. This was in the context of love inspiring virtue. It goes on to read, “An army made up of lovers and their loves, they would overcome the world.”³²⁵ ³²⁶ Here,

³²³ One of those ‘types’ is embedded in the word itself, i.e., *philo-sophia* as the ‘love of wisdom’. I am arguing that these various ‘common’ views developed within the very cultural, religious, or societal vacuum that the ‘trickle down’ philosophies of love have established, i.e., the errors have persisted in their stead. My explanation for that is that though the prevailing concept(s) of the nature of love have this ‘top down’ trajectory (conjured by specific ‘schools of thought’) they are more likely than not predicated upon prevailing premised ideas of love commonly held by the masses.³²³ It is as if the academic thinkers grab the gist of the commonly formed idea of love, and then upon reflection codify and confirm it, repackage and distribute it back almost arrogantly implying, here is what you meant. Little of this is systematically intentional of course, as this idea of love ‘goes out’ to the many by means of various media (cinema, literature, music, more recently pop psychology, etc.), and becomes embedded in the mainstream psyche. More often than not, these influences are (or were) admitted unbeknownst (it just seems right). They become readily accepted by and with each cultural, religious, or society uncritically—there is something to them that just rings true. It is as if the common person is fed on a diet by the very ingredients, they themselves prefer and supplied; the academic then fine-tuned the recipe and all ate. I am arguing that this is evidently true when ‘love as a way of knowing’ is affirmed. Does it not just ‘seem right’ to say ‘the heart knows’?³²³ I have chosen here as my method to prune and sickle away any error, in order to reorient a proper understanding of not what constitutes love as an idea or even the nature of love, but in what regard the *idea of love as being* constitutes as a nature.

³²⁴ Certain aspects of each system that I feel do not contribute to my intended contrasts will be excluded; their absence is not intended, nor will it, misrepresent the overall schema. I will stick to what is considered stereotypical in terms of the thought and process of each understanding of love; it is often forgotten that though stereotypical notions of any system cannot speak for ‘all’ of the thinkers in that school, the enduring features are those that have persisted by historical consensus.

³²⁵ Plato, *Symposium* in *The Dialogues of Plato*, Vol. I. trans B. Jowett (New York, NY: Random House, 1892), 178c, p.307. (My paraphrase).

³²⁶ This famous statement in the *Symposium* of Plato’s is a robust assertion to make. Prior to considering the meaning of that claim, one is immediately confronted in this dialogue by some peculiarities in distinction from other Platonic writings. First among them is that the *Symposium* does not present the discourse in a strict dialectic fashion

Socrates is not heard as the definitive voice on the matter under consideration, but rather the voice of a woman, a stranger, a prophetess, Diotima, who *instructs him* in the lesser and greater mysteries of love.³²⁷

From the onset of study in this literature, love is typified as (1) a ‘type’, in this instance, as *eros*. This *eros* is held in esteem equal to the gods. In fact *eros* is a goddess who is the eldest of all. But the order of these gods is also coupled with another division, accordingly here in that “Love is inseparable from Aphrodite, and if there were only one Aphrodite there would be only one Love; but as there are two goddesses there must be two Loves.”³²⁸ Each of these loves exemplify something distinct. The earthly Aphrodite exemplifies the ‘common love’ which tends towards women and young boys (*pais*) for the purpose of self-gratification. The ‘heavenly love’ arises from the Heavenly Aphrodite, where in the absence of a mother, this love tends towards male-exclusive relations.

Another important point to glean in this Athenian tale is that although this love is ordered to virtue (of the *pais*), there is present with either the Heavenly or Earthly Love (2) an intended connotation of sexual expression (*pederasty*-adolescent and passive) typified as a passion for another. A clear distinction is that the Heavenly Love arises from noble intentions, and the Earthly Love is motivated by the desire of base enjoyment.³²⁹ This treatment of love is not so neatly or

where Socrates may cross examine an interlocutor. That characteristic is not totally absent, but its dearth does result in leaving the terms employed rather unclear at times, thus resulting in ambiguities that have tended to create historical debates over both the nuanced meanings and at times the dialogue’s focus.

³²⁷ Cf. David Naugle, “The Platonic Concept of Love,” the *Symposium*, www3.dbu.edu/naugle/pdf/platonic_love.pdf.

³²⁸ Plato, *Symposium*, 181b, p.309. Capitalization of ‘Love’ in the original.

³²⁹ It is of note that even in the modern interpretations of *eros*, it need not be equated with base instinct. In response to the claim of “Friedrich Nietzsche, [who said] Christianity had poisoned *eros*, which for its part, while not completely succumbing, gradually degenerated into vice,” it has been in Catholic theological circles restated (so it is said) to the proper role of drawing the beloved to another in the human experience. Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, *Deus caritas est*, December 2005. And too D. C. Shindler’s “The Redemption of *Eros*: Philosophical Reflections on Benedict XVI’s First Encyclical,” *Communio* 33 (Fall 2006), 375-99.

singularly categorized, as a notion of this love is oriented to immortality, i.e., procreation. This as a desire for immortality draws the human person, not only to that which is deemed beautiful in this life, but to a higher good for the mortal creature. Through each runs a strain of an intellectually appropriated *eros* as connected with an ultimate expression of love which is “not an attempt to express or purify sensuous feelings but rather to suppress them by sheer rationality”³³⁰ eager to unite immortally with something divine.

Socrates explains love’s connection to procreation to Diotima in that “generation is a sort of eternity and immortality...and as if, been already admitted, love is of the everlasting possession of the good.”³³¹ Although there persists with this *eros* an enduring ‘aim to the good’, that good itself arises as the initial shortcoming or obstacle to love as an authentic human nature, and thus the last abstraction. First, this ‘type’ of love is (1) a good that can only be shared with a few. Connected to that, consider that as an orientation it does not remove *eros* from desiring the other (including both Heavenly and Earthly Love) which (2) links it directly to a value. The other is point is that it (2) binds this ‘type’ of love to a sexual expression, albeit ultimately a disinterested one aimed at a higher purpose. My proposal of the ‘idea of love’ as *being* can account for those absent characteristics without falling prey to the limitations of this *eros*.

Another ‘type’ of relational love for the Greeks is that of *philia*. This ‘brotherly love’ is often represented as a deep abiding friendship. Like *eros*, *philia* is a limited love not given indiscriminately, but rather “the two are alike with respect to being, on the one hand, an expression of *choice* and, on the other, being experienced as something which seems to *happen* to us. [It is sometimes held that the distinction between *eros* and *philia* is the sexual attraction, but] while an

³³⁰ Cf. Lydia Amir, “Plato’s Theory of Love: Rationality as Passion,” *Practical Philosophy*, November 2001, 9-10.

³³¹ Plato. *Symposium*, 207a, p.331.

important element of romantic love, it does not amount to romantic³³² love in its entirety. The point is that *philia* is a broader type than *eros* and the distinction cannot simply be reduced to one of sexual expression. So, we may say that *philia* is (1) selective in ‘who’ the recipient of this love may be, and remains (2) an experience qualified (towards a good³³³) of that particular selected relation, and in light of that it is necessarily (3) connected to an action. But again here, this ‘good’ is not an objective single unity, even if the pursuit is noble and steadfast.³³⁴ The positive that *philia* expresses as a ‘love’ response is unfortunately (1) relative to the good each seek together *and* within the other. Also, *philia* though tethered to an expression albeit not sexual, is in light of that good seeking (2) a selective and thus value-laden assertion. Finally, as an expression this ‘love’ is both (3) connected to an action, and ultimately remains (4) relegated to a ‘type’.

As a segue into the theistic theories of love, there is another ‘type’, perhaps *the type*—the volitional love of *agape*. *Agapeic* love is and has been identified as *the* exemplar. For that reason this love was ‘baptized’ by the early Christians as a selfless God-like love—of a God who *is* love. The Christian import of this love from the Greeks is found in the New Testament and the writing of the Early Church Fathers. In Matthew’s Gospel, the ‘beatitudes’ of Christ offer a series of ‘you have heard it was said...but I say to you’ pericopes that are aimed at reaching the root cause of the original prescription, i.e., murder is predicated by festering hatred, therefore ‘I say to you’ if you hate you have in all intents murdered. These coupled comparatives have as a goal to move the hearer to ‘love an enemy’ in the way one ‘loves a neighbor’. Using *agape* as the affirming

³³² Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 93.

³³³ Here Aristotle connects the lasting friendship (love) to each provided as they are good, for excellence is an enduring thing. Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1156^b12.

³³⁴ Within those parameters of selectivity and quality, Aristotle thought “the greater part of the friendship of love depends on emotion and aims at pleasure” (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1156^b2-3, p. 1827), at least for those who were young rather than the mature who could mitigate such drives. A logical conclusion is that here we may speak of a lesser or greater expression of *philia* where the selection and quality are dependent upon the maturity of the ‘loving’ person. Even though the aim of *philia* may be said to be more genuine and oriented towards a higher good *in* the other, not even in its ‘purer’ state is one referring to a nature or essence.

love, each person should without reservation ‘love (αγαπατε) the enemies of you’.³³⁵ This is beyond the ‘friendship love’ and obviously not constrained by the context of a sexual relation.³³⁶

This *agape* as a ‘Greek love’ defied certain notions of Greece’s penchant for equity and justice, and principal among them is the seemingly indiscriminatory consideration of a valued good (ἀρετή) in the *other*. The purity of this ‘type’ of love for “the classical Greeks, with their love of measure, appropriateness, and moderation, [holds that they] would have found it repugnant and horrifying [because if] ‘nothing in excess’ is applied to men, that goes doubly so to gods. It would have struck the Greeks as cosmic rape”³³⁷ to consider *agape* in a context where one may receive more than one gives.³³⁸

There are ways this can be abused, which perhaps on the surface that does not present itself as a weakness (would it not apply to all systems?). But in relocating the value from the good *in* ‘this person’ or ‘that act’ to the Absolute it has transpired to an unreachable ideal for created being.³³⁹ It could be that (1) *agape* is a love that *is* this One God which creates an ontological chasm between the created ‘lower’ being who is not God and the Absolute who is God, i.e.,

³³⁵ Cf. Mt. 5.43b, *Greek-English Interlinear New Testament*, Trans. Robert K. Brown and Douglas W. Comfort (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House Publishers, Inc., 1993), 17.

³³⁶ There is no termination in sexual expression (immortality), or even that of friendship (good *in* the other). What disqualified both *philia* and *eros* from the height of *agape* was the selective nature of the formers, i.e., asking why is the other loved. By contrast *agape* love in context becomes “God’s love [that] is spontaneous and ‘unmotivated’; consequently, so that a man’s love for God, if it is really to deserve the name of *agape*, must also be spontaneous and ‘unmotivated’” (Cf. Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, 93). So, although there remains a good by which one orients themselves to *in* the other, love of that good with *agape* is more akin to a drawing into and becoming, rather than simply choosing that good based on some quality.³³⁶

³³⁷ David L. Norton and Mary F. Kille., Eds. *Philosophies of Love* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield Publisher, Inc., 1971), 156.

³³⁸ In brief, the entire concept of *agape* rises above what otherwise would be deemed an appropriate ‘love’ response by comparative value. In its entirety, it “represents a fundamental [historical?] ‘reversal in movement’, in so far as love is no longer restricted to the striving of the inferior towards the higher being, but now becomes the defining characteristic of God, of the highest being” (Hans Joas, *The Genesis of Values*. Trans. Gregory Moore (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 88). Then, according to this schema, the Beatitudes are not simply a logical application, but concern for those who ‘hate’ you becomes an imperative explicit in the nature of this *agape* love.

³³⁹ Even though here *Agape* has become the Christian God who is One, it presents itself problematic in light of the two concepts of *becoming* and the *One*, i.e., on the basis of at least those two considerations.

anything that is *only* like another is not the other, and therefore the created never really can *agape* another.³⁴⁰ Another issue that springs from this is that if (2) *agape* is this One God's nature and the claim is held that the created loves the *other* in an identical manner, then there arises a Plotinus-like dilemma in "that which comes from the One could not be the same, because otherwise the One would not have been the One (but many)."³⁴¹ So, either the *agape* is different between the contingent and the One God, or if not different than the one *agape* being many is not *the* One God.

There really is no way around this paradox. *Agape* either is what it is (One God) and the human person never really is fully capable of this *agape*, or *agape* is not what it is (One God) by virtue of the impossibility of the many being the one. Rosmini's appurtenance resolves this otherwise impossible conflict, in that both unity and ontology are preserved (the *many* share in the appurtenance of the *One* God).³⁴² With my proposal this 'unity of One' rises as a harmonization that for the created and contingent is never a reduction of the Ideal, though I will reserve my discussion of this harmonization for a following subsection.

What I demonstrated with the presentation of Classicalist theories of love was that each are unable to move beyond a transactional condition of love. Any attempt to *baptize* the notion of *agape* love into the Absolute (Christian God) will fail, splitting between the error of inaccessibility (unreachable One) or the absurdity of non-existence (the many cannot be One). *Rosmini's idea of*

³⁴⁰ I would not say that in the created contingent human person as *imago Dei*, and by virtue of that therefore in the sharing of a nature transcendence is achieved, and so that my point of contention is overcome. The theological concept of *imago Dei* and *idea of being* are clearly related, but not the same.

³⁴¹ Dmitri Nikulin, "The One and the Many in Plotinus," *Hermes*, 126. Bd., H. 3. (1998), pp 326-40, Cf. 336. Note that this point would also force a flattening of the Absolute's imminence.

³⁴² *Agape* even in the Classical sense then does remain the Ideal, but is achievable. Even when there is a sharing of this real by a disinterest to value, one is removed from this being a 'type' and the love is not left at the point of exemplar.

being as the appurtenance of the Absolute retains unity of the One, and without division allows harmonization with this love as a nature.

Theistic theories

In consideration solely to *agape* as an exemplarily love, as it is predicated on being equated with God's nature, that connection begs the question as to what is (1) the understanding and notion of this One God's nature? It is an obvious and simple point, but one that is often gleaned over as commonly held or accepted as a given. The other is similar, but premised on *agape's* connection to whatever nature of God one holds, since God's nature is not the human person's nature, then any human person loving other persons in line with *agape* must admit some level of participation between the created and Creator. In the case of this adopted Greek love it speaks directly to the relevance of (2) the relation of grace and nature in terms of each (together) affecting one's understanding of love as *agape*. To explicate these issues, I will present a sampling first of the Jewish idea of this love, then two stylized Christian concepts (primarily what would be a Protestant rebuttal to the Catholic/Orthodox presentation), and conclude with an Eastern theistic concept of such an ideal selfless love as given in the aphorisms of the *Narada Bhakti Sutra*.

Judeo/Christian theories

The relationality between God and man is determined as a central recollection found in the *Sh'ma Yisrael*. It reads, "Hear, O Israel, The Lord our God in one Lord. And thou shalt love (αγαπησεις) the Lord thy God with all thy mind, and with all thy soul, and all they strength."³⁴³ Here one finds the root use of *agape* as the chosen term for love. Though admittedly it is not necessarily

³⁴³ Deut. VI. 4-5, *The Septuagint with Apocrypha: Greek and English* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2005), 239.

connected to the Lord's nature but rather represents an enduring affection between the uncreated God and the created human. As an export of this God's love, it is intended to be a like-held love between and among humans. This concept of love is expressed explicitly by the great Commandment (love [αγαπησειζ] your neighbor [*re'akha*] as yourself—Lev. 19:18), which is not some repudiation of the *self* but an extension of the affection and care of oneself to the *other* premised on a self-love. It perhaps can be best understood as a sharing in the concern for the *self*, extended to the *other* with the standard being the created human's love for God.

Additionally in “the Hebrew [it] does not say simply ‘love they fellow,’ making *re'akha* the direct object, but *give* (or extend) *love* toward *thy fellow*...where the goal is aspirational, aiming not to eliminate self-regard but to overcome its invidiousness.”³⁴⁴ A further insight into the nature of this love is that the use of the term *re'akha* “is etymologically related to the root word for ‘shepherding,’ suggesting that the word *re'a* implies a personal attitude of care or shepherding toward others.”³⁴⁵ So, overall then in the Jewish frame of mind one is not speaking directly of a ‘God-nature love’ (though it does not discount that), but an ideal that flows from God to His people, and then from His people to each other.

For Christians then, even though this *agape* love had transitioned into and become incorporated into early Christian thought, there has been varied developments even within single faith expressions. To proceed then, I will: briefly expisit the grasp of ‘love as an idea’ in the Roman Catholic intellectual tradition focusing on Jacques Maritain and Karol Wojtyła; and then in terms of the Protestant tone; I will present that of Paul Tillich and Anders Nygren.

³⁴⁴ Lenn E. Goodman, *Love Thy Neighbor As Thyself* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008), 13. (Emphasis in original)

³⁴⁵ Hermann Cohen, *Ethics of Maimonides*. Trans. Almut Sh. Bruckstein (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004), 153.

Agape love in the Christian condition is God's nature expressed as love *for* the human person, *given* to the human person, meant to be *returned* to God *through* other human persons each created *imago Dei*. This creation (including the human person) is a 'spilling out' of the relationality of this Creator God where this self-sufficient God draws all 'things' back to the source.³⁴⁶ This is why if the *agape* love is God, then any love as *agape* must contain some level of disinterest—not to be read as indifference.³⁴⁷ Uncreated love, in pouring itself out on creatures, remains love and consequently is not satisfied unless another expansion responds to it and makes union possible."³⁴⁸ With this another element appears in this *agape* love, that of forming a multiple (expansion) into a unity of one (union) while preserving alterity (Created and uncreated remain distinct).

But even here this *agape* love need not exclude the sexual union, though a certain rehabilitation of *eros* is necessary. On that Karol Wojtyła offers a metaphysical treatment of love which he considers *agape* here as a betrothed love—a symbolic (sacramental) manifestation of this *agape* intersexually. Wojtyła forms his treatment of this love under the realms of attraction, desire, good will, and reciprocity. The attraction for him, following Aristotle, is for each "human person as an indescribably complex and, so to speak, an uneven good"³⁴⁹ that draws each one to the other. There is an understandable asymmetry in the good *within* each, but this asymmetrical attraction is part and parcel of this love.³⁵⁰ Goodwill is the manner in which this love is to be considered genuine for where it "is the same as selflessness in love: not 'I long for you as a good'

³⁴⁶ Accepting that dogmatically though doesn't imply this God is in need of the return love (though it will be argued it is part of the nature of both love and/as God).

³⁴⁷ I hinted to this when I brought up *agape* in relation to the Sermon on the Mount's beatitudes. Maritain points out that embedded within this *given/received* and *necessary/disinterested* paradox there lies "a metaphysical necessity.

³⁴⁸ Jacques Maritain, *Notebooks*, Trans. Joseph W. Evans (Albany, NY: Magi Books, Inc., 1984), 227.

³⁴⁹ Wojtyła, 76.

³⁵⁰ With the element of desire, the love is not itself *the* desire but love in this evaluation is bound up in the pursuit of this satisfaction, even if the desire is of an excellence found in the other.

but ‘I long for your good’.”³⁵¹ Here then the asymmetry is now to be applied to the reciprocity, i.e., an asymmetrical reciprocity. In the love expressed in and with the couple, “a ‘we’ comes into existence, [but] bilateral love is not in itself enough, sin still in spite of everything involves two ‘I’s’, though they may be fully predisposed to become a single ‘we’.”³⁵² So then because the ‘good’ in each is uneven, the reciprocity is by necessity asymmetrical, but nonetheless bound together alludes back to Maritain and the union capability of this *eros*-expressed *agape*.³⁵³

In the Christian tradition this disinterested God-love is the nature within the Creator, and an element *within* the created, i.e., it is grace. The Roman Catholic intellectual (and theological) tradition treats the human person as a cooperative agent *in* and *with* this grace-expressed love. That pinpoints an element of demarcation with nearly all of the expressions of the Protestant tradition (Lutheran/Reformed) as the differing philosophical anthropologies³⁵⁴ determined a breach in the grace-nature relation from the onset. This *misunderstanding* of the human person was anachronistically affirmed amidst the thought of Reformers engulfed in decadent Scholasticism and nominalistic tendencies. Rather than a cooperative element of faith and love (*fides caritate formata*) it was held by the Reformers “that it is impossible to affirm and uphold the sovereignty of God without a corresponding annihilation of the creature, especially man.”³⁵⁵ This affected developing Christian traditions; on certain points, severed them.

³⁵¹ Wojtyła, 83.

³⁵² Wojtyła, 85.

³⁵³ It would require more space to work this out clearer, but *in nuce* love as *eros* remains the ‘pull’ and love as *agape* the ‘force’; both are personal loves and each complimentary.

³⁵⁴ This subsection alone should make it clear to the reader that my premise of ‘love as the appurtenance’ would be negated from the start in consideration of the philosophical anthropology of the Protestant faith expression.

³⁵⁵ Louis Bouyer, *The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism* (Princeton, NJ: Scepter Publishers, 2001), 176.

The transition then to *sola gratia* pressed the Catholic/Orthodox cooperative aspects of grace³⁵⁶ arousing and exacting human acts of love on one side. With the Protestant (Lutheran/Reformed?) tradition the loving efforts of the human person are to be suppressed, or at least made to be a matter of indifference.³⁵⁷ And in that way it inevitably makes the presence of *love* one too of indifference.³⁵⁸

The implications of this then arise in consideration of love manifesting in the finite created's harmony *in* and *with* the Infinite Uncreated. The love takes on a wholly distinct schema; within the realm of a grace-covered individual (extrinsically declared) as opposed to a grace-transformed individual (intrinsically transformed), the chasm between the finite and infinite lies outside of a privileged reach. The resultant framework then is that "there is no conditional way of reaching the unconditional; there is no finite way of reaching the infinite"³⁵⁹ and God as love remains wholly Other. That is not to imply that this Infinite Love does not *reframe* (or reform) the lives of the human individuals or that there is no element of love connected to an act which sublimates this faith, but this love as *agape* is contained as the nature of the Absolute, but that nature is/cannot be transferred to the created.

This needn't be an 'all or nothing affair', as for Paul Tillich this love maintains a transformative aspect, even if not indicative of the ontological status of the human person where that love enables the individual to become the God they love in and with other, and to whom they

³⁵⁶ I recognize that other liturgical traditions, such as the Anglican, Methodist, and such do not share the strict separation on these points. My issue here is not concerned with the veracity of the theological divisions, but the overarching sense of cooperation between nature and grace that can best be demarcated by these expressions.

³⁵⁷ Cf. Bouyer, 173.

³⁵⁸ This is true not as an indifference in terms of the *value* of the other as a person 'indifferently loved', but in the salutary value of love's relevance altogether which is made indifferent towards an inherent ontological worth, i.e., the love flows from an ordinance and can exhibit no cooperative efforts in creation.

³⁵⁹ Paul Tillich, *Dynamics of Faith* (New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2001), 16.

place faith into.³⁶⁰ But in light of this, there arises this necessary tension in Tillich between this ‘otherly-love’ (*agape*) and what he understands as a selfly-love (*eros*). In the mode of existence this forms what he terms an ‘ontological polarity’ that perpetually distorts the love of any individual. As to the distinction between love as *eros* and love as *agape*, Tillich seeks to respond to their existential rupture. Defining all love as a longing for reunion, which implies fulfilment, he seeks to counter the division of love into a ‘desire for self-fulfillment by the other being’ (*eros*) and ‘the will to self-surrender for the sake of the other being’ (*agape*) as indicative of a false alternative.”³⁶¹ The primary issue is that the latter finds its source in the Infinite and the latter in the human subject.³⁶²

Concerning Anders Nygren, he follows the Platonic grasp of love as that which desires the beautiful in the other. With the division between love as *eros* and *agape*, Nygren finds the former “is man’s aspiration after the highest good he can conceive. It is an activity of man. God Himself can hardly be said to love in this sense, since there is no good which he lacks or can desire.”³⁶³ That Godly love is expressed as *agapeic*, and like other understandings of *agape* it is a disinterested unreserved love. But Nygren would present it as *eros* and *agape* by their nature and object are diametrically opposed. Thus, *agape* is not within the realm of possibility for the human subject as the motivation is more akin to obedience than willful ascent which lines up more closely with *eros*

³⁶⁰ The ‘holy’ has the power to unite these moral elements to the faith directed element (ontological) according to Tillich. He claims that although it seems natural to the human person to deny dependence of love on actions and faith, that they are implied in faith and acts cannot be separated from it; then in spite of all distortions in the interpretations of faith...it is true however inadequately it has been expressed. Cf. Tillich’s *Dynamics of Faith*, 126ff.

³⁶¹ Julia T. Meszaros, *Selfless Love and Human Flourishing in Paul Tillich and Iris Murdoch* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016), 95.

³⁶² Tillich was steeped in secular existentialism; a fuller treatment would consider that to mitigate the concepts presented here, but nonetheless his cultural import to an apprehending of love as *agape* stands.

³⁶³ A. S. Dewdney, “Agape and Eros,” *Canadian Journal of Theology*, Vol. I, No.1, 1955, (19-27), p. 19. Tillich was steeped in secular existentialism; a fuller treatment would consider that to mitigate the concepts presented here, but nonetheless his cultural import to an apprehending of love as *agape* stands.

as an expressed self-love desiring the other, in this case God. Here there then is one movement of love up (*eros*) and the other love as a movement down (*agape*).

The underlying nature-grace dichotomy I have offered surfaces here as an ironic paradox. In that the created material world is ‘good’ (according to Divine Revelation) Nygren declares the human person’s aspiring love as limited to *eros* which is “in its every form a final egocentricity that is dismissed as something perverse and spiritually blind, wholly worthless and unpleasing to God. The question then is, are not physical needs and desires an inevitable part or state in human life, advancing towards higher goods outside the self?”³⁶⁴ If so, then holding Nygren’s position results as a rejection of not solely man’s inability to love as *agape*, but too in that it implicitly concedes a human nature incapable to do so. The conclusion from this perspective then is that the God-like *agape* is not within reach of the human person, and the human-like love *eros* is man’s love (for God) based on the worthiness of the object (in God) to which it is directed but will never reach the only appropriate ‘type’ of love that is reserved for within God alone.

In this section I have reviewed some key Jewish and Christian thinkers and their schemas of the notions of love. I began with the Christian import of *agape*, then spoke of the Jewish use of *agape* and its connection to shepherding. Then I tendered the broad division in the Christian comprehension of love, from an asymmetry bound to the good which included a cooperative element, to *agape* as wholly the Other where the relation to the Absolute was extrinsic. Now I shall continue by incorporating an analysis of an Eastern treatment.

³⁶⁴ Cf. Dewdney, 26.

Eastern synopsis

I will offer a representative notion of a single custom that presents itself as key overlap, as found within the Hindu tradition of the *Narada Bhakti Sutra*. The two primary loves I will cover then are *bhakti* which is a ‘devotion love’, that even in its transcendental properties stands as an elevated human love. The other is *prema* that resembles, though rather imperfectly the Greek love *philia*. This *prema* is a general category of love, though meant to connote selflessness. In this tradition, one does not find the dichotomy separating the love of god(s) and the human person as was proposed in the manner Nygren asserted. But in the first instance these loves remain distinct. Secondly, I will retain some relation to ‘types’, regardless of the interdependence they relationally share.

More so than exterior rituals or simply some increase in knowing, there is in this tradition the love between human persons and their god(s) referred to as *bhakti*. Sometimes literally translated as devotion, it also contains this shared sacred value while maintaining a distinction by perfections, i.e., it could increase or decrease. The other is the general understanding of love known as *prema* which has that connotation of selfless caregiving love, and also the notion of loving the inner-self. And though these perfections do not carry the same connotation of types (*eros*, *agape*, etc.), neither are they entirely removed from that critique in that each forms some arena or boundary to qualify it as a category, and by that notion must essentially contain some element of value.

With *prema* as a ‘personal love’, it stands out as the ‘soul’ of “*bhakti* or the higher love [which itself] is a cross over from the mortal, that is, the mundane, day-to-day existence”³⁶⁵

³⁶⁵ R. Raj Singh, “Eastern Concepts of Love: A Philosophical Reading of Narada Bhakti Sutra,” *Asian Philosophy*, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2005 (221-29), 225.

aspiring towards a transformative quality of the love. This *bhakti* presents itself as an escape from mortality (to something other) *via* the love which itself urges the individual towards immortality. As a transcendent love it becomes that by which one reaches a state of ‘true love’ where all emotive responses and desires become futile, even obstacles for that matter. In verse 55 of the *Narada Bhakti Sutra* it reads...

Achieving that experience one sees only love,
Hears only love, speaks only love, and thinks
of love alone.³⁶⁶

The transcendent character of this love is a reflective state of mind of the bearer of this love. As each person is one’s own master, each person is fully responsible for the perception of the world and in this case of love. It remains substantially relevant for personal spiritual progress.³⁶⁷

This love though is not self-affirming, but a self-originating modality of love in the manner of the inner authoritative capacity it purports, i.e., it is its own standard. As the foremost of love this “*bhakti* essentially is an elevation of personal love, meaning it is not a different kind of love. *Bhakti* is an application of love between persons to the love between the devotee and God.”³⁶⁸ This concept grounds the love in something that is accessible, yet its immanence contains the seeds of immortality. The relation of each person to god(s) takes on the desiring of ‘gifting’ oneself to another.³⁶⁹ There arises from this love “a natural quest, as one begins to enjoy *giving* happiness rather than merely taking solace in the happiness received. In the yet higher love (*prema-bhakti*),

³⁶⁶ In Prem Prakash, *The Yoga of Spiritual Devotion: A Modern Translation of the Narada Bhakti Sutras* (Rochester, VT: Inner Traditions International, 1998), 102.

³⁶⁷ For a fuller treatment, see Prakash, 103.

³⁶⁸ Singh, 228.

³⁶⁹ Here I would consider the parallel with Christian love to seem obvious, even if superficial. It has the grasp of *agape* and the tone of *eros*. Again, it does not hold the same connotation, as the similarities are slightly more accidental, but nonetheless apparent.

the process of giving love becomes blissfully enjoyable, for the lover is a giver and not a mere pleasure-seeker.³⁷⁰

Though I have offered but a single non-monotheistic Eastern expression of love, I have explained *bhakti* as the ‘devotion love with the transcendental property it continues to be a form of elevated human love. The other love I described was *prema*, the ‘general love’ but selflessness love. I further offered that there is not the dichotomy between God and the human person with these loves, nonetheless each retained the modality of ‘types’. It is on that point alone, which my thesis continues to assert will relegate any form of such a love, distinct from qualifying as equivalent to the native appurtenance of the human person.³⁷¹ I will now move my analysis forward to those theories of love which find their expression in what I consider to be the ‘modern era’.

Modern ‘turn’ theories

Philosophical turns tend to repudiate aspects of the ideas which preceded them and these subsequent eras are characteristically marked by their historical dissimilarity from what was inherited. In the process of discrediting a system, here the theistic underpinnings attached to love were to be annulled. To demonstrate those effects, the initial subsection “Into the Enlightenment” will cover the concept of love as it was framed by the Rationalist. I will limit my presentation to the thought of Immanuel Kant (willful and gleeful duty) and that of Friedrich Nietzsche (slave-like mentality of ‘fear my neighbor). Then subsequently addressing the evolution of the idea of love into the era of “Romanticism”, I will consider the theories according to Rousseau and Hegel.

³⁷⁰ Singh, 227.

³⁷¹ That is, it suffers the same complications of the various Greek loves in terms of how it can resolve the tensions of being one, many, and retaining alterity.

Before concluding this section on “Schemes of Love” the last treatment will cover the Twentieth Century ‘rise of the ego’ and a contemporary attempt of recovery.

Into the Enlightenment

In this section I will begin with Immanuel Kant showing his reliance on love as ‘duty done gladly’ and argue that it results in an elevated self-love based on criteria balancing pleasure and displeasure. His notion of imperative ‘duty’ simply is the same rationality placed on love as any other moral act, but with the expectation of doing so willingly with cheer. Moving onto Friedrich Nietzsche I will contend his emphatic assertion of ‘love thy neighbor’ is essentially distilled to ‘fear thy neighbor’. As a slave mentality it simply reduces to a self-slave enclosure where one’s own will of ‘loving others’ becomes incestuous and stagnant as the love is isolated from the otherwise equal and unique ‘other’.

The concept of love in the schema of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) stems from the same rational basis upon which he developed his epistemology. Though not unlike his epistemology, this notion of a rationally-founded love did not preclude a love for *or* connection with the Christian God.³⁷² Kant forms two modalities. The first understands (1) love shaped as a presentation *to an object* according to concepts; the other as a sense in which (2) love is based on the *receptivity* of the subject.³⁷³ This determines his ‘power of desire’ as it relates to love. From this as “rational beings, one’s consciousness of the agreeableness of life is determined as *happiness*, and the

³⁷² His view was rooted in the moral expression summed up in what he took as God’s law. This ‘revealed law’ fell into the ethic of an ideal, and the love then becomes a striving towards perfection that can be rationally acquired (contained?).

³⁷³ This would be where feelings as happiness are measured by pleasure or displeasure.

principle whereby one makes happiness the highest determining basis of the power of choice is the principle of self-love³⁷⁴ rationally chosen by the human agent.

This constitutes a two-fold love in an apparent opposition. On the one hand “because Kant must construe love as a ‘sensuous pleasure derived from an object’, he asks whether the love of God is also to be thought of in this way. Since God is no ‘object of the senses’, he rules out this possibility.³⁷⁵ But the concept of being able ‘free to love’ unconstrained by instinct may too become part of the equation either in the case of (1) love of God, or (2) love between human persons. When Kant’s view(s) are applied to a sexual love, there is what can be termed a ‘high love’ and a ‘low love’. High love carries the notion typically thought of as caring for the other, but as a ‘low love’ it finds expression as an ‘animal mechanical’ self-love. The latter is arational and does not involve comparison—or, more precisely, does not involve an evaluation of the happiness of others in comparison with one’s own happiness.³⁷⁶ So, this low-love is selfish, and perhaps does not rise to a necessary quality to be considered what many would hold as a *real* type of love. Kant thought to love another one must seek something within the other, rationally detectible, that can draw the lover to love. In the case of (2) love between human persons the concept of a perfection fits there as the advent of *something* sensed.³⁷⁷ Back to the case of the (1) love of God who cannot be sensed, the highest perfection can only be conceived (discovered?) rationally.

³⁷⁴ The summary of Theorem II was taken from Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002), 33-34.

³⁷⁵ Pärttyli Rinne, *Kant on Love* (Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter, 2018), 86.

³⁷⁶ Rinne, 66.

³⁷⁷ That some *thing* could be the recognition of a talent, an internal characteristic that becomes externally viewable, etc. This ‘sensed perfection’ then moves the human will to love based on the rational qualities known that contribute both to a love of the other, and an increase in happiness necessary for self-love.

This love for the other is compelled by an ethical notion of duty.³⁷⁸ In terms of the Great Commandment for Kant, in loving God and neighbor the latter love is fully capable of fruition yet the love of neighbor (between the created) cannot be strictly compelled or commanded *by* the other without some delight being *practically* reserved in the act of loving.

No human being has it within his power to love someone merely on [someone's] order. Therefore it is only *practical love* which is understood in that kernel of all laws. To love God, in this signification, means to fulfill his commands *gladly*; to love one's neighbor means to perform all duty toward him *gladly*. The command that makes this a rule, however, also cannot command one to *have* this attitude in actions conforming to duty, but only to *strive* for it. For, a command to do something gladly is intrinsically contradictory, because if we already know on our own what we are obligated to do, and if we were moreover conscious of being glad to do it, then there would be no need at all for a command concerning it; and if we did do it, yet not gladly but only from respect for the law, then a command that makes this very respect the incentive of the maxim would act precisely contrary to the commanded attitude.³⁷⁹

The establishment of a category of freedom sets this 'rule' of love of God and neighbor as the seed under which that Commandment carries no force outside of the will 'gladly' aligning. Any instinct which might be present or 'instigate' such an ascent as love to the other must arise as an ethical duty. But it remains otherwise contrary to the very stated case if that duty were the binding drive, i.e., although by Command one is *told* they are to love it cannot really be love if one is *told* to love.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁸ The Ancients tied love to the pursuit of a 'good' (highest?), but with Kant's system the causality must be predicated solely on practical reason and forms some aspect of ethical beneficence for the other. This impinges on the category of freedom, which in one regard the good in the other can move the will while remaining firmly stable within the boundaries of cognitive reason.

³⁷⁹ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*. Trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002), 108.

³⁸⁰ This schema does not discount any of the emotive signaling one would expect to accompany a display of love for either God or neighbor, nor does it precipitate it. But this love likewise must not be committed simply by a natural inclination towards what is perceived good or beautiful in God, or the other. And since inclinations too cannot be directly commanded, the commandment to love as I have presented it prior, can only concern practical love, i.e., love of neighbour exhibited as active rational benevolence. The sensible 'signals' which still present themselves in this practical love simply appear as a *residue* or a *supplement*. This then in itself informs or generates the kind of emotional state that should approximately be accompanied when acting from duty. To 'do one's duty' to God is 'to love God' and act lovingly on His behalf gladly (Rinne, 89), and also to the other. But in each instance, it stirs the senses while nonetheless remaining rationally appropriated as a love that springs from the will, but nothing greater than an elevated self-love expressed as a practical love formed by the 'duty done gladly'.

Addressing the views of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)³⁸¹ in this section I will explore two aspects of Nietzsche's philosophy which impinge on the view of love. The first is (1) a slave mentality as it applies to morality, and the concept of love affected by his claim of (2) the impossibility of objective truth.

Concerning the latter, with (2) this impossibility of objective truth Nietzsche's opposition to any empirical epistemic certainty falls prey to what is an observable 'fact'. For him this 'fact' contains no more certainty than the individual 'willing' of any other observable version of events, i.e., the 'willing' is not causal. Certainty by extension in terms of moral knowing then is dependent on *your* subjective good. Speaking as Zarathustra, he says that in his life he has sought the answer which would satisfy the question if there was '*the way*' and only '*the way*' above all other ways. Zarathustra replies, "A testing and a questioning hath been all my traveling:—and verily, one must also *learn* to answer such questioning! That, however,—is my taste:—Neither a good nor a bad taste, but *my* taste, of which I have no longer either shame or secrecy. "This—is now *my* way 'the way.' For *the way*—it doth not exits!"³⁸² This is not some 19th century version of 'alternate facts' but more precisely (perhaps there is at least this concession to an objective truth), that there are only 'alterable facts'.

I argue that philosophically love is an anthropological element dependent on objective certainty. This certainty then must align with 'the truth' or 'the way', and the subjectivity of 'taste' in untenable applied to knowing or loving. But "according to Nietzsche our lack of self-knowledge

³⁸¹ I recognize that this stretches the time-frame beyond the commonly held Enlightenment era that typically ends with the French Revolution. Though an argument not part of this study, it is not uncommon to recognize that Nietzsche to remain within this domain. I mention this not to enter into that debate, but only to stave off any concern or a perceived misstep in the time-frame by his inclusion. In short, the Enlightenment was the 'water he swam in' and although it was an ethos he attacked, he nonetheless retained certain elements common to the period or movement and therefore 'fits' into this section. Cf. Call, Lewis. *Nietzsche as Critic and Captive of Enlightenment*. 1995. University of California, Irvine. PhD Dissertation.

³⁸² Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. Trans. Thomas Common (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University, 1999), 177.

is mirrored in [the] crippling dependence on overly rationalistic or metaphysical conceptions of human nature”³⁸³ which inevitably result in the subjective submission of love to that inherent epistemic uncertainty. The application of this adherence of rationality to the subjective translates then to the place love occupies. Love, like ‘*the way*’ is reduced to taste, so that there is not ‘*the love*’ but only ‘*my love*’ or ‘*your love*’, both of which may be alterable.

This reactional lack of certainty, and resultant subjective criteria for knowing brings Nietzsche to the (1) the slave mentality as it applies to morality. If one were to say they ‘love their neighbor’ what could that mean in terms of a standard between holders of varying tastes?³⁸⁴ In this schema love devolves into the subjective values necessarily resultant for personal satisfaction and thus, external to morality as it exists for the ‘other’—an ingenious egoism. This is nothing more than some “Dionysian affirmation of the world reformulated as an exhortation to become more willing to admit freely to one’s own desires, regardless of their moral value. The concern for others, for the evaluation of one’s own actions and their consequences, diminishes,”³⁸⁵ and what is perceived as ‘love’ remains (for Nietzsche it ‘arrives’) as a subjective taste finally accepted as ‘*my way*’.

Love then, if it holds any concept of being a power or force, is always calling the weak to protect themselves, i.e., love as the preservation of ‘*the way*’ from those who might impose ‘*their way*’. This structure then calls forth some ethical system to reel in the powerful who would simply get ‘*their way*’ at the expense of those whose ‘*my way*’ was suppressed. The export of this modality to love then is that the concept of love as an expression of Nietzsche’s slave mentality where the

³⁸³ Kathleen O’Dwyer, *The Possibility of Love: An Interdisciplinary Analysis* (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2009), 11.

³⁸⁴ Yet, there remains this societal ‘glue’ of care and benevolence that appears to exist in some universal context as a Nietzschean instinctual force which results in mutual satisfaction and the pursuit of general happiness (biologically driven love?).

³⁸⁵ Joas, 32.

‘ethical duty’ is a camouflaged response devolving into “a product of ‘repressed’ sentiments for vengeance on the part of banausic men who ‘displace’ their sentiments because they are powerless.”³⁸⁶ For Nietzsche then³⁸⁷ after the structure of society as a whole appears determined and secure against external dangers, it is this fear of the neighbour which creates new perspectives of moral evaluation”³⁸⁸ where the impossibility of objective truth has morphed into the impossibility of love.

With Kant, I clearly showed that in as much as any love is founded on self-love, according to his schema that love is predicated on pleasure/displeasure, the imperative ‘duty’ simply is the same rational measure placed on love as any other moral act. The expectation of doing so ‘gladly’ can be as much of a reluctance as a willful choice of good for and to the other. When I turned to Nietzsche, I showed that with his emphatic assertion of ‘love thy neighbor’ being akin to ‘fear thy neighbor’, there is simply an exporting of his slave mentality that isolates the ‘I’ from the equal and unique ‘other’. I will now move onto Romanticism, which in tandem likewise sought to repudiate the dissimilar ideas of Kant and Nietzsche.

Romanticism

In this section on Romanticism, I will show first that Rousseau’s conception of love posits the ideal as a form of an expansive self-love which results in little more than an isolated individual’s automation, i.e., pursuing one’s own end *in* the other. Then moving on to Hegel I will reveal his

³⁸⁶ Joas, 28.

³⁸⁷ Here the Great Commandment to ‘love thy neighbor as thyself’ can hold no semblance of love that is not based on anything outside the perimeter of control. To ‘love the neighbor’ is closer to the reluctant accord that stems not from the ‘glad willingness’ of Kant, but rather surfaces resultant of the fatigue at failing to achieve one’s own ‘*my way*’. “In the final analysis, ‘love of one’s neighbour’ is always something secondary, partly conventional and arbitrarily illusory in relation to *fear of the neighbour*.”

³⁸⁸ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*. Trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 149.

radical notion of love serving as a uniting feature between self and other. As seemingly attractive to my thesis³⁸⁹ this notion ultimately falls prey to remaining an ‘interior sense’.

There is something unique from the ‘modern turn’ in that Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) has a high regard for the human person’s inherent capability to ascend the good they willfully choose. He “asserts that human beings are born good, and that the real source of corruption is located outside the individual—in society. This Rousseauian idea is expressed in his well-known phrase, ‘man is born free, but everywhere he is in chains.’”³⁹⁰ In this liberty/shackles dichotomy the idea of love, specifically *eros*, manifests as the power to become free. Love loosens those chains; though he is careful to warn that possibility is remote. Rousseau sets to task an appropriate pedagogy where given the positive view of the human person’s inherent potentiality, love as *eros* can become the cultivator of benevolence towards another.

The ‘chains’ of the State (the human person’s environment) are the result of an evolutionary process of sorts. The pre-social ‘savage man’ of Rousseau is analogously developed by a modality of the maturation of a State to reflect the biological development of the human person,³⁹¹ mirroring an understanding of the needs of a young child. For example, when a child begins to cry the mother runs to their aid, but before too long the cry takes on the essence of a command. The crying child “begins by asking our aid; they end by compelling us to serve them. Thus, from their very weakness, whence comes, at first, their feeling of dependence, springs afterward the idea of commanding others.”³⁹² The point here, without developing his analogy any

³⁸⁹ In as much as his thought lies in the realm of ideas the creative and communicative nature in speaking of a self-recognition in the other (and the unity of the absolute).

³⁹⁰ Kerry T. Burch, “Rousseau on Love, Education, and Selfhood in ‘Emile’”, *Counterpoints*, Vol 114, Eros as the Educational Principle of Democracy (2000), 118.

³⁹¹ There are in his developmental process, a total of five stages, the initial stage (childhood) is the longest term, and too the one incurring the most risks.

³⁹² Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Émile: or Concerning Education*. Trans. Barbara Foxley (London, England: Everyman’s Library, 1963), Book I, 29.

further, is the advent of the ‘everywhere chains’ that the human person is basked in from birth is that from which all need liberation. *Eros* then as the soul of education proceeds in freedom for the human person as the ‘way out’ where this need for gratification is *the* awakening of self-love.

This self-love, present in the human person from the earliest point of existence, Rousseau terms *amour de soi*. Though this is a primitive quality based on the concept of self-preservation (crying for a genuine need), it need not be crassly selfish in character. “Rousseau holds that the boundaries of the self are elastic and hence can be stretched to incorporate another or many others. Self-love is itself malleable and susceptible to transformation and generalization.”³⁹³ As a self-love, *eros* is not limited to the good (or needs) of the individual who self-loves. *Eros* in this manner, once awakened at the puberty ‘stage’, aids in the widening of this *amour de soi*. But this primitive self-love expands to the desire for the esteem of others, or what Rousseau terms *amour propre*.³⁹⁴ This ‘other-interest’ self-love is aimed to make oneself lovable, to garner respect and have others find you pleasing. He says in *Émile*, “Be just, humane, beneficent. Be not content with giving alms; be charitable. Kindness relieves more distress than money can reach. Love others, and they will love you; serve them, and they will serve you.”³⁹⁵

In those parameters then one finds Rousseau’s turmoil and consequences of love.³⁹⁶ Relationally, the human person is always in conflict for Rousseau; hidden interests are always present underneath an otherwise benevolent action.³⁹⁷ He accepted the notion of a beneficent God

³⁹³ John M. Warner, *Rousseau and the Problem of Human Relations* (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2015), 20.

³⁹⁴ It is widely known that this term did not originate with Rousseau, but nonetheless fits his comparison with the instinctual self-love.

³⁹⁵ Rousseau, 60.

³⁹⁶ Notice I am not including here a treatment on God’s love (Divine instinct?); it is not central to Rousseau’s project of fulfilment of the human person in her or his social relations.

³⁹⁷ Cf. Warner, 19—“The hope of creating a stable and just political society on the basis of narrow self-interest is a soul-shrinking and self-destructive dogma masquerading as a science of politics. It had succeeded only in multiplying the sources of human conflict, narrowing the scope of human desire, and undermining the psychological sources of virtue and social affection. Legitimate social institutions must offer deeper compensations than the empty

and an afterlife where sufferings of life would be averted eternally, but Rousseau thought it was not here on earth that the “pinnacle of human happiness was reached in the asocial state of nature but rather in the primitive sociability of the ‘Golden Age,’ where the establishment of the nuclear family and the introduction of ‘conjugal and paternal love’ were adequate compensations for the psychological disturbances introduced by the birth of *amour propre*.”³⁹⁸ This love (*eros*) of the ‘here and now’ cannot drive the human person to transcendence, in spite of such claims.³⁹⁹

In my treatment of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), I want to point out there also existed this oppositional struggle that lies ‘under the surface’ of the human person—it proves to be a source of discord. But in response to whatever ‘psychological disturbances’ might be present externally, from achieving an inner unity he “drew his hope that philosophy, a ‘new philosophy, which consisted not in mere fixed and abstract concepts divorced from existence but in a systematic movement of concepts in connection with existence [that] could provide for the genuine, rational grasping of the infinite in [this] life.”⁴⁰⁰ So, there arises in his quest some security to be found in an abandonment of the ‘knowledge of love’ to discover a landing in something experiential of the infinite. Hegel’s notion carries this idea of love as being ‘outside of oneself’⁴⁰¹ where one is capable of grasping the ‘viewer of self’. This speaks to and encapsulate Hegel’s understanding of this self. This ‘self’ feels love as “only in love alone is one at one with the object”⁴⁰² as a transcendental intuition positing love as a subject-object identity.

felicity of Hobbes and Locke, and a satisfactory account of human relations must comprehend more than the impoverished and arid associations to which that anemic conception of happiness had given rise.”

³⁹⁸ Warner, 7.

³⁹⁹ The asocial nature of the human person according to Rousseau betrays any genuine import of what would normally be held as *agape* love and therefore insufficient as a nature.

⁴⁰⁰ Alice Ormiston, *Love and Politics: Re-interpreting Hegel*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2004), 29-30.

⁴⁰¹ Here envisions a dramatic scene of hovering outside one’s psyche.

⁴⁰² Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Miscellaneous Writings of G.W.F. Hegel*, Ed. John Stewart (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2002), 119.

In the experiential (practical engagement) of both the self and the ‘social other’, love then functions as the unifying element. Though this unity is not derived from some rational judgment the unity arises by the feature of this love as a ‘feeling’—a ‘spirit’ of sorts. Yet this feeling although unifying, is not unitary, i.e., within the family “love is described as spirit’s ‘feeling of its own unity.’”⁴⁰³ There is an underlying necessity in this vision of love that as some predisposition to division the unifying love overcomes discord. The power of this unity is proportional to the division or disunity where “the more variegated the manifold in which life [itself] is alive, the more places in which it can be reunified; the more the places in which it can sense itself, the deeper does love become.”⁴⁰⁴ This love (as an ethical love) in a syllogistic sense takes on the role of a middle term and forms as ‘a will’ expressed socially between self and world (others).⁴⁰⁵

This could be reasoned as a movement toward the Absolute embodied essentially in the unifying love consisting in the categories of family and individuality, with love again as the middle term. Hegel here is developing this concept of love in opposition to the duty-laden love of Kant’s rationality. In Hegel’s mind Kant’s ‘duty done gladly’ never could disentangle itself from strict conformity to the Great Commandment. Then in opposition to Rousseau Hegel rejects that instinctual yoke placed on the human person. For Hegel this unifying ‘function of love’ is a practical engagement of both the self and the ‘social other’. From that then in terms of Divine love, “since the divine is pure life, anything and everything said of it must be free from any [implication]

⁴⁰³ Toulou Nicolacopoulos and George Vassilacopoulos. *Hegel and the Logical Structure of Love* (Victoria, Australia: Re. Press, 2011), 132.

⁴⁰⁴ Hegel, *Miscellaneous Writings of G.W.F. Hegel*, 287ff.

⁴⁰⁵ Ethical love is thus necessarily intersubjective in the sense that it constitutes an objective universal essence that functions as loving beings’ substantive field of interaction. Within this substantive field the loving bond embodies the moments of unity and difference. The first (moment of unity), takes the form of individual self-unity structuring the identity of the ‘loving self’. The second (the moment of difference), takes the form of the universal difference that defines family members as a plurality (Nicolacopoulos and Vassilacopoulos, 132), thus generating in the family a feeling of its own unity.

of opposition,”⁴⁰⁶ which leaves a genuine love (if one may call it that) not within the reach of this the same ‘family’ that experiences that practical unity brought about by experiential love—there is an unresolvable tension.⁴⁰⁷ Though Hegel’s system does not seem to provide a means to ‘bridge’ this self/nature chasm, as he undertook in his experiential *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it remains unattainable

First with Rousseau I demonstrated that his conception of love was ideally an expansive self-love. That notion results in an isolated individual’s automation, where the other becomes a means to pursuing one’s own end. With Hegel, though it was promising that love can serve as a uniting feature (self and other), in as much as his thought remained in the realm of ideas, his system fell prey to love as an ‘interior sense’ of the feeling where the ‘way out’ for love remains an elusive goal. Now continuing, as Romanticism waned in the 19th century, by early in the following century one can identify an evolution of such an idealistic notion of the self; I will now proceed to offer a treatise on that approach.

Twentieth Century theories

I have selected three 20th century thinkers; Sigmund Freud, Harry Frankfurt, and Karol Wojtyła. Freud’s treatment of love and sex revolutionized the cultural ethos. Frankfurt offered a notion of one’s personal desire not easily being disentangled from a personal sought-after benefit. Wojtyła’s characterization of love as a total autonomous surrender is promising in recognizing both one’s own value and in that, the realization of the ontological value of the ‘other’. What I intend to show

⁴⁰⁶ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*. Trans. T.M. Knox. *Works in Continental Philosophy*, Ed. John R. Silber (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 225.

⁴⁰⁷ In Hegel’s “philosophical system the final emanation of an Absolute is that which seeks rational self-comprehension. The philosopher follows the unfolding of the Absolute in both the world of nature and humanity, comprehending the unity of both of them in the Absolute as a totality” (Ormiston, 33).

overall is love's transitioning from an inherited yearning experience to some erotic 'push' from behind, which ultimately posits a tension in the restructuring of the motivations that can ultimately be resolved in the ontological realization (value) of the other.

By the beginning of the 20th century, the impact of Freud and his psychoanalytic method popularized various notions of love and sex. These followed with methods of free association and dream analysis. It is not an overstatement to claim that all that has followed in terms of academic understandings of love has either been influenced by or in some manner must engage his thinking. In popular thought⁴⁰⁸ his notions of the *id* and *ego* are part and parcel of the vernacular. In the words of Richard Rorty, "The problem is that love looks different after one has read Freud."⁴⁰⁹

Rise of the ego⁴¹⁰

In this section on Sigmund Freud's (1856-1939) conception of love I will show how he proposes that all love is derived from *eros* which he holds as the satisfaction of a necessary drive. This drive is instinctual; not teleological towards the self or other. Though I would posit Freud's conception of love possessing an inherent aspect of being in that to not love is to cease to fulfill something inherent, love is reduced to the movement from relation; to impulse; to some foreseen or desired sexual union.

⁴⁰⁸ Though it is likely the 'average' person has not read Freud directly.

⁴⁰⁹ Richard Rorty, "Freud, Morality, and Hermeneutics." *New Literary History*. Vol. 12, No. 1 (Autumn, 1980) 180.

⁴¹⁰ *Ego* is a Freudian term, that is well known. But as I will immediately begin a discussion on Freud's view of *eros* which he associates primarily with the *id*, I would like to offer a brief explanatory remark as to why I chose *ego*. In the addendum to Freud's *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality* (1915), there began a clarification as to what degree 'sex' explained mental pathologies and neurosis. He did not want it to explain 'all' things, and began to develop a distinction between that which is *ego*-directed (inward) and that which is object-directed (outward). To comment farther is beyond the scope of this subsection. But I do see the 20th century's grasp of love as heavily oriented towards *eros*, and I further understand *eros* as primarily *ego*-driven, i.e., a primitive selfishness. That is the intended use of the term *ego* here.

In his view(s) of love it is duly noted that any issuance of ‘what love is’ must be tempered (accepted in context) by its therapeutic aims, i.e., investigating the underpinning subconscious conflicts and/or repressions from developmental periods. Centering his project on *eros* Rollo May points out how Freud appealed back to the Platonic notion. But whereas both Plato and Freud claimed the centrality of *eros*, and equally held to the pervasive nature of the idea of this *eros* marked by its ubiquitous consideration over the millennia, the distinction between these two thinkers could not be starker concerning the nature of this love.

Freud defined *eros* as a push from behind, a force coming out of a ‘chaotic, undifferentiated, instinctive energy-source along predictable and prescribable paths toward a mature life and only partially, a painfully civilized love. Whereas for Plato *eros* is entirely bound up with the possibilities ahead which ‘pull’ one; it is the yearning for union, the capacity to relate to new forms of human experience. It is ‘wholly telic, goal-directed, and moves toward the more-than-nature’.⁴¹¹ In Freudian terms this *eros* is the libido. With previous thinkers there has been this internal-drive notion of *eros*, but Freud plainly makes it the ‘love instinct’. Yet it is one that does not drive the individual human person towards a particular perfection. It is quite evolutionary in its interpretation, not unlike the arbitrary ‘force’ of biological Darwinian evolution.

This *eros* entirely lacks the unifying force as *agape*, “unlike Plato (or even Hegel), Freud denies that the cosmic force which binds all living substance is oriented toward any perfection. The universal love that Freud calls *eros* does not progress toward stages of greater spirituality.”⁴¹² So, rather than a perfection this love functions as the satisfaction of a drive⁴¹³ which “consists in

⁴¹¹ Rollo May, *Love and Will* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1969), 88.

⁴¹² Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love: The Modern World, Vol. 3* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 112.

⁴¹³ Freud “repeats the claim that in its origin, function, and relation to sexual love, the *eros* of the philosopher Plato coincides exactly with the love-force, the libido of psychoanalysis.” Cf. Irving Singer, *The Nature of Love: The Modern World, Vol. 3*, 99.

the removal or modification of an inner irritant. A drive therefore focuses on an object only insofar as it can be used as a source of inner relief—a scratch for the subject’s felt itch. And an itchy mind has a way simply of imagining objects to be scratchy.”⁴¹⁴ Here one is left not with any genuine love as either a sacrifice on the part of the lover or a value perceived in the loved but rather love is reduced to a *misperception*.

Between this sexual drive and self-preservation, where does that leave any non-sexual expression of love?⁴¹⁵ Freud’s *libido* has a whole other function.

[The] libido is an expression taken from the theory of the emotions. We call by that name the energy, regarded as a quantitative magnitude, of those instincts which have to do with all that may be comprised under the word ‘love’. The *nucleus of what we mean by love naturally consists in sexual love with sexual union as its aim...* Psycho-analytic research has taught us that all these tendencies [self-love, love for parents and children, friendship, and love for humanity in general] are an expression of the same instinctual impulses; in relations between the sexes these impulses force their way towards sexual union, but in other circumstances they are diverted from this aim or are prevented from reaching it.⁴¹⁶

In what manner then do these ‘diverted tendencies’ consist of love? In that love towards friends though non-sexual forms as a response to some sexual drive what can there be but residue from the unsatisfaction that only genital love would have otherwise had the power to quench. Love in the form of these diverted tendencies falls into the realm of an annihilation of the sexual drive which remains unsatisfied.

There remains a persistent ‘genital character’ to love in Freud’s schema. Even at puberty at the advent of emancipation a genuine Freudian love “requires that the individual has fully separated from the parents. Otherwise, the individual will experience the beloved merely as a

⁴¹⁴ Velleman, 350.

⁴¹⁵ At least asked in terms of such drives not connected with self-preservation.

⁴¹⁶ Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. Trans. James Strachey (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, 1959), 29, (emphasis mine).

corrected version of a parent.”⁴¹⁷ This is not the same notion of *eros* as presented by Rousseau where some instinctual element to love once awakened at the puberty ‘stage’ *aids* in the widening of the *amour de soi*. Here it is diversion, possible a regression, but certainly a perversion of the love-drive. If one connects this libido-love to perversion (a breakdown of the drive’s aim) then for Freud two factors are evident. First is that “the sexual instinct has to struggle against certain mental forces which act as resistances, and of which shame and disgust are the most important. [And secondly], the sexual instinct itself may be no simple thing, but put together from components which have come apart again in the perversions.”⁴¹⁸ This is not a divided love such as representations by proximity and expression, i.e., *philia* (friendship), *eros* (drawing), *agape* (selfless)—one can claim this love as misguided.⁴¹⁹

This love if intimately connected to the sexual drive can do little in escaping its ego satisfying control. Where Rorty said ‘the problem is that love looks different after one has read Freud’ it is the conflation of ‘sexual drives’ with the ‘idea of love’ as the most pervasive obstacle to address in the contemporary era. The modern ‘popular’ mind can hardly think of love as separate from sex—love as love⁴²⁰ the chief slogan among them. I will address specific issues of this conflation in the following chapter where I synthesize loving and being.

⁴¹⁷ Martin S. Bergmann, “Freud’s Three Theories of Love in the Light of Later Developments,” *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, Vol. 36(3), 1988, 670.

⁴¹⁸ Sigmund Freud, *Three Essay on the Theory of Sexuality*. Trans. James Strachey. *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. VII*. London, England: The Hogarth Press, (Reprint) 1995, 162.

⁴¹⁹ What misguides this love then is in consideration of the ‘it’ which is thought hateful. Hate is that which destroys or at least impedes the reality of satisfaction in terms of the ego. Whatever ‘it’ is which stands in the way of the drive’s satisfaction, is the criteria of division to be despised to the extent it reduces the pleasure of the libido lacking satisfaction. “The relation of unpleasure seems to be the sole decisive element. The ego hates, abhors and pursues with intent to destroy all objects which are a source of unpleasurable feelings for it” (Sigmund Freud, “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes.” Trans. James Strachey. In *On Metapsychology: Theory of Psychoanalysis*. Ed. Angela Richards (Harmondsworth: Penguin, Vol. 11, 1964), 136).

⁴²⁰ This slogan has the urban connotation that ‘sexual’ love between individuals should not be constricted by biological sex. Often, it is an affirmation of ‘gay marriage’. My use here is neither a critique or commentary on that expression. But I do affirm that it refers exclusively to ‘sexual love’, as the love (however one defines it) between a grandparent and grandchild, that between a mother and son, etc., is not affirmed by the idea of ‘love is love’, and has

Recovery and confusions

In dialectical fashion, all subsequent thinkers begin a conversation with what is native to one's time (hence the premise for my displaying these historical schemas), or even that which one find themselves in the midst of (hence my premise for leading off with Freud). In the last of these inherited presentations of the idea of love, I will look at Harry Frankfurt who has spanned the 20th century and Karol Wojtyła who came into the cultural milieu in the latter part of that century.

Harry Frankfurt

I will demonstrate with Harry Frankfurt (b. 1929) that love appears as any desire in the schema of a teleological approach that retains a psychological tension. This means that simply pursuing what one desires (loves?) is not a sufficient motivation. The personal desire cannot easily be disentangled from the resultant personal benefit that will always carry the suspicion of an extra-love motive.

In the way that Freud connected desire as that libidinal drive toward satisfaction joined to the sexual act in some manner, Frankfurt would question the actual purpose of such a drive once it had been satisfied. So, in relation to the *la petite mort* the question arises as to what factor(s) arises for the perpetuation of caring in the absence of a drive. Frankfurt's idea of love follows a progression beginning with (1) caring, and the motivations underneath, and then considers in what manner (2) taking ourselves seriously is a mode of intentionality predicated on detecting that first point.

Frankfurt would first offer a caution that any desire must be more than an unsatisfied coveting of the thing desired; there are 'inner divisions' at play. Perhaps it is a desire for a 'thing'

never been contested otherwise as illegitimate. That phrase intends to capture the 'right' of two or more individuals to express their sexual love contractually, i.e., one has always been 'free' to love (*agape*) whom they will, but 'love is love' holds that any adult consensual sexual relation should be affirmed.

recognized as not good for us and in that way the desire is an unmediated ‘want’ instigated by some weakness.⁴²¹ Then there is another manifestation of this ‘inner division’ that comes into play during the process of discerning what Frankfurt terms as ‘higher-order’ desires. The human person by this understanding is “not limited to desires that moves one to act. In addition, each has the reflexive capacity to form desires regarding their own desires—that is, regarding both what we want to want, and what we want not to want.”⁴²² So, not only in this schema is desire determined by a conflicted telos, but too in terms of the psychological tension or apprehensiveness of *what* to desire as an object itself.⁴²³ In Frankfurt’s analysis the closer one’s desire is motivated by that which they consider noble, the freer they are concerning the things that a particular individual has considered important.⁴²⁴ And overcoming these tensions is the means of determining the nobility of the desire in terms of an elevated caring love.

That then is the crux of Frankfurt’s proposal; one pursues what one cares about and the more genuine the motivation of that pursuit, the fuller and more authentic then is the caring. Love becomes the modality of this caring spared of the tension. But in this schema, subjectivity abounds; what is the standard for this nobility? Frankfurt, following a literal translation of Spinoza’s

⁴²¹ For example, consider a person with a desire for a particular food that aggravates a developed pathology they struggle to control by diet, yet they eat what is ‘not good’ for their health.

⁴²² Harry Frankfurt, *The Reasons of Love* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 18.

⁴²³ The point here is that recognizing one’s own motivations is not sufficient to form the drive for caring. We often find ourselves acting in ways, and performing tasks by motivations that are found shameful or quite frankly, selfish. An illustration of that last point would be a spouse, who wishes to display concern for their homebound ‘other’, makes frequent trips to a particular health food store for that spouse’s dietary needs. But unbeknownst to the homebound spouse, the trips are ultimately motivated by a physical attraction to an employee who works at the health food store. Even though the ‘care’ given to the spouse at home is laudable, the shopping spouse senses shame in the motivation to provide the care under the form of gawking. Other examples abound: attending public fundraisers for a cancer patient to demonstrate that one *cares* to ‘defeat cancer’, but is ultimately motivated by public recognition; or the public donation of generous sums of money to a school in a poverty-stricken area for reasons to illustrate one’s ‘care’ about education and the less fortunate, but the genuine motivation is situated in the need for a tax deduction or the public recognition of philanthropy.

⁴²⁴ This is the caveat of course. If education is not important, then even giving for public recognition *may* not be sufficient. If one has no enduring care for a spouse who is incapacitated, even the thrill of a romantic encounter will not sustain the act of ‘going shopping’. At some point, the individual’s genuine motivations will form the desire.

*acquiescentia in se ipso*⁴²⁵ (*summum bonum*), claims that when we as human persons individually “acquiesce to ourselves, or will freely, [then] there is no conflict within the structure of our motivations and desires. We have successfully negotiated our distinctively human complexity. The unity of our self has been restored⁴²⁶ and those motivational tensions resolved.⁴²⁷

In this section on Frankfurt, I have shown that a teleological goal is a powerful psychological drive (not entirely disconnected from Freud’s notion), but as the desire is intimately tangled in and with one’s benefit that possible notion in itself discredits love from any certainty founded in an unsullied personal motivation. I will now consider love according to Karol Wojtyła who found any ‘use’ of the other as the opposite pole of genuine love.

Karol Wojtyła

In this section I intend to demonstrate Karol Wojtyła characterization of love as a total surrender of one’s autonomy. From that abandonment arises a recognition of one’s value of the ‘self’ and the subsequent realization of the ontological value of the ‘other’. Wojtyła’s project corrects Frankfurt’s ‘genuineness of feeling’, but in doing so there never is the absence of some ‘value’ which remains necessary for his personalistic norm to flourish. In terms of Wojtyła’s export into the ‘secular’ world a certain dogmatic underpinning is necessary.⁴²⁸

⁴²⁵ Cf. Baruch Spinoza’s *Ethics*, “Scholium to Proposition 52,” Part IV.

⁴²⁶ Kate Padgett Walsh, “All You Need Is Love? Frankfurt and Hegel on Love As Freedom.”, Vol 48, Issue 4 (Winter 2017), .

⁴²⁷ Consider how this is in contrast to Kant; here love does not appear as a rational choice, though it is not necessarily irrational either. It can be chosen without reason. For instance, “if there were someone who literally cared about absolutely nothing [love included], then nothing would be important” to that individual person (Harry Frankfurt, *The Reasons of Love* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004). The focus here though is not on the love *per se*, but the resolution of tensions. This is not the love of a crass ego. Here Frankfurt holds that “love is a particular mode of caring. It is an involuntary, nonutilitarian, rigidly focused, and—as is any mode of caring—self-affirming concern for the existence and the good of what is loved” (Walsh, 194). Yet, if one refrains from this utilitarian use *of* the other, it cannot affirm something *in* the other beyond the extent that it claims to be a means of resolution of the inner tension(s). By this account “love entails two closely related volitional necessities. First, a person cannot help loving what he loves; and second, he therefore cannot help taking the expectation that an action would benefit his beloved as a powerful and often decisively preemptive reason for performing that action” (Walsh,196).

⁴²⁸ I content this beyond the mere reliance of a theistic supernatural Absolute.

The Polish philosopher and Roman Catholic Pope, Karol Wojtyła (1920-2005) has situated his understanding of love as rooted in the good of the human person. Without a disdain for any inherited historical contributions to the field of ethics and thus love (albeit contraries to his system were discarded), “his primordial source is not the thought of one or another philosopher, but rather the very experience of man”⁴²⁹ as first and foremost a human person.⁴³⁰ Though Wojtyła was not responding directly to Frankfurt, once the idea of love as inner tensions are accounted for, he would counter that nonetheless no objective determinant remains as applied to persons.⁴³¹ If it is accepted that the prevailing consensus finds that “people generally believe love can be reduced largely to a question of the genuineness of feelings”⁴³² then the import Wojtyła pulls from Frankfurt (no inner tension) is akin to this broad concern for genuineness. But one may argue that with Wojtyła the sense of attraction as left to subjective ‘genuineness’ can never really migrate far from the *solicited* value found in the other, and from the self, returning as a response from a solicitation of desire.

The retort for Wojtyła is not to argue that love is not found in desire, but that desire cannot encompass love as a value or object of longing of this ‘experience of man’—genuineness is insufficient. One further critique is introduced in his analysis of modern *situationism*, i.e., the closing in of an experience that denies elements of analysis that are either foundational or essential to address the subjects. That leaves an interior structure of the person (in experience) that gets ‘cut-off’ from any interaction of the loving persons. The notion of value still arises here, but it is closer

⁴²⁹ Miquel Acosta and Adrian J. Reimers, *Karol Wojtyła’s Personalist Philosophy: Understanding Person and Act* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2018) 15.

⁴³⁰ This of course is not something that many have found to be an obstacle to a proper *form* of love. The error in many of these theories “is not their choice of an aim for love but their shared assumption that love can be analyzed in terms of an aim. This assumption implies that love is essentially a pro-attitude toward a result, to which the beloved is instrumental or in which he is involved.” Cf. J. David Velleman, “Love as a Moral Emotion.” *Ethics* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), Vol. 109, No. 2 (January 1999), 354.

⁴³¹ Wojtyła’s understanding of love is not reductive to ‘sexual’ or even to that of an attraction. But for the purposes of illustration, I will continue to draw from his *Love and Responsibility* which primarily forms the argument of that relation between opposite sexes.

⁴³² Wojtyła, 78.

to a self-value found in the ‘other’ and when expressed as love each person “forcibly detaches the person from their natural inviolability and inalienability. It is a renunciation of autonomy”⁴³³ for the other where even the use of each *by* the other (love as providing pleasure as a value for the other) results in nothing more than a mutual egoism—loving of the pleasure each *self* willingly receives in simultaneous tandem *with* the other.⁴³⁴

Here Wojtyła’s approach is dogmatic. Connecting the conjugal act (referenced as the visible love) must be within a marital covenant. Outside of reasoning from Divine Revelation,⁴³⁵ one would be hard pressed to exclude a consensual procreative act between unmarried lovers.⁴³⁶ It appears Wojtyła addresses an important factor of love, but leaves a question that in its narrow expression⁴³⁷ cannot assume the total human dominion of activity.⁴³⁸

With this section on Karol Wojtyła I showed how he characterizes love as a total surrender of one’s autonomy and as a recognition of both one’s self-value and realization of the ontological

⁴³³ Wojtyła, 125.

⁴³⁴ Wojtyła’s notion overcomes that subtle utilitarianism (for him ‘to use’ is the opposite of ‘to love’) and seeks the value of the other as a response to love (the good *within* for the other, which remains an orientation *to* the other). This value of the other becomes the reason to love (the good one brings to the other to be loved). For him it is situated in the ‘personalistic norm’ where the only proper response between persons is love, akin to but cresting Kant’s duty-laden notion of not using another person as a means to an end. Yet, while conceding that Wojtyła never reduces love to a genuine sexual expression, that does become the primary semiotic tool where love is a bodily endowed virtue—the love of the Absolute organically manifesting as *the* visible. I wish to address that concern next.

⁴³⁵ Does this become a weakness? Yes, in as much as it limits any export of this particular revelatory thesis⁴³⁵ to a wider constituency who would not share those underpinnings.

⁴³⁶ Even *ad intra* there is the charge that such “a responsible theological phenomenology of the body as primordial mystery or symbol of human freedom and bondage must include every aspect of sexuality...embracing all the other ways in which human embodiedness both enables and limits human freedom through the body” (Luke Timothy Johnson, *The Revelatory Body: Theology as Inductive Art* (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B Eerdmans Publishing, 2015), 24). In other words, the human body in all relations, particularly those sexual, is messy and awkward, but even that aside, there are powers greater than a purified Freudian urge one must overcome. All language is about ‘control’ and in sexual matters it almost inevitably raises a political question: Whose body is being controlled by whom? That is to posit the notion that sexual control is limited in an intimate act, without even accounting for the devastation that arises from the various ways that bodies have been controlled by regimes both political and economic.

⁴³⁷ I was purposefully selective in Wojtyła’s treatment of love, but understand love’s connection to bodily expression for him (even if not reduced to the sexual) remains a fundamental explication of his overall project.

⁴³⁸ The love of a person who sits at the deathbed of their terminally ill spouse of fifty plus years is more profoundly intimate than any conjugal act. And to what necessity must there be any sexual expression that love is predicated on. There is something profound in Wojtyła’s notion of love, but I sense it is a project not yet fully built.

value of the ‘other’. But in overcoming Frankfurt’s ‘genuineness of feeling’ there remained some ‘value’ that necessitated a response even in his personalistic norm forfeiting any export by virtue of the dogmatic underpinnings.

In conclusion on this section, I demonstrated that with Freud, Frankfurt, and Wojtyła, love’s transitioning from an inherited yearning experience was transformed by Freud as an erotic ‘push’ from behind, which ultimately posited a tension in the restructuring of the motivations according to Frankfurt, and with exceptions, resolved in the ontological realization (value) of the other in the view of Wojtyła, with those reservations previously mentioned notwithstanding.

Loving and being

In this section I begin to synthesize an understanding of love as beings’ ontological core.⁴³⁹ Here in contrast to the inherited schemas on love from the preceding section, I will expose how they precluded a unified grasp that was simultaneously individual and universal. I will begin to construct the argument on the basis that Heidegger was correct when he claimed Western philosophy had evolved to conceal being, but contrarily in that the unconcealment is ultimately premised on an impersonal reality.

For Heidegger this Being posited what was “the nearest remains farthest from man”⁴⁴⁰ yet there is something centrally between (*metaxy*) that there is an “understanding of consciousness in the concrete, in the personal, social, and historical existence of man, as the specifically human mode of participation [here I would substitute the term harmony] in reality.”⁴⁴¹ I recognize a

⁴³⁹ I am withholding my own treatment of love as an application of Rosmini’s appurtenance until the following synthesis chapter, where I will traverse some of the themes of Chapters III and IV in order to present my argument fluidly.

⁴⁴⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*. Ed. David Farrell Krell. London, UK: Harper Perennial, 1977), 234.

⁴⁴¹ Voegelin, *Anamnesis*, 4.

paradox here. Like Heidegger I am not equating Being with the Absolute, as there remains no privation of the Absolute in this Being, i.e., the Absolute is in Being, and Being is not assimilated into the Absolute. But the *metaxy* between the Heideggerian ‘homelessness’⁴⁴² and Voegelin’s experiential consciousness⁴⁴³ in the world mirrors the paradox sensed *between* the contingent being and the Absolute. There the Absolute as ‘exemplar being’ and ‘man as Being’ forms “the synthesis of the dialectal opposition of the Absolute and the world [which] only takes place in the mode of human self-consciousness.”⁴⁴⁴ I argue then the Absolute does not overtake Being but achieves in this finite Being a harmonization where the finite is brought into the infinite relationally as a realization of the Absolute in human experience. In that being itself *is* the ‘good’ as “in terms of the agapeic origin: the good of creation [then] as for itself is given by this origin. [It is] greeted in the primal agapeic astonishment”⁴⁴⁵ which then in my schema is love made present.

With that one arrives at an ontological orientation of the ‘nature of love’ in route to an understanding of ‘love as nature’. In like manner to Rosmini’s foundational *idea of being* that takes the epistemology to its ontological core, here too the ‘nature of love’ finds it is ontologically repositioned as a *metaxy* between the Absolute and finite. When one speaks of this Being it is in relation to the *idea of being* only properly expressed as ‘love as nature’. Rather than love as something that flows from *being* (or Being), this *being* that is not simply evidence *of being*, but itself *is being*.⁴⁴⁶ But this ‘love as being’ as I propose does not collapse into Heideggerian homelessness, as it itself become Being among beings. Not accepting the Absolute as being places

⁴⁴² The Nietzschean nihilism.

⁴⁴³ In the way which any part is of the whole.

⁴⁴⁴ Christos Yannaras, *On the Absence and Unknowability of God: Heidegger and the Areopagite*. Trans. Haralambos Ventis (London, UK: T&T Clark International, 2005), 36.

⁴⁴⁵ William Desmond, *Being and Between*, 71.

⁴⁴⁶ Heidegger also posited that as the human person is in relation to “the location of truth of Being amid beings, it gathers to itself and embraces *ek-sistence* in its existential, ecstatic experience” (Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings*. Ed. David Farrell Krell. London, UK: Harper Perennial, 1977), 235.).

the individual person into a gnostic state; a conflation of the ‘structure’ and the ‘revolt’, where “the structure of the spirit cannot be abolished through a revolt against the spirit. The revolt itself must assume the structure of the spirit.”⁴⁴⁷ In my schema love as being does not abolish either, but assumes each together. I will now offer a consideration of the inseparability of loving and being in continuing my synthesis of love and being.

The inseparability of loving and being

In connecting loving and being I will employ a tacit epistemic approach. Specifically arguing that ‘to be’ is inextricably poised to be ‘one who loves’.⁴⁴⁸ In the last stanza of Percy Bysshe Shelley’s “Love’s Philosophy” it reads...

The fountains mingle with the river
And the rivers with the ocean,⁴⁴⁹
The winds of heaven mix for ever
With a sweet emotion;
Nothing in the world is single;
All things by a law divine
In one spirit meet and mingle.
Why not I with thine?—⁴⁵⁰

Now one may be *on* or *in* the ocean—where there is no river. Or one may be *on* or *in* a river—where there is no ocean. But this misdirects the analogy of Shelley’s prose applied to love and being as I am not arguing against the separateness of love and being which each constitutes the

⁴⁴⁷ Michael D. Henry, “Voegelin and Heidegger as Critics of Modernity,” *Modern Age*. Spring 2001, Vol. 43, Issue 2. 124.

⁴⁴⁸ Here I am referring to the fact that many beings do not love. But since my point is that being do not love, but are love, is as to say that they are apparently not manifested as such.

⁴⁴⁹ To work out this analogy one can speak of standing at the *point* where the river meets the ocean, yet be hard-pressed to declare exactly where that *point* is. There is no defined interception of the river by the ocean; and even if identified it literally will change with the tide. With these estuaries there is such a symbiotic relation between the river and ocean as whatever is discharged by the river supplies the ocean (nutrients) and the ocean returns (oxygen) to the place where they meet.

⁴⁵⁰ Percy Bysshe Shelley, “Love’s Philosophy” in *Percy Bysshe Shelley: The Major Works*. Eds. Zachary Leader and Michael O’Neill (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009), 446, selection.

form of the water as distinct but not single⁴⁵¹ but by the water itself as the material aspect where by laws divine both the river and ocean “In one spirit meet and mingle.” With this persistent mingling, we all know the distinction between what *is* a river and what *is* an ocean; yet where they mingle one cannot think them apart. Applied to loving and being, the mingling is equally ‘one’ as each offers the other some sort of exchange and though both are discovered and realized as distinct ‘being’ and distinct ‘loving, each remain inseparable as the *being* that *loves* and the *lover* that *is* (*being*), mingle together as the potential *being-lover*.

What I offered with this poetic analogy was a means to (1) address the claim of being and loving as a composite concept necessarily connected, and (2) allow what is explicitly known to be addressed tacitly, recognizing the clear expression limit of the ever ready *being-lover*.

The convertibility of being and loving

I will present (1) a rediscovery of the exclamatory love-being (*Is*) unveiled in the other (*aletheia*) where the conversion of being and loving are affirmed, so that then this affirming (1a) presents itself as *the* re-unveiling of love-being. And as with ‘knowing’, this maintains the (2) double meaning of *aletheia* as reality and truth, and now then by extension, love as being.

In the last stanza of William Butler Yeats’ composition “Among School Children”. “Among School Children” it reads...

*O chestnut tree, great rooted blossomer,
Are you the leaf, the blossom or the bole?
O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?*⁴⁵²

⁴⁵¹ Cf. “Nothing in the world is single”.

⁴⁵² William Bates Yeats, *The Collected Poems of W. B. Yeats*. Ed. Richard J. Finneran (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1996), 217.

Considering the mental distinction between the chestnut tree and its trunk (bole), and the dissimilarity between the dancer and the dance, one is quick to assume that each can be present without the other.⁴⁵³ But how can there be ‘dancing’ without *that person*, or ‘that person’ with *dancing*? This not reducible to semantics and is not a matter of identifying what one is doing (‘that person’ is a ‘dancer’) or if that person is currently dancing (‘that person’ is presently dancing),⁴⁵⁴ but rather to illustrate that the *act of doing* (dancing) is the *being* doing the act (dancer).

It appears paradoxical to consider one separate from the other as each is intuitively indivisible from the other metaphysically yet one cannot exist outside of an equal correspondence with the other; they are separably identifiable but convertible. Applying this ‘dancer and dancing’ analogously then to ‘being and knowing’, it speaks to the reality that like ‘dancing’, “knowing functions to compose who one is. Since one cannot enter into internal relation nor indwelling without experiencing change, one’s very self is implicated in one’s knowing”⁴⁵⁵ by the same manner where the occurrence of the ‘dance’ *changes* the experience of the indwelling of the ‘dancer’.⁴⁵⁶ This constitutes a reality in as much as the knowing as *self* is both an interaction and interdependency. Where one has “designated essential being as a being-unfolded or unfolding of pure, meaningful structures”⁴⁵⁷ into the realm of a being-knowing (dance) and also as a ‘being-

⁴⁵³ A pedestrian answer to how each is different would likely revolve around a simple statement; ‘Everyone ‘knows’ the difference’, i.e., it is *that person* that is dancing and/or not-dancing is a not-nothing—or no (no)thing. Yet this really does not account for what the reality would be of a ‘dancer without the dance’.

⁴⁵⁴ Consider that even if the person is not presently dancing, it would be odd if they were only considered ‘dancers’ while performing. This ‘dancer’ is an innateness that bonds the act of dancing to the actor dancing in which the identity of ‘dancer’ perpetuates beyond, or is not limited to the action performed.

⁴⁵⁵ Warner, 220.

⁴⁵⁶ What I offered with this poetic analogy was to (1) address the claim of being and knowing as composite concept which are inseparable and convertible, and (2) allow what is explicitly known to be addressed tacitly, even if a firm articulation does not suffice to express one’s self as the *being-knower*. I will continue now with being and loving confirming them as convertible⁴⁵⁶ ideas. As in the previous chapter I referred to a Voegelin ‘grounding’ as the foundational and immutable structure of being’s consciousness; that framework is operative here.

⁴⁵⁷ Edith Stein, *Finite and Eternal Being*, 327.

knower' (dancer), then neither is original to the other and each participate corporately as *being*.⁴⁵⁸ This being-knower arrives "as an original that does not uproot it from being other than self. The excessive 'creativity' of modernism tends to see the human person as the absolute original, and other beings as merely an image thereof...[but] the self as originating is itself a participant in the origin power of being itself."⁴⁵⁹

In considering "*alētheia* as the realm of unconcealment as the concealed clue, the implicit horizon, the unconceived realm, [as that] within which the Greek experience of Being unfolds,⁴⁶⁰ then all that is convertible with that Being belongs intrinsically to that unveiling as being. By recognition of that the modern forfeiture of being is overcome. Once what was artificially attached to the sense (*ratio*) in terms of 'knowing' is dislodged as native to Being, then it follows that any equal epistemic clinging of love expressed as an affective drive or value will equally be (1) re-affirmed in the unveiling of love as being.

From this develops an "anthropological premiss (sic) that distinguishes radically and definitively from any mysticism that seeks to surpass personal self-consciousness through an ecstasy of the *ego* into the boundlessness of an impersonal 'Absolute'."⁴⁶¹ The theophanic evinces (1a)⁴⁶² of which I will speak about in the following chapter rather erupt as the Absolute (through

⁴⁵⁸ For each offers the other some sort of exchange and need not be pressed as an archetype as is sought in the contemporary ethos. Though both are discovered and realized as distinct 'being' and distinct 'knower', each as self remains inseparable as the *being* that *knows* and the *knower that is (being)*—each are in actual existence the *being-knower*.

⁴⁵⁹ William Desmond, *Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness: An Essay on Origins*, Second Edition (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2014), 46.

⁴⁶⁰ John D. Caputo, "Demythologizing Heidegger: 'Alētheia' and the History of Being." *The Review of Metaphysics*. Vol 41, No. 3 (Mar., 1998), 524.

⁴⁶¹ Christos Yannaras, *On the Absence and Unknowability of God: Heidegger and the Areopagite*. Trans. Haralambos Ventis (London, UK: T&T Clark International, 2005), 89. Capitalization is mine.

⁴⁶² These are those moments of break-through, where what is known (I love this person) becomes not simply evident, but realized. The inarticulation becomes part of the schema of the affirmation innately known. It is that native sense of 'knowing' that this is what love is, and the realization that each (knowing and loving) are convertible aspects of one's Being.

being-as-love) doing violence to *beings-in-the-world* and simultaneously fostering a *syzygetic* relation (2) with the socio-culture at large as *beings-with-us*. But they are the manifestations (affirmations), and not reduced to either an affective drive or value—as was my critique on the many variances of love.⁴⁶³ What Heidegger found attractive in Parmenides, what Voegelin ferreted out in the Pre-Socratics (there is no being that doesn't think), are akin to a preanalytical content of the nonpropositional exclamation 'being as *Is*' which shares that convertibility with the idea of love. The knowing exclamation of the *Is* as being with 'to be' and the native 'love' are not simply concurrent or inseparable, but converted.

In this subsection, I have demonstrated the convertible character of 'being and knowing' and that of 'loving and being'. I then moved to explain the various distinctions which result in the notion of love as it moves to an ontological basis. As a rediscovery of the exclamatory love-being (*Is*), it is unveiled (*aletheia*) as a conversion of being and loving where both remain distinct but are affirmed. With each, the double meaning of *aletheia* as reality and truth, and now by extension, love is re-discovered.

Summary remarks and conclusion

In the previous chapter I showed that being and knowing had not just shared horizons but were equally indistinguishable as Absolute in Being—the native source of the Divine in the finite 'being as self'. This chapter was to mirror the first and copy that schema *substituting* 'loving' for 'knowing'. The idea of love as native to the human person in the appurtenance is not only to assert there is some triad of being (being-knowing-loving), but that love possesses an epistemic quality

⁴⁶³ This Being is more deeply known *when* and *in* the affirmation of evidenced love.

which while remaining convertible with knowing is never reduced to the same plane, i.e., love and knowing may share convertibility, but love is preeminent.

Even within the nature of the human person, this hierarchy remains amidst the simultaneous ability of 'knowing-being' and 'loving-being'. If there is some analogous attraction of this innate love (Divine appurtenance) in each person as a magnetic pull towards the Absolute, there remains the ability of each (Absolute and appurtenance) to extract knowing from being.

V. Findings on Love and Being

God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him. In this is love perfected

~what John the Beloved did say.

From the beginning of critical scholarly inquiry, the topic of love has been examined from nearly all academic fields and methodological approaches. My seminal argument has been the claim: love is not what *being* does but rather *love* is being. That claim has its supporters but I offer two unexpressed tangible modalities. The first is that this *love as being* has never been (1) identified as the instantiation of ‘what is’ as an appurtenance of the Absolute. It has been labeled the ‘essence’, thought of as what a human person is at ‘the core’. But ‘the core’ has been understood as the ‘important’ element without a proper system explaining the origin in the self and the relational aspects to the other as necessary. In academic quarters, analogously the ‘love as being’ is to the person in the way water is good for human physiological health. Ontological considerations of love⁴⁶⁴ have focused on this love as a reality, but as a reality for the human person posited as a capacity inherent *in* being as *something* being needs.

In my presentation of the epistemological system of Antonio Rosmini I have demonstrated that there is an *idea of being* without which no thought can form. It is both essential and primitive.⁴⁶⁵ The certainty inherent in this knowing arises from his conclusion that the *idea of being* is not sourced from within the subject; it is a Divine appurtenance of the ‘event’ as Absolute. This realization did not in itself account for *how* knowledge was formed, but only the epistemological origin. Thus, the *idea of being* is an indeterminate innate being, the origin of ideas and source of knowledge, and a foreign yet native Divine appurtenance. I recognize a direct

⁴⁶⁴ Though I am thinking here directly of Francis Etim, please refer back to Section I.f.ii where I treated the lacuna and problem of love as ontology.

⁴⁶⁵ Rosmini thought this so obvious, he was puzzled that no other philosopher had detected it prior.

parallel of this *idea of being* with the idea of love. This presents my second unexpressed tangible modality that when one claims (2) love *is* being it is determinative as the *idea of being*—love is the last abstraction.

This overcomes the conundrum of love attached to a value, an expression of the human person flowing necessarily from a rational element terminating in a conscious choice, i.e., the subject ‘capable to love’ is the subject ‘choosing to love’.⁴⁶⁶ In short, the *being* as subject chooses the object which is likewise determined and identified by the type of expression where *all* ambiguities inherent in those varied expressions are considered to be some aspect of love.⁴⁶⁷

As linguistic terms seem needed for clear expression, I am not discounting those ‘types’ in this project. But I am stating their prevalent acceptance masks love as *idea of being* and subsequently then, love as *being*.⁴⁶⁸ Ironically though unidentified, ‘love as *idea of being*’ seems to be intuitively grasped by all rational beings and is ubiquitously celebrated. I mean it is tacitly identified (recognized only when it surfaces as a love event) and then venerated (sublime marked moments). I offer the identity, veneration, and origin of that love as *idea of being*.⁴⁶⁹

⁴⁶⁶ That ‘choosing’ has determined the *type* of love and such a locution of love culminates in a taxonomy: one elects to be selfless or benevolent, aspires to familial tenderness, desires an attraction, or simply is inclined to love oneself. Common to each is the subject choosing to ‘give’ relative to the subject who ‘receives’.

⁴⁶⁷ At best they are types of love with one exemplar (*agapeic*?) among them.

⁴⁶⁸ To the degree any concept of love(s) is pacified by this prevailing schema the sensing of that interior pre-rational notion of ‘something’ working in the subject as *being* will remain unsought and under-discovered.

⁴⁶⁹ In Appendix B as an example, I will illustrate my point using literary instances which are replete with these unexpected moments of unarticulated awe and evidential evinces. I will demonstrate this phenomenon of love as *ideal being* using (1) *Les Misérables* with the moment of Jean Valjean’s speechlessness to Bishop Myriel’s gesture for redemption; and (2) Leroux’s *Phantom of the Opera* where Erik who was seduced by sorrow over his own misuse of love, removes his mask and frees Christine having tasted in her tears all the happiness the world can offer. What I will present in those fictional accounts, which would have no export were they not universal, will appear as an interruption of *being* which quickly becomes realized as a glimpse of *being*. There arises something unmeasurable—a saturation—yet this ‘other’ seems always present, and in that sense becomes interpreted as a return of *being*. That *something* is *somebeing* that appears in alt-moments where such evinces of *love as being* erupt. The rhetorical literature accounts I will utilize are by individuals and in culture understood as a genuine witness to one’s own love-encounters.

If one takes from Rosmini's project this *idea of being* as an appurtenance responsible for all other *ideas* in knowing and applies it to *the* idea of love, a convertibility must exist between love and knowing. This convertibility as a mutual predication within a real distinction still can maintain a hierarchy (order by foundation) of 'love' over 'knowing'.⁴⁷⁰ From this convertibility human *beings* form *syzygetic* relations, i.e., an alignment of being(s).⁴⁷¹ Evidenced not as the *loving* act of subjects together, but together the *idea of being* of *subjects* loving. This ontological singular is not merely a participation or conscious act by the *self* with the *other*, but rather a harmonic embodiment of the *self/other* exposing *idea of being* as love. The 'last-abstraction' validates the foundational *idea of being* where saturated experiences confirm what is otherwise only tacitly known—"to love *is* to be' and 'to exist *is* to love'.

Convertibility of love and knowing

There is nothing controversial to say 'love and knowing' are conjoined but to affirm love precedes knowing seems poetic but irrational.⁴⁷² The *idea of being* can contain both as mutually predicated and convertible, while still retaining the precedence of one (love) in hierarchy. The solution lies in the response to my third thesis question; "In what way can the innate '*idea of being*' be love?" I will argue that (1) the origin of love is convertible not with the process of knowing but the prerequisite and primary foundation of knowledge (as an elevation of credulity), and though (2) the process of both 'knowing' and 'loving' may err in application or method, love remains realized

⁴⁷⁰ This conforms to the commonly accepted notion that one may love another *being* and come to know that *being* in and through that love, while holding equally as true that the ascent of knowing never necessarily results in loving that *being*. The latter will always be qualified by some rational choice (is there something known *to* love?) and the former *via* a tacit apprehension (how is it known what *is* loved?).

⁴⁷¹ I am tempted here to leave being as singular when understood as *idea of being*, but for clarity will leave it plural in context to understand multiple persons as beings who are in possession of the *idea of being*.

⁴⁷² If one loves in order to know then what is loved is not yet known.

unblemished in *being* by the same way knowing retains certainty from subjectivity—preserved in and by the appurtenance.

Love as the last abstraction

What I will demonstrate in this section on love as the last abstraction is that Rosmini’s project alone allows for foundational certainty in the knowing and love of self and other. With *idea of being* as the last abstraction⁴⁷³ its purpose is to attain certainty by extending to *being* a universality. The theories of knowledge I expounded in the “Epistemological Review” section have varietal approaches to the problem of universals, none of which are satisfactory. Within those schools of thought the possibility or method ‘to abstract’ a universal from a particular affects the ontology⁴⁷⁴ and by default result in skepticism pertaining to any non-observable metaphysical reality; consider Hume for example.⁴⁷⁵

In my study of ideal being, the discrepancies in pairing love to something akin to a universal by *only* the experiential would place it entirely in the realm of the subjective sensual-response category. Metaphysically this creates a clear divide. Any non-physical, metaphysical source of cognition will have for its basis “neither external experience, which is the source of physics proper, nor internal, which is the basis of empirical psychology.”⁴⁷⁶ This is undeniably a

⁴⁷³ I offered a full explanation of this utilizing Rosmini’s example by abstracting all from the person Maurice, down to the last abstraction—the *idea of being*. Cf. Section II,e,vi.3.

⁴⁷⁴ Those systems which do not accept universals, such as mental grouping for purposes of organization in line with conceptual nominalism (William Ockham), some semantic means to speak of resemblance by representational class (David Lewis), or even the notion of tropes—those non-concrete particulars (Edmund Husserl). These approaches develop only some static ontology, built on constructed classifications as an assembly of resemblances, logically reducing *being* to qualities possessed *by* the individual alone. I find nominalistic approaches too obviously foreign to my project for offering any further dissection.

⁴⁷⁵ Though tangential to this study but worth stating, Hume differentiated between *Relations of Ideas* and *Matters of Fact*. The prior was founded on cause and effect, the latter asserted that “the knowledge of the relation is not, in any instance, attained by reasoning *a priori*, but arises entirely from experience.” (Cf. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1993) 17.

⁴⁷⁶ Immanuel Kant. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2001) 9, §264-266.

different path from the *a priori* category I offer where a notion of the convertible property of ‘love and knowing’ take root in something (appurtenance) that is quite literally at the bottom of any predication, i.e., *being* as it is in itself.

In considering the relation of external stimuli/sensation to this innate *idea of being* in terms of objectivity, the traditional dichotomy amongst the Rationalists and Empiricist epistemology would present the latter as sensations being instrumental for knowledge while the former finds sufficiency in reason alone. Yet with the *idea of being* firmly in the *a priori* camp, the question remains as to how experience has the power to alter this love-knowing innate appurtenance. The terse response is, that it does not. The distinction is that this innate *idea of being* as knowing and loving may be confirmed in concept *via* sensation⁴⁷⁷ but it cannot alter what has been revealed because the *idea of being* is not only prior, the *idea of being* is also indeterminate—it is unfixed prior to the sensation.

Internally then, *mutatis mutandis*, loving and cognition does not change what is sensed externally, and the exterior sensation does not alter loving nor cognition. This results in the claim that what is experientially loved and sensed puts *the idea of being* in contact with *the real* world and is determined *by* that encounter.⁴⁷⁸ This “recognizes an active subject as a necessary correlate of the passion each being experiences...where the objectifying of sensation leaves it unmodified, and on the other hand the intellect [and by extension love] tells each that an exterior agent must have produce it”⁴⁷⁹ as extra-subjective, yet it remains native to the particular being. This is the profit gained from Antonio Rosmini’s system. An application of the notion that the error is not in

⁴⁷⁷ Knowledge from outside stimulates a response.

⁴⁷⁸ An individual does indeed love as the grasping of the real thing - not simply a person’s love or knowing stimulated by the sensation which may or may not be the result of disorder or deception (that Cartesian malicious demon).

⁴⁷⁹ Franck, 90.

the experienced love or sensation (via any of the issues which would lead to subjectivism), but only in the *deficiency*⁴⁸⁰ where the love and cognition renders itself *as error* only in terms of the consequent loving or judgment that follows, i.e., a lack of harmony of *being*. For if “one of the two objects are the subject of the judgment [and love] and the other the predicate, every error consists [only] in the wrong union of a subject and predicate”⁴⁸¹ and not in the action, disposition, or means, due to the *idea of being* remaining indeterminate. The sensed *other (being out there)* is distinct, realized, and truly lovable and knowable whereas the primitive idea is both universally borderless and exteriorly objective (foreign to the subject).

In this schema certainty of love and knowledge is linked to, but not anchored to, exterior experience as a source. It is in clear contrast to *a posteriori* knowledge, yet a non-Rosminian rationalistic deductive *a priori* method does not contain the indefinite primitive idea of Ideal *being* to ensure residual skepticism is not brought to bear on the judgment or some semblance of the *being's* love. The last abstraction is a sharing of the divine. The human person possesses an “insatiable longing for the direct vision of ultimate being that the Phaedrus attributes to the gods alone,”⁴⁸² and it is here in that harmonizing vision that both the self *is* known and the other is drawn *into* the self. What I demonstrated in this section is that love as the last abstraction alone allows for foundational certainty in the knowing and love of self and other. I will now look at how this *a priori* Ideal *being* moves the individual to know and love the other.

⁴⁸⁰ Rosmini follows through to this thought by comparing *error* to *evil* in that they are negative and not a positive thing. Following Augustine in that what is true *is*, and what is false *is not*. Cf. *Certainty*. 143, footnote #160.

⁴⁸¹ Rosmini. *Certainty*, §1251, 143.

⁴⁸² Webb, *Philosophers of Consciousness: Polanyi, Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard, Kierkegaard*, 122.

A priori ‘knowing’ of the other

The importance at this juncture is to focus the orientation of love (convertible with *being*) to the realization of the other as aligned with the *idea of being*. In the way that love and knowledge are founded on universal being (*idea of being*), both knowing and loving the other is also dependent on the source of this shared common primitive *idea*. This common primitive *idea* pre-exists. Love and knowledge are “formed by the vision of universal being... where the love of all beings extends as far as knowledge. [In this way then] to ‘follow the light of reason’ is therefore equivalent to ‘Love all beings.’”⁴⁸³ As being and love are commutable and convertible, both are *a priori* for love and innate knowledge of *the other* originates in the *idea of being*. The point of how this is observed remains.

That which is outside can be sensed and the claim of an *inner (a priori)* knowing of the other is thought private and thus biased as intra-subject perceptions are thought to lack objectivity. That which is ‘sharable’ is thought limited to the extent it is mutually demonstrable, but still does not offer objectivity. This derives from the logic that anything interior is an isolated subjective experience and the *real* of the *outside* is a modality located as an unshared horizon. This places any *a priori* claim of loving and knowing beyond an objective reach. This shortcoming is thought to be exposed as the crisis of the mind/body bridge.⁴⁸⁴

This issue of a necessary ‘bridge’ is a question of philosophical realism.⁴⁸⁵ The Thomist philosophical historian Étienne Gilson challenges any certitude from knowledge *starting* from the ‘inside’ but his conclusion rested on the notion one either begins with thought, as in the Cartesian

⁴⁸³ Antonio Belsito. “Person and Morality” *Witness*. No. 22, (November 2007), 97. Capitalization in the original.

⁴⁸⁴ In the absence of some firm ‘contact’ traversing this external/internal chasm, skepticism abruptly surfaces, i.e., there is no way for certainty to either align properly or reliably relate between the concept (mental observation) and the object (physical existence) that was observed.

⁴⁸⁵ In terms of the use of *realism* by Étienne Gilson in this sense, this is an epistemological and theological use meant as both a reproach to those variations of Critical Realism where definitions left the meaning undetermined (cf. Andrew Wright’s *Christianity and Critical Realism: Ambiguity, Truth, and Theological Literacy*, New York: NY, Routledge, 2013), and Naïve Realism where there is proposed to be no deception through sense perception as there is a causal relationship that exists between object and awareness, typically without intermediaries.

method (*I doubt*) and reaches outward (this or that is known), or one begins with the ‘being’ observed externally (*really sensed as present*) and in some fashion processes that inward.⁴⁸⁶ Gilson’s objection is that “if extramental reality is immediately given, the *cogito* can hardly be prior to it, and, [as] the two are equally present, [then] in what sense can the *cogito* be posited as the only possible starting point?”⁴⁸⁷ Though Gilson was correct in one respect, on another point he was mistaken.⁴⁸⁸

In fact, the apparent consternation of the so-called ‘bridge’ without which real knowledge is thought impossible is in many respects a product of the vocabulary employed. The ‘internal’ and ‘external’ terminology becomes the element of confusion. For the “metaphorical expressions such as ‘going outside’ and ‘communicating bridge’ make the question impossible to resolve...by searching for a material or mechanical solution to a purely spiritual [i.e., immaterial] fact.”⁴⁸⁹ The ability of the human person to perceive, with *being-in-itself* as the innate cause of love-in-self (even if imperfect) and knowledge-in-itself (even if only a possibility),⁴⁹⁰ is that which as *being* literally preserves objectivity. The *idea of being* is the unifying principle itself, and therefore not in need of any bridge.⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸⁶ It is the latter (sensation) which initiates the former (knowledge).

⁴⁸⁷ Cf. Étienne Gilson, *Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge* (San Francisco, CA: Ignatius Press, 2012); specifically, Chapter II, “Immediate Realism and the Critique of Knowledge”.

⁴⁸⁸ When one recognizes that there is simultaneously a being sensed externally (Tina, a stool, etc.), there is also a being that is doing the sensing (I sense Tina, I sense the stool, etc.). Prior to both being concurrently conscious of knowing the external object (I sense) and the other being independent of that consciousness (Tina, stool), the being-in-itself is extant prior. To make this clear, Gilson in this respect was correct that (1) the being of the object and one’s sensation of that object are simultaneous, but he is in error to assume that (2) therefore nothing precedes the other by those facts. If there were not something before each being-in-itself, then the sensing and external existence would not be attainable acts as a foundational potency of knowledge, and in my project; love. The “basic determinations and principles of being, which apply to all beings as beings, is an a priori condition of the possibility of our every act of knowledge” (Emerich Coreth, *Metaphysics*, English Edition by Joseph Donceel, (New York, NY: Herder and Herder, 1968), 35).

⁴⁸⁹ Rosmini, *Certainty*, §1082, 34.

⁴⁹⁰ It is a larger argument outside of the immediate purview of this chapter, but Rosmini does provide the rationale for moving from a mere *possibility of being* to that of *subsisting being*.

⁴⁹¹ One may be tempted to call this *being-in-itself* the bridge, but that would only once more fall into the physical linguistic fallacy.

This *idea of being* as a “starting point is not [something here to be] strictly *demonstrated*; it is, rather, *vindicated*, in [the] sense that nobody can deny it without at the same time affirming it...as a Hegelian mediated immediacy.”⁴⁹² The Rosminian method is able to preserve this vindication where other innate theories which preceded his own have been found wanting.⁴⁹³ Though conceding *being* as the first principle of human knowledge does not solve all worlds.⁴⁹⁴ The critique remains that it easily paves an inroad to idealism where it would seem the only alternative is “to posit the inner-outer disjunction as primordial and prioritize the external [ideas], as the really real”⁴⁹⁵ or perhaps as self-existing entities that offer limiting degrees of access. I will now address that directly by offering a few examples of previous philosophical theories that support the innate *a priori* schematic to state their deficiencies relative to Rosmini’s *idea of being*.

Ideal being and the Absolute

My research problem posed the question of how this *a priori* appurtenance presents itself as the *form* that love occupies within the human person while remaining both a harmonization and a passive readiness for solidarity with the *other*. This is an unmasking of *personagenesis* conveyed as the infinite *appurtenance* of the Absolute—Love where as a being-as-love, simultaneously realizes the *other*—active solidarity. Collectively then, self (with appurtenance), plus other (realized *personagenesis*), plus the Absolute (harmonizer of being) results in Love. To directly

⁴⁹² Coreth, 35.

⁴⁹³ This speaks back to the previously mentioned Augustinian mistaken/existence, Cartesian doubt/existence, and the Rosminian ‘fundamental feeling’.

⁴⁹⁴ Gilson accepts that much, distinctions notwithstanding. Cf. Gilson’s *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1952), 2, where he points out that any failures (up to this point) should not be blamed on metaphysics *per se*, but on the metaphysicians that have mistaken the first principle of metaphysics on something other than *being* itself. This is not a concession of agreement between Gilson and Rosmini, for with the latter *being* is not simply the first principle, but rather the last abstraction.

⁴⁹⁵ Neil Ormerod, *Faith and Reason: The Possibility of a Christian Philosophy* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2017), 128.

address my research question, I will confirm in what way Love is *given* to the contingent (created) from the non-contingent (Uncreated), as an ontological appurtenance drawing itself through ‘each and others’ as a cosmic return to the Absolute. The necessary metaphysics has historically been offered by Augustine.

Augustinian metaphysics

Here I will explain the *idea of being* in terms of the ‘means of origin’ which is not meant to be synonymous with the ‘means of access’. This is not a question of where the *idea of being* begins within the contingent, but in what way is it an icon of the non-contingent origin (Absolute). Created *being* emigrates from love and knowledge gained corporeally which then stages ‘upward’. This requires only the necessary inaugural stimulation of the *idea of being* by things real⁴⁹⁶ where one “gathers together and collects (*colligere atque animadvertendo curare*) items which previously lurked scattered and neglected (*sparsa et neglecta latitabant*)”⁴⁹⁷ awakened through the mechanics (or sensing) of this ‘anamnesis process’.⁴⁹⁸

Proofs or vindications of the mechanics of these non-material instances are evidenced in aspects of mathematics, *eudaimonistic* pursuits, and particularly the innate drive towards wisdom (without which no one could be happy). These are all occurrences which a being experiences as real, but that the bodily sense cannot give proper account. I will offer one example in terms of the

⁴⁹⁶ That itself does not conflict with an Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition, perhaps even within the Platonic/Augustinian modality—when the latter is understood pertaining to phenomena as temporarily fragile. For instance, with Augustine and Plato, both share a sense of *anamnesis*.

⁴⁹⁷ Robert J. O’Connell. *St. Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul* (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 1989), 124.

⁴⁹⁸ Though this is true concerning Augustine, it should not be noted that other epistemological claims (Rationalism, Empiricism, etc.) are not without their own criterion issues, or are presumptively superior and have not led also to skeptical conclusions. Augustine places partial onus on the role of belief as distinct, but in direct relation to understanding. In *De Libero Arbitrio*, Book II.2 he states, though “believing and understanding are two different things, we [are] first to believe the great and divine things that we desire to understand.”

immaterial *eudaimonia*. This is derived from the pursuit of the good *via* one’s extra-sensory desire for wisdom. Augustine points out that as there is a “notion of happiness stamped on [the] mind even before one is happy—for by means of that notion one knows confidently and says without hesitation that one wants to be happy—so the notion of wisdom [is] stamped on the mind even before one is wise.”⁴⁹⁹ Here the origin appears to precede the cause, and is natively present without any sensory stimulation. Yet in my schema the origin of *being* is not simply immaterial, but further the uncreated *idea of being*;⁵⁰⁰ the Absolute as *esse* (being) where all things proceed from the Source and Cause, as a gratuity arising before necessity or obligation;⁵⁰¹ each as a love response. Here I explained the *idea of being* in terms of the ‘means of origin’ without it being synonymous with the ‘means of access’.

Deus interior intimis meis

The origin of *being(s)* has its source in a given ontological presence that precedes any experience—interiorly passive and ever receptive. These interior presence(s) as “ideas are certain original and principal forms (*logoi* as opposed to *ideae*) of things, i.e., reasons, fixed, and unchangeable, which are not themselves formed, being thus eternal and existing always in the same state.”⁵⁰² The claim of this ‘sameness’, and by extension the *idea of being*, beholds a nature as a shared *idea of being* that as an ‘unchangeable given’ to the human person from without (objectively)⁵⁰³ is nonetheless innate and intrasubjective. This uncreated presence in the form of *idea of being* (appurtenance of

⁴⁹⁹ Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio (On Free Choice of the Will)*, trans. Thomas Williams (Indianapolis, MN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), Book II.9, 48.

⁵⁰⁰ I wish to remind the reader that this is not ontologism, as this *idea of being* is an appurtenance and not the essence of the Absolute.

⁵⁰¹ Cf. Milbank, *Suspended Middle*, 43.

⁵⁰² Augustine, *Eighty-Three Different Questions*, trans. David L. Moser (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982), Q.46 “On Ideas”, 80.

⁵⁰³ Augustine refers to the origin of these ideas as being contained in the Divine Intelligence.

the Absolute) is declared to be true (certainty) not simply in as much as true *ideas* emanating forth, but in that they are inherently *truth* indeterminately, i.e., not only *are* they ideas, but they *are* true in themselves and formable in the human person as a harmonic embodiment.⁵⁰⁴

With Antonio Rosmini

I will now guide this concept via a Rosminian treatment of the innate *idea of being* as it is extended to ‘loving and knowing’ as one. This non-passive interchangeable pairing of ‘loving and knowing’ remains receptive and provides the necessary substratum for the innatism of ‘indeterminate being’ as Ideal *being*.

Ideal being

In my first thesis question of whether Rosmini’s *idea of being* as an appurtenance of the Absolute provides a sufficient foundation for the objective origin of thought, the response lies in the ontological appurtenance (*idea of being*) of the Divine Absolute that provides both (1) the origin of thought, and tacit experiential evinces that vindicate (2) the resulting knowledge that flows as the form of love.

Though yet to become determined this *idea of being* requires sensation. But the limitless (*being without restriction*) is also a mandatory feature applied to both created and uncreated being (contingent). In that regard this notion of *being* “is so *universal* that it can be applied by the mind not only to God,⁵⁰⁵ but also to all other beings in the sense that by means of this light [each]

⁵⁰⁴ In this way the idea of this being as truth (Absolute) is “*interior intimo meo et superior summo meo*” (Augustine, *Confessions*, Book III, Ch. 6, §11, 36 (popularly translated as “more inward to me than my most inward part; and higher than my highest”).

⁵⁰⁵ Clearly beyond the scope of this research, it would be interesting and even necessary at some point to reconcile Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of “God without being” as the apophatic entirely ‘Other’ with the Rosminian notion of being that retains transcendence without collapsing (flattening) the otherness of the Absolute. The issue for Marion of placing categories of being on the Uncreated is the obvious hurdle.

conceives things only inasmuch as they are beings to which belongs that objective existence in common.”⁵⁰⁶ The presence of this objective existence is the nature of the human person, yet that same *being* precedes the human person—nature prior to existence. It is that which is not of man, given to man to be that which is of man in an *unrealized* solidarity of all *being* in and with that of the Absolute. It is an unqualified sharing (*participable being*) of that which is proper to the Absolute, without a concurrence of natures (*imparticipable being*).

Divine appurtenance

Then to follow with my second thesis question concerning the ontological appurtenance of the Absolute in the human person as the origin of love, I am extending the ontological appurtenance (*idea of being*) to the human person’s *being*. This entails (1) the origin of love as a native yet foreign ontological foundation, and (2) the culmination as a ‘drawing back’ to the Absolute resulting in love’s manifestation in theophanic evinces, i.e., moments of alt-love.⁵⁰⁷

These ideas as archetypes appear on a continuum stretching from the entirely inaccessible to the privileged remote. To reach them requires a traversing of the innate immaterial realities as “the spiritual, transcendental, non-human, outer space on the one side, and yet [harmonizing with] the flesh and the world in the physical, non-mystical, material”⁵⁰⁸ domain on the other side. Rosmini’s *divine appurtenance* as no mere potentiality finds itself modified subjectively by sensory perception. As a modification seeking the cause as component “there must be a substance, or first act which is the basis of the being; because whatever exists is, in this sense, either a

⁵⁰⁶ Stephen Eyre Jarvis, *Rosmini, A Christian Philosopher: As Understood by His School* (St. William’s Press, Market Weighton, Yorkshire, 1888), 22.

⁵⁰⁷ The literary pericopes will reference and illustrate that directly.

⁵⁰⁸ Vladimir Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness of God* (English and French Edition), (Yonkers, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2001), 63.

substance of the appurtenance of a substance: there is no middle term between the two.”⁵⁰⁹ This modification is not the realization of an *a priori* judgement, but rather a ‘thinking’ and ‘loving’ of the appurtenance which logically requires a ‘thinking’ and ‘loving’ of the being in itself, i.e., that of the Absolute in the form of a mental abstraction [and givenness of being], but not a ‘seeing’ of the Absolute itself (essence).⁵¹⁰ There is something *underneath* this substance of the human person where both the fixed and mutable share *being*.

With Gregory of Palamas

This exchange in thought and love finds expression in Gregory of Palamas (1296-1359), expressed in the mystical practice of *hesychasm* as the notion of the uncreated energy of God (Being) understood not as a synthesis with the Absolute but a real interior harmonization with an exterior *being*.⁵¹¹ This communion with the shared *divine appurtenance* stands as the source of solidarity which as a harmonic modality preserves alterity (being) and assumes unity (being in Being). This comprehension of the Absolute “is not so much the cancellation of the temporal interplay between Being and beings, as rather the absolute fulfilment of their interdependent relationality. Hereby [the Absolute’s] *essential* Being, the *esse ipsum*, or the coincidence of Being with essence in [the Absolute], is conceived as the full *giving* of Being as an infinitely determined essence, whereby, alone, there is ‘to be’.”⁵¹² This then is the Absolute of love that is given—the ‘given Absolute’.

⁵⁰⁹ Antonio Rosmini, *The Origin of Ideas*, Vol. III (London, England: Kegan, Paul, Trench, & Co., 1886), Chapter V, Article III, §1206, 137.

⁵¹⁰ This in itself is not opposed to Thomistic philosophical thought; cf. Aquinas’ *Commentary on the Sentences* where it is stated that the created ‘sees’ the Uncreated as a similitude indeterminately, without presuming this ‘seeing’ to be that nature of the Absolute in itself (Sent. Dist. 3, q.4, a.5).

⁵¹¹ This explains the Absolute’s transcendence without sacrificing any aspect of immanence—one act does not wane at the increase of the other, or vice versa.

⁵¹² John Milbank, “Can a Gift Be Given? Prolegomena to a Future Trinitarian Metaphysic,” 153-54.

I have shown that the linking of the *created* and *Uncreated* (Absolute) offers a paradigm similar but distinct from the transcendent and imminent dichotomy, while also accounting for the ‘bridge’ of those mental and physical realities. This paradigm allows for the sharing of the nature of Being and being that otherwise is found wanting in Western Essentialism. I will now address that ‘blind spot’.

The blind spot of Essentialism

The exiled Orthodox theologian Vladimir Lossky (1903-1958) critiqued the Thomistic approach which “links knowledge of [Absolute] to the created *nous*. For Aquinas, if mind or *nous* is created, then its sphere of activity is linked to the realm of being...and a conceptual knowledge of [the Absolute’s] being”⁵¹³ is all that is *participable* for the human person. Lossky deems it the ‘blind spot’ of essentialism. First, in the dichotomy of imminence and transcendence there arises an issue of accrediting the Uncreated Absolute as an unmediated union with the created in which transcendence is can be maintained.⁵¹⁴ But this otherness in its preservation of transcendence leaves a participable gap. There is an ‘intellectual blind spot’ where the Absolute “is personally present only in His transcendent difficult-to-participate Essence (as in the traditional Western essentialist theism), with no unmediated personal union”⁵¹⁵ capable to conform or ‘maintain form in’ a harmony in and with the created.⁵¹⁶ Important to grasp is that here “the givenness of being is neither an *immediate* thereness nor a dialectical *self-mediated* thereness. The givenness of being is

⁵¹³ Aristotle Papanikolaou, “Divine Energies or Divine Personhood: Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas on Conceiving the Transcendent and the Immanent God,” *Modern Theology*, 19:3 (July 2003), 360.

⁵¹⁴ But there is no controversion there. As ‘Other’ there is no grappling with the Absolute as a singularity (simplicity) or intra-unity separate from created being.

⁵¹⁵ John Cheng. “The Distinction Between God’s Essence and Energy: Gregory of Palamas’s Idea of Ultimate Reality.” *Ultimate Reality and Meaning*, Vol. 21, No.1, 1988, 99.

⁵¹⁶ In the Palamitic schema the unmediated union presents itself as “the Divine Essence-Energy Being radiating unceasingly His very Essence-Energy Being in all directions (Cf. I John 1:5, “God is light”), embracing, and permeating all creation” (Cheng, 99). This distinction allows for a mixing of Absolute Being/being without an absorption of one into the other.

metaxologically intermediated. Hence its thereness, while constituting a world unto itself, also points beyond itself to a power it also images.”⁵¹⁷ Adopting this expression allows relationality and ‘love as a *way of knowing*’ to come to the fore abolishing any blind spot while preserving *idea of being* as the convertible source of love and knowing. Following that principle, I will explore further how this traversed blind spot is expressed in the Eastern Essence/energies contrast.

Essence and energies

Within the essence and energies⁵¹⁸ distinction offered with Palamas, the former remains forever reserved within the Absolute (immanence) while the latter is offered as a communal transcendent *way of knowing* all *being(s)*.⁵¹⁹ The import of this energy-ontological implant (*knowable harmony*) is that human personhood as “being a revelation of *truth*, not as ‘substance’ or ‘nature’ but [rather] as a mode of existence”⁵²⁰ permits an intrapersonal communion between the Uncreated Absolute and the contingent created to come to the fore. To what degree this allows for and constitutes being is wanting contrasted to Rosmini’s *idea of being*.

Love as an *integration* of one’s being—the immanent out-of-reach (essence/sun—*unknowable*) which is neither a mere symbolic reality or engulfing pantheism (the alterity does remain intact), unites ‘love and being’ under the condition of harmonic embodiment. Without an

⁵¹⁷ William Desmond, *Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness: An Essay on Origins*, 218. Italics mine.

⁵¹⁸ It would be beneficial to construct a full comparative study of the Eastern Orthodox Essence/energy distinction with the Rosminian Absolute Being/Ideal *being*, where in each the Perfect allows participation of the imperfect. That of course would be a Christian dogmatic treatise. I do not recognize the two as identical expressions, even if I think there is overlap.

⁵¹⁹ An elementary yet clear analogy of the Essence/energies is to consider a person on Earth in relation to the Sun. An individual warming themselves in the Sun’s rays can be said to be participating with the ‘energies’ of the sun, while totally distinct from the ‘essence’ of the Sun—that totally and unreachably remoteness (nuclear fusion). The failing of that analogy is that the ‘lining up with the rays’ (warmth) does not ontologically result in conversion; the *being* does not become Sun-like, only warm.

⁵²⁰ John D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 106. Emphasis mine.

equal measure of substance, a real conversion of the nature of personhood with and in the Absolute surfaces.⁵²¹

In the way I am developing the paradigm this ontology of personhood *via* harmonic embodiment is both personal and importantly identifiable. Indeed, *prima face* in the system I promote it is “affirmed that an energy is never apersonal”⁵²² whether it be attached to the Absolute or tied to a harmonic ontological relationality of being-with-other. Within and from the ancient Christian tradition the *created* and Absolute’s sharing of personhood/being⁵²³ is upheld as a mutual communion. There is no existent conceivable self as an individual, such as the Aristotelian *this* (τόδε τι),⁵²⁴ given that [the Absolute] appears as an event of communion. It is communion which makes beings ‘be’: nothing exists without it, not even [the Absolute].⁵²⁵

Here I argued that the import of the energy/essence distinction promotes a movement from essence to activity, the latter of which can be observed as evinces (*icons*) in an event horizon. It follows logically that the Absolute “is not a static essence or a motionless ‘what.’ The *proodoi* or *dunameis*⁵²⁶ of [the Absolute] is the activity [and] indicates a going forth outside toward another”⁵²⁷ affirming that ontology in this way precedes any epistemological grounding.⁵²⁸ Hence,

⁵²¹ To extend my concept within the Sun/rays analogy, the warmed-person would be made Sun-like, who now has the capacity to extend this warmth themselves by virtue of the Divine appurtenance (Sun-like) which forms their own being with other beings. As an aside, I see no need to approach this concept of divine energies *apophatically* (leaning towards the hyper-essence).

⁵²² Papanikolaou, 375.

⁵²³ In Roman Catholicism, this is referred to as *communio personarum*. It is foundational for the anthropology and liturgical thought of Karol Wojtyła (Pope John Paul II). It is a sharing in the mystery of absolute love.

⁵²⁴ The τόδε τί (a this) “somehow articulates the appearing individual as such, neither simply an instantiated particular nor an unintelligible singular.” Cf. Christopher P. Long, *Aristotle on the Nature of Truth* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 179 for a fuller treatment.

⁵²⁵ Zizioulas, 17.

⁵²⁶ These are specifically Dionysian terms that connote processions (*proodoi*) and forces (*dunameis*), both of which in this study place the Incarnation as a central tenet.

⁵²⁷ Aristotle Papanikolaou, *Being With God: Trinity, Apophaticism, and Divine-Human Communion* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 16.

⁵²⁸ This is the world in liturgical relationality as the “resolute deliberate gesture made by those who ordain their *being-in-the-world* a *being-before-God*, and who do violence to the former in the name of the latter”⁵²⁸

the unknowable Essence and participable energies unite under the condition of harmonic embodiment. I will now continue to explore the relation of those realities.

Divine energies as harmonic embodiment

The Original Essence (Absolute) and participable energies (powers gifted to *being* with *beings*) unite as an ontological harmonic embodiment of the created in the Uncreated. Of the Absolute, the givenness in the form of Divine energies allows ‘communion’ to develop into (or present itself as) an ontological implant (appurtenance), by which *being* is convertible with love. The absolute original, which here I present as the Absolute, in the relation with the created being “requires a metaxological both/and...it is intimate to the being of things yet recedes into a reserve that no finiteness can exhaust...as a *poiesis*, becoming embodies original power.”⁵²⁹ This becoming of an ‘embodied power’ presents itself as a harmonic *being(s)*—love as sustaining the other. This occurs through saturated events in the same way sense data awakens⁵³⁰ the *idea of being* as knowledge, these saturated moments (evinces) excite the *idea of being*—witnessed love. The harmony in and with the Absolute becomes *de facto* a harmonization with and in other *being(s)*—love *becomes* the connection of beings—a loving/knowing of the other—a mutual sustainer of all *other* beings where the other is neither oneself nor foreign.

Scotus and the ‘accidents’ of God

This *communio* or ontological relationality is what is ‘first known’, even if it eludes overt articulation in each instance. I will now explain how any problematic expression does not make

creating the world habitable for participation with the Absolute via energies. Cf. Jean-Yves Lacoste. *Experience and the Absolute: Disputed Questions on the Humanity of Man*, trans. Mark Raftery-Skeban (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2004), 42.

⁵²⁹ William Desmond, *Desire, Dialectic, and Otherness: An Essay on Origins*, 236.

⁵³⁰ The reader is to be reminded that now *awaken* does not refer to the Augustinian notion of previously scattered and neglected items brought together via sensation.

the ‘first known’ undiscoverable as the accidental properties remain firmly tied to common, yet observable events. Each *being* is only a *being* in that this *being* is in communion with other *beings*. Every being is a *being-among-beings* and that which is ‘most common’⁵³¹ presents itself as a condition of possibility. In that each *being* participates in and with the *energies* of the Absolute, there is a *real* sharing of *being* between the created and Uncreated—univocity.⁵³² From this univocal concept of *being* one moves from the visible accidents of a *being* to the knowledge of that *being* as *an* object in reality. Rather than a Thomistic “analogical commonness as the mark of transcendental Scotus introduces a new kind of univocation, which ‘transcends’ the univocation of a genus, as the precondition of a science of being in general”⁵³³ that can then be accepted as a first philosophy. For Scotus this univocity contains “every metaphysical inquiry about God that proceeds in the following way: it considers the formal notion (*ratio*) of something, then removes from that formal notion the imperfection it has in creatures while retaining the formal notion [as such], to which it then attributes completely the highest perfection and in this way it attributes that notion to God.”⁵³⁴ That which is common is what has been colloquially termed accidental.

The explanation is that since this ‘first philosophy’ has as its object *being* itself, and not the Absolute,⁵³⁵ it is closer to a pure ontology. Though this developed at a period of time when

⁵³¹ *Communissima* to phrase it in a Scotus term.

⁵³² The brief introduction of Scotus’ univocity of being at this point is only to show some continuity in terms of ‘shared being’, and not to conflate with or suggest that the Subtle Doctor is not opposed in form to divine illumination and its epistemological concerns for reliability and certitude (knowledge). For Scotus, there is a concern that the process of abstraction from a *phantasm* (that which is produced in the sensing agent) introduces the kind of risk that precludes knowledge. Cf. Billy Dunaway, “Duns Scotus’s Epistemic Argument against Divine Illumination,” In Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne & Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), *Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018), 29-53. (specifically, pp. 34-35).

⁵³³ Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Phillip the Chancellor (CA. 1225) to Francisco Suarez* (Studien Und Texte Zur Geistesgeschichte Des Mittelalters), (Leiden, Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2012), 432.

⁵³⁴ Cf. Duns Scotus, *On Being and Cognition: Ordinatio 1.3*, Trans. John van den Bercken, Fordham University Press, 2016, p. 51.

⁵³⁵ Where with Aquinas, even though ‘first philosophy’ studies *being* and not God directly, in his system the Absolute is the *cause* of *being* as such. The commonness of anything as transcendental is confined to finite *beings* alone. Cf. Aertsen, 239.

ontology and metaphysics had not yet been considered distinct⁵³⁶ it could currently be understood currently as an *onto-theology*.⁵³⁷ In this modality the created and Uncreated have ‘that which is common’ without it necessarily being synonymous with a universal. The distinction is that “something is *common* when it is able to be in some other singular than that in which it is. Universality is a feature of concepts; commonness is a feature of the nature. The uncontracted nature is common”⁵³⁸ and only exists in individuals, i.e., “through the medium of individuals, which exhaust its being.”⁵³⁹ These accidental (commonness) properties of a contracted nature are visible at least in the observed effects (evinces) and in that way vindicate *ideal being* as evidences of love.

Here I argued that the accidental properties as ‘first known’ remain firmly tied to common observable events (evinces). I will now show the ‘oneness’ of love prior to connecting that ‘one love’ to these evinces.

Love as one

An underlying necessary point is that love as *idea of being* is indivisibly simple. Any taxonomy used to identify varying relations as ‘types’ would have to be accepted as some subjective part (species of the genus) of the exemplar I argue divides or dilutes the concept of love as one.

⁵³⁶ Scotus wrote primarily in the latter part of the 13th century. In fact, the case can be made that one “can conclude that metaphysics and ontology do not have a distinct subject matter.” To present Hofweber’s argument would require more space than permitted here. Cf. Thomas Hofweber, *Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2016) specifically “12.3, The Philosophical Project” and “12.4, Objections and Refinements” 301ff.

⁵³⁷ There would be categorical reservations with any Heideggerian connotation applied. Specifically, Heidegger’s “claim that ‘the onto-theological constitution (*Verfassung*)’ is the necessary structure of *all* metaphysics...[thus] denying the difference between being and beings, because God is both the highest and the explanation of being.” Cf. Jan A. Aertsen, 6 (Emphasis in the original).

⁵³⁸ Peter King, “Duns Scotus on the Common Nature,” *Philosophical Topics* 20 (1992), 57.

⁵³⁹ Peter King, 65.

The one love in the many

As previously conceded, I do not discount the varying types but recognize them as relational signifiers⁵⁴⁰ nonetheless masking ‘love as *a* nature’. If colloquially ‘types’ are necessary for clarity let those types be degrees of ‘harmony’ fixed upon the single point of *love as being*. It may be appropriate to retain them as potential parts⁵⁴¹ of the *idea of love* ordered to but lacking the proper power of love as nature, i.e., necessary descriptors of a relationship status.⁵⁴²

Harmonization and the Absolute

I find it accurate to consider love only as each *beings*’ relation to the Absolute with the *idea of being* better understood as a harmonic embodiment. The concept of embodiment is the innate attribution of this appurtenance.⁵⁴³ Since the *idea of being* is innate and remains a self-return to the Absolute, the passivity is one’s alignment with the appurtenance.⁵⁴⁴ That conforming to the innate *idea of being* (current) becomes exited to the degree it is moved by the rawness of exposure to the Absolute in evinces of love (conforming to the flow). I will now connect the commonality of love, through harmonization to these evinces.

⁵⁴⁰ I can reiterate here that I concede only that some language must exist to speak of the various relationships that this ‘one love’ occupies. But I hold to the idea that they only speak to the relation, not the idea of love.

⁵⁴¹ In virtue theory a potential part is ordered to some secondary act; an adjoined virtue.

⁵⁴² I am not suggesting this. I’ve already made the remark that this leads to confusion of the oneness of love. I state it here only to suggest some means may prove necessary to overcome what would otherwise result in ambiguity if the expression were not identifiable given their enculturated and ubiquitous presence.

⁵⁴³ The import of the term harmony grants the connotation of a chord. A simultaneous experience of ‘all the notes’ of a shared nature (Being, being and beings) where each does not participate in or with the other in as much as together, they resonate as a sequence. The harmonic embodiment of the *idea of being(s)*, when truest to one’s nature is by analogy more akin to the way a proper diet affords health in the person. To the degree that some variant is compared to the *agapeic* exemplar would be akin to the proper diet aligning the being with health, rather than just some stage of health comparative to an exemplar (perfectly healthy).

⁵⁴⁴ A limping analogy would be a person in the current of a river; the water moves the individual regardless of their ‘going with the current’ (passivity to the Absolute), but there remains some means of the body conforming to the flow and accepting the direction of the current (harmonization with the Absolute).

Evinces of Love

To be clear with the contribution of Scotus, the nature as it has *esse* in the intellect *is* universal, each “instantiation characterizes the relation between universals and particulars, not natures and the individuals that have them.”⁵⁴⁵ Yet I am claiming that it is in this *sharing of the nature* with the Absolute and created being(s) from which the particulars and universals manifest. The accidents (evinces) are an instantiation of the innate *idea of being*. What they become are observable points that demonstrate the ‘awakening’ as saturated events which in a real way, present themselves as icons of *Being*, predicated on the very fact that this One Love has located itself in *being*.⁵⁴⁶

Love and the integration of being

In the being-love/love-being convertibility, there is a breach of the somatic confinement that appears as a quality. It need not be appropriated as an affect even if it is confined to be ‘witnessed’ in experience—a phenomenal *qualia*. In my schema these visible icons “not only make present another reality, but also overcome the opposition between two realities while maintaining the integrity...[as the] icon transcends the ‘antinomy’ between the Uncreated and created.”⁵⁴⁷ Without spiraling into subjective mysticism⁵⁴⁸ the ideas of love and of being cannot simply be analyzed as

⁵⁴⁵ King, 57.

⁵⁴⁶ There is something here also that should harken back to the inseparability and convertibility of love and being, but following my notion of the sharing of nature(s), an integration processes forth in the visible icon *made* visible by and in the evinced event.

⁵⁴⁷ Papanikolaou Aristotle. *Being With God: Trinity, Apophaticism, and Divine-Human Communion*, 39. Capitalization mine.

⁵⁴⁸ I mention that not in terms of a lacked shared experiences of subjects, but an un-sharable intra-conscious sensation that lacks commonness.

qualitative experiences to be dissected as a ‘thing’s analyzed and grasped. That reduces them down to a mere rational and internally reductive exercise.⁵⁴⁹

This may appear as the affective trumping the rational, leaving a chasm where either love emanates from a modality of passion (I am following my heart) *or* where it is formulated as a reasoned and describable access to something deeper in one’s self or with that of another (I am knowingly entering into love of self or other).⁵⁵⁰ My schema necessitates some reframing. First, it is important to note that the term *spontaneity* is really a misnomer. The being-love as I present it is precognitive and only appears *unreasonable* due to a dualistic underpinning.⁵⁵¹ The way the affective and rational interact though is *in* and *with* this *idea of being* which is foundational.⁵⁵² With my system this precognitive love-being experience follows that modality, but something of the experience remains asymmetrical, perhaps in the sense of a resonating reaction—(glass attuned to the frequency?). So, in the way that ‘experiencing’ a symphony is not the same as hearing an arrangement of notes, analogously the evinced encounter “depends upon, is emergent from, the sequence of sounds.”⁵⁵³ Any manifestation from a being-love experience cannot be deduced from

⁵⁴⁹ For example, there is this type of love that one ascribes to know, there is this determined quality of being that expresses such love, etc.) which is very much akin to the dilemma illuminated by Gabriel Marcel’s problem/mystery dichotomy. In short, Gabriel Marcel distinguished a *problem* as that which is in front of the individual and can be described and potentially solved through systematic steps that can easily be exported to others. By contrast a *mystery* is not something ‘unknown’ as the popular connotation would hold. Rather it is that which each being is involved *with and in*...there is no systematic approach to ‘finish’ as there is no ‘problem’ to solve. It is best understood as an experience that envelops the individual and results in some notion of enlightenment.

⁵⁵⁰ Typically, this experience seems to accompany spontaneity. The person in experience has a causal account where something exterior and uncontrolled—at least initially—seems to ‘appear from the unknown’ moving the heart or mind. As a cause, this what and how is therefore sought under a reasoned and describable account, i.e., what happened and how has this happened?

⁵⁵¹ Something prior to cognition (affective) does not seem to logically fall under the domain of knowledge (rational).

⁵⁵² An analogy will help. A musical score experienced is both weakened and deflated when approached as a *problem*, but if one considers the distinction between the *idea* of the score, and the interplay of the notes, the experienced score still allows qualities to exist in hierarchy (order) without one causal factor suffocating the other. There is never an experience of notes singular, but the harmony which creates the sequence. The idea is not directly known, the experience is of the harmony, and the notes underly that experience.

⁵⁵³ Roger Scruton, *The Soul of the World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013), 38-39.

the progression of events (one experiences the vibration, not the ‘notes’), but rather the totality of the arrangement draws being into Being as an event.

There is no experience of symmetry in the event, and the ‘happening’ appears spontaneous but in reality, is causal. Being, and the *idea of being*, is ontologically prior to the moment of the love-being presenting itself as an icon in being(s). Neither is the sum of a rational and internally reductive scrutiny brought to bear on the event piecemeal—the harmonization is the manifestation of the experience (see Appendix for a manifestations of these alt-love moments). To a degree, one can describe the ‘arrangement’ perhaps in retrospect, but to remain true the experience must acknowledge that it is the harmonized melody or alt-love moment which takes ontological precedence over the ‘notes heard’ or the ‘event witnessed’. The *idea of being* as an innate and *a priori* love-being is not determined by any knowing, even if it lies within an epistemological parameter. One in fact finds the reverse of this concept of knowing, as the love-being in the alt-moment arises as both a limit and measure of the knowing itself: knowing could never purport to reveal and sustain the ‘what’ or ‘why’. I will now argue that that revealed self alt-moment is itself the measure of the truth one would purport to know.

Love as the limit and measure of truth

This instance of *a priori* as the condition of *love-being* can leave the impression that something unknown cannot be loved.⁵⁵⁴ The standing notion is that if love is a volitional choice, and if “a person’s relationship with being is based on truth and knowledge [then as] a constitutive element of the appetitive faculty, love needs to be informed by knowledge from the intellectual faculty to be able to choose properly”⁵⁵⁵ disclosing a genuine good to the will. It is argued that without direct

⁵⁵⁴ That is, *something* or *someone* yet unencountered is a future event—all events are concurrences with *being*—and can only be thought of as a potential love until known.

⁵⁵⁵ Etim, 506.

contact with an event or person, and/or rationality is not brought to bear on the event or person— then there can properly be *no love* of that event or person.⁵⁵⁶ Asserting ‘reason’ as necessary for truth leading to knowing, and that knowing then as the limit or condition for love, forces love into the conclusion of a rational choice, i.e., I know you and based on some quality perceive, love you. But the converse is true, meaning that love is the limit of truth. The colloquial standard of ‘to know then love’ must be reversed where though love remains convertible with being, the knowing-truth of the other is but is a signifier of being. That signification is still critical, but not prior.

This ‘love limit’ (reason) as displayed in the human person becomes a somatic signifier and therefore a visible exercise. Observable actions reveal both reason and truth as transcendents are no longer limited to the body. Yet there is something ‘in-between’ beings where the origin is revealed. With beings the giving of the origin as love for each “pivots on an irreducible otherness, one side which points back to the enigma of the origin as absolutely other, the other side of which dovetails into the middle world as marked by its own otherness.”⁵⁵⁷ This ‘knowing being’ cannot lay claim to that in-between. I argue that although both love and truth exist in language they are not reduced to the signifying tools (grammar and syntax), but each necessarily includes the *other* (limit and signifier). Even if “the existence of reason in language, along with its ontological and epistemological universality, indicates that [each being] *is* spoken to and called to respond,”⁵⁵⁸ there is a provocation for the *other* to reply to the signal of the *idea of being* as origin. The measure then of truth appears in those eventful alt-moments where “like words, through which truth is

⁵⁵⁶ But I am asserting that that which remains *unexplained* is not appropriated synonymously with an event *not chosen* or even self-originating, i.e., truth found in knowledge does not determine love.

⁵⁵⁷ William Desmond, *Being and Between*, 269.

⁵⁵⁸ López, 589.

expressed, are not physical masks behind which lurk self-enclosed, inert concepts...[but] a being's self-transcendent expressivity"⁵⁵⁹ where with *another beings*' appetite is harmoniously attuned.

Reason is found at the point of contact where truth flows *from* love, rather than a point of contact where love flows from the truth discovered via reason. I hold that 'truth from love' is intuitive and concrete. Reasoning to truth is not simply a power of the intellect, and not the sole source of knowledge—love as Ideal *being* is *the* way of knowing.⁵⁶⁰ I argue reason flows in the form (language) as a love-event emergent (inaugurated) by the Ideal *being*, but knowing is penultimate.

[That] man desires to know the truth in freedom is the discrete indication that his existence only makes sense inasmuch as it is given to him by Another (*e-venire*) in order for him to be and to discover his unknown origin. Since the source cannot be less than what comes from it, the logic of human existence is grounded in an Absolute whose nature is not an *a-logikos* absolute freedom—which is the fundamental presupposition of today's nihilism—but a *logikos* Absolute who can address man because language is to be found first and foremost in the Absolute himself.⁵⁶¹

If this were not true, then any uninaugurated intra-personal love would simply fall between the emulation of an ideal or floating sentiment.

If otherwise love is reduced to a place on a continuum between the mere romantic notion of loving the *self* in the other or that of loving *concepts* or particulars in the other by the *self*, then at best either is a recognition of the commonness (nature) and not *being* (love). This colloquially is 'good will' expressed as a 'feeling of love' stemming from a mutual egoism or the condition of a generic 'love of humanity', but not a love of this or that person. With the reality of the notion of Ideal *being* in place the proposal that love forms as a language is not confined to two loving each

⁵⁵⁹ López, 590.

⁵⁶⁰ Regarding the veracity of that claim *prima facie*, consider the proposition 'to love is to know'; there is something that seems correct in that. But when converted to 'to know is to love' there is something that solicits immediate caution. We know being(s) we love, but we do not love all being(s) that we know. The former takes ontological precedence, which does not summarily dismiss the latter, but finds it to be lacking order (hierarchy).

⁵⁶¹ López, 592. The insertion of 'Absolute' for 'God' is mine.

other outside of themselves but rather two selves drawn by love present in the appurtenance returning to its origin. Love is not void of or limited *by* truth, but rather culminates as an event horizon *of* truth (as both a limit and measure) which can be evidenced in alt-moments. One occurrence of these is in and with manifestations of need, i.e., visible saturated events where the demand of the other unites with the desire of the self. Events of sorrow provide a clear example to explore such events of love as *idea of being*. I will offer those next.

Love as evidenced in sorrow

If one were to admit *prima facie* what is the relation of love to sorrow, it would be that the experiences of sorrow, despair, and such are signifiers of a physical and psychological pathology.⁵⁶² Love then from another offers a potential motivator towards consolation—the other’s sorrow detracts from default happiness.⁵⁶³ Typically this is understood as empathy. Each in need “yearns for something to fill the hollow, to make up for the sense that [each] is missing something—this is the lack or gap from which desire springs”⁵⁶⁴ and it is this cascading of mutual need and fulfillment of comfort that centralizes the form of love in human life. But that is hardly the sum of it and is in fact misleading if thought to merely point to “‘being-to-being desire satisfaction’ as the foundation for establishing the solidarity of persons. This is not to diminish the notion of empathy relative to love as in fact one “loves because [they] can empathize—that is, stand in another’s shoes and care about what it feels like to be there.”⁵⁶⁵ But in this study, love-as-

⁵⁶² In Allen V. Horwitz and Jerome C. Wakefield’s *The Loss of Sadness: How Psychiatry Transformed Normal Sorrow Into Depressive Disorder*, depression is rightly understood as an identifiable disordered human emotion, but the work also sharply critiques the recent psychiatric diagnostic practices and their evaluation of the criteria for reaching that conclusion.

⁵⁶³ There is merit in that notion, as sorrow does become a ‘moment’ of disclosure that draws the other in.

⁵⁶⁴ Bruce Fink, *Lacan on Love: An Exploration of Lacan’s Seminar VII, Transference* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2016), 35.

⁵⁶⁵ Maia Szalavitz and Bruce D. Perry, *Born For Love: Why Empathy is Essential—and Endangered* (New York, NY: Harper Paperback, 2011), 4.

being draws each *being* to the *sorrow in the other* transcending any vicarious co-suffering, i.e., it is the ‘need’ of *being* itself signally to love beings.

Need of ‘being-for-other’

There is a distinction made here between two *beings* that share some degree of sorrow and an undivided ‘sorrow event’ between two who share *being*—sorrow in ‘being-for-other’ in the self and other. It is not a Freudian psychological allocution where the nature of love always “declares that ‘I’ and ‘you’ are one and is prepared to behave as if it were a fact,”⁵⁶⁶ even if there is validity to that. The ‘I and you as one’ sociality is not some rote response that artlessly arises out a drive towards this recognized desire to fulfill the need of the other, which again is the definition of *mutual egoism* where one longs for self-satisfaction in the other. The need of ‘being for the other’ is a precedent which interprets signals of the cognitive impression of the *other* known in *being* yet unencountered.⁵⁶⁷ This is not a percipient laying hold of the other’s need that reveals an impotence or incapacity in one’s own *being*, but alt-moments of activation (needs in others) which in utter powerlessness awakens love as *being-for-the-other*.

Love and need

Rather than having this initial interpretation of *powerlessness* migrate as a weakness in one’s self (contrasted to a self-sufficiency), it evidently appears as a signifier to another that one is in *need* of love. In that way each is drawn to the other as a sharer of *being*. The fact that this gaze of love in terms of the perceived need can be muddled (mutual egoism), or even overwhelmed by capacity

⁵⁶⁶ Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Trans. James Strachey (New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1962), 13.

⁵⁶⁷ Such as the impetus of a personal gaze *to* and *of* the other—a meeting of beings.

(love of humanity over this human),⁵⁶⁸ it is an expected saturation in the sense that the “bedazzlement characterizes what the gaze cannot bear.”⁵⁶⁹ The reality remains that this sorrow, despair, and suffering as a signifier when re-interpreted is not just a response for the other but a way of knowing one’s self.⁵⁷⁰

Some motivation seems key in consideration that the “psychological manifestations of love are not sufficient in themselves, indeed, love is only psychologically complete when it possesses an ethical value.”⁵⁷¹ But the motivation need not be rationally chosen prior to the act—this is my central argument. The ethical value of this ‘sorrow-response’ is left sterile, or better yet widowed, when the signifiers of physical and psychological sorrows and sufferings are treated unnecessarily as pathological. This is to mean that an adequate anthropology must contain sorrow as a normal and necessary human state which demonstrates the relation of beings. These signifiers concretely point to desires that establish the harmonization of *being* and the capacity for love as the *idea of being* revealing itself between beings as love surfaces in and as ‘the need’ in the other. Present in each *being-for-other* lies the condition of the human person’s intersubjectivity. When it is the ‘I’ that feels bad, it is the ‘you’ for whom this ‘I’ feels bad *for* in oneself. This is neither empathy nor pity. This defines one’s subjectivity and from one’s response to other’s sorrow in those alt-moments of activation, love visibly erupts.⁵⁷²

⁵⁶⁸ It is nothing to say, “I love humanity.” That love requires no action, no sacrifice, no movement towards the *other*, but only placates one’s notion of happiness or delight in holding what had been referred to as an ‘escapist’ mentality.

⁵⁶⁹ Jean-Luc Marion, *The Visible and the Revealed*, trans. Christina M. Gschwandtner and others (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2008), 36. See section 5 of the chapter entitled, “The Saturated Phenomenon”.

⁵⁷⁰ The often-quoted Rabbi Abraham Heschel puts it thus, “The man who has not suffered, what can he possibly know, anyway?”

⁵⁷¹ Wojtyła, 167.

⁵⁷² The converse is a disassociation and a denial of one’s being shared with the other. The altering moments of these encounters become in every way Archimedean occasions of discovery—for good or ill.

Even fictional accounts in literature of such ‘sorrow-love-need’ events inspire, because the universality of the intimate⁵⁷³ experience relates to the commonness of our nature as and with *idea of being*. The universal yet constructed appeal mirrors literal beings’ yearning. intimating poetically what rings as genuine universal experiences.⁵⁷⁴ From the ‘fictional’ communicative ensues an expression of “universality without intimacy—intimacy without the universal: the first is the temptation of mimesis, underpinned by external opposition; the second is the temptation of self-creativity, inspired by internal opposition”⁵⁷⁵ in the event. The narrative reveals a transcendent truth (commonality) of love’s alt-moments.

Here I will use a literary reference to tacitly relay the recognition of shared beings harmonizing a conquering effect towards the tenderness which sorrow provokes in self and other. In Chapter IX of Mary Shelly’s *Frankenstein*⁵⁷⁶ the aloneness, i.e., the lack of shared *being* that the Creature is experiencing (those are Victor’s precise words in the text), created the desire for the creation of a companion female. Shelly says the Creature yearns for that “with whom [he] can live in the interchange of those sympathies necessary for his being.”⁵⁷⁷ But with fear and knowledge that the Creature’s difference poses an obstacle to a union outside of his *being* (a human would not share his sympathies), he would be content to be with another of his kind to live in bliss as hideous monsters apart from gentile society.⁵⁷⁸ His sorrow was deep and as a last gasp in the admittance of his lament he declares, “If any being felt emotions of benevolence towards me, I

⁵⁷³ Intimacy carries the connotation of being reduced to some sexual expression. In reality, it is a description of clarity where being is revealed to being—an interior gaze of the self and other.

⁵⁷⁴ And the self artfully relates to that which is not merely a description of imitation. In the encounter the artist creates what otherwise remains obscure to expression.

⁵⁷⁵ William Desmond, *The Intimate Universal: The Hidden Porosity Among Religion, Art, Philosophy, and Politics*, 70.

⁵⁷⁶ Chapter XVII in the 1931 edition.

⁵⁷⁷ Mary Shelly, *The Essential Frankenstein: The Definitive, Annotated Edition of Mary Shelly’s Classic Novel*, Ed. Leonard Wolf (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1993), 195.

⁵⁷⁸ This is not his true desire, but a consolation he accepts knowing the world would not have him.

should return them an (sic) hundred and an hundred fold; for that one creature's sake, I would make peace with the whole kind."⁵⁷⁹ The fracture in the Creature's lack of shared being, with no like-being to reciprocate sufficiently to his sorrow, results not in love drawn to him by his signified need but in a hollow response resulting in alienation of his *being* among beings. What was evidenced in sorrow, when met with indifference resulted in estrangement. As a privation the Creature's signifier to another in *need* of such a love was severed from the other who as a sharer of *being* the beings signal remained. The sorrow persisted unreciprocated as the Creature wandered into the Artic frozen wasteland.

Alt-love moments of awakening

This uprooted *being* interiorly with the mind is directed towards knowing with the exterior discovery of good as love in the *other*. Both captivates and authenticates *being*. Though not a novel idea it is in need of 'threading together' in my project as a legitimate philosophical application.

Synderesis of love⁵⁸⁰

To claim there is some aspect of love combustible in one's being, in need only of ignition is remarkable in one way and prosaic in another.⁵⁸¹ My proposal of love undoes that lapse into error by dissolving the broad ambiguity of love, revealing love rather as 'one' never removed from the Absolute in that it is present in created *being*.⁵⁸²

⁵⁷⁹ Shelly, 196.

⁵⁸⁰ This Medieval term, synderesis, is closely aligned with conscience, and thus practical wisdom. They hold, generally speaking, to that which prepares one for goodness; the first principle of morality, inclinations, etc. It is the 'spark' of conscience. I am not employing it here in this Scholastic sense *per se*, but utilizing it as the sense of preparedness which is native to the human person, but nonetheless not something that is self-originated.

⁵⁸¹ By that I mean, it never ceases to ring true, but it has been poetically told and retold almost to the point of cliché.

⁵⁸² Perhaps it has not been done elsewhere so well as in Dante Alighieri's *Purgatorio*. There was an instance in Canto XVIII where such a concept of love had vexed Dante who was hesitant to press Virgil, his guide (reason personified) for an exposition. Sensing his concern, Virgil analogizes for Dante that as fire moves upward by its form so to "the mind, created quick to love, is readily moved towards everything that pleases, as soon as by the pleasure it

An inclination of the mind is a powerful source of love that performs a synderesis-like⁵⁸³ motion (outward and upward), instigated by pleasure. It can be understood as a “the spark or fire put into the heart of man, [that with] the deed done, brings fuel to this fire”⁵⁸⁴ resulting in a blaze within *being*. It is with and in the *idea of being* that one finds contained both a unity and an activity, which requires essentially no data from experience. Nonetheless it is aroused in experience, exposed and put ablaze. Epistemologically Rosmini expressed it as

the ideas, therefore, of the *true* and the *good* arise from the very first application of ideal being, and constitute the two most general aspects in which this being presents itself when applied. They correspond to the two modes in which essences exist, viz., in the mind and outside the mind. Ideal *being* in its application in the mind as the source of acquired knowledge, is *truth*; and in its application outside the mind as the source of lovable subsistence, it is *good* (bene).⁵⁸⁵

I have shown this convertibility of love and knowing exported to my project as a synderesis of love in the culmination of one’s incarnation by and with the Absolute. I will not show this discovery both originating and terminating in a disclosure of *idea of being* appearing as theophanic evince.

Theophanic evinces

This discovery is *the* acknowledgment of a reality; it is an unveiling of sorts of an incarnate human quality.⁵⁸⁶ What is discovered is an *alien possession* of the incarnate being in and of the realm of

is roused to action (Dante Alighieri, *Purgatorio*, trans. John D. Sinclair (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1961), Canto XVIII, 233).

⁵⁸³ The analogy here can be compared to that of Jerome’s (the Biblical translator) reference to it as the *scintilla conscientiae*, which is often described as the ‘initial grasping of the good and right’, or even the alternative as that of the Franciscan Bonaventure who places synderesis in the realm of a primary volition.

⁵⁸⁴ Cf. Jeremy Taylor, *Ductor Dubitantium: Or, the Rule of Conscience in All Her General Measures; Serving as a Great Instrument for the Determination of Cases of Conscience*, 1, 1-1.

⁵⁸⁵ Rosmini, *The Origin of Ideas*, 339-40.

⁵⁸⁶ Typically, to speak of the human person as incarnate is to identify the immaterial form (*anima*) embodied in material flesh as a whole instance—*incarnatus* (made flesh). But here the reference is of more than a ‘real’ embodiment just as ‘two in unity’.

Ideal *being*.⁵⁸⁷ This requires a necessary balancing of the immanent and transcendent.⁵⁸⁸ The alt-moments make manifest a distinction and maintain an origin in and with the Absolute, but are not extraordinary intuitively as the Absolute persists as the *idea of being*.⁵⁸⁹ The reality of possibility is not reserved to those ‘grand’ moments, but is evident formally in the object sensed as the manifestation intuitively known.

The category of possibility should be used to express that the idea of an object ‘agrees with the formal conditions of experience (in accordance with intuition and concepts),’ that is... [where] not only that the idea of an object is in agreement with this formal structure of our intuitions and concepts, but also shown to be applicable to our experience by the occurrence of some sensation that can be taken as evidence for its reality.⁵⁹⁰

In the sensed alt-moments each *being* moves from a static metaphysical entity to a dynamic ontological icon, not to be determined by degree or type.

My approach preserves the otherwise eviscerated love void of its transformative affect,⁵⁹¹ and rather than reduced as a reaction to certain external stimuli, albeit authentic responses, love is not susceptible to an external-temporal governing force that produces the ontic experience. If the Absolute stands as the origin of momentum, drawing Itself to Itself, the causality (Humean relationality) is evidenced in the experience.

[Yet] the perpetual content of experience cannot stand alone apart from a valuational content, and the nature of that valuational aspect is integral to ontic intensity. [There is] the seemingly incompatibility, pointed out by Hume, between actions determined by character

⁵⁸⁷ The emphasis of Eastern *theosis*, along with the Western prominence given to partaking the Deity’s nature is not foreign to this concept, even if there has remained a legitimate concern of ontologism in the latter.

⁵⁸⁸ On one side the unease of pantheism, and the ‘leveling’ of *being* and *Being* with the other. The *idea of being*, proposed as love, steers clear of that fate.

⁵⁸⁹ I want to make certain not to comparatively force my alt-moments with those manifestations of the Absolute expressed as Biblical theophanic evinces such as the ‘burning bush’ or ‘Transfiguration’. Rather my method can accommodate those wonderous evinces of *moti amoris* (motions of love), treating them as disclosed instances of the Absolute infusing the being’s incarnated modality, but also contain the more prosaic evidenced events—a tender embrace, sharing of tears, etc.

⁵⁹⁰ Paul Guyer, *Kant* - Second Edition (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 131.

⁵⁹¹ Consider also the more ‘properly human element’ that John Stewart Mill claims to have inherited from the influence of his wife Harriet Taylor, whom without which his own ‘masculine’ pursuits (science) would have been left in abstraction. Cf. Claudia C. Klaver, *A/Moral Economics: Classic Political Economy and Cultural Authority in Nineteenth-Century England* (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2003), 136.

and free ones. How can each change morally from within, without a force to alter ongoing momentum?⁵⁹²

In the Christian personhood of the Trinity (Absolute), the *comprehension of beings* is conceived in the term *perichoresis*.

Perichoretic spilling-out

This understanding conveys the concept of “an image often used to express the idea of a community of beings in which each person, while maintaining its distinctive identity, penetrates the others and is penetrated by them.”⁵⁹³ It does not simply imply, but determines that “human love is irreducibly triadic, involving self, Absolute, and neighbor. One cannot simply have a relationship with the Absolute unmediated by relationships with neighbor.”^{594 595} By and within its nature cannot be contained—the energies issue forth in a continuation of the procession of Absolute being towards and within created *idea of being*.⁵⁹⁶

This innate love released through experience in and with the created *being*, is not a reliance of *Being* on the created physical *being*. But in that the Absolute “draws [all things] closer to each other and, following their invincible natural bent, end by becoming, all of them together, one,”⁵⁹⁷

⁵⁹² H.G. Wright, *Ontic Ethics: Exploring the Influence of Caring on Being* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 155.

⁵⁹³ Alister E. McGrath, *Christian Theology: An Introduction* (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2016), 305.

⁵⁹⁴ According to Kierkegaard love can never be abstract, but necessarily moves toward the concrete other. Cf. Robert L. Perkins, ed. *International Kierkegaard Commentary—Works of Love*, Vol. 16 (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1999), 148. I substituted ‘Absolute’ for ‘God’.

⁵⁹⁵ This concept of *perichoresis* has profound implications in the social and political economy. Specifically, the theologian Leonardo Boff has argued that this has important implications for Christian political thought. The issue being argued in this research, should surmount the typical understanding of the relevance for all created beings. Cf. McGrath, *Christian Theology*, 305.

⁵⁹⁶ A Balthasarian phrasing is *apropos*, God creates *esse* “in order to release the essences [*essentiae*] from himself.” Cf. Hans Urs von Balthasar, *The Realm of Metaphysics in Antiquity*, Vol. 4 of *The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics* (= *GL4*), trans. Brian McNeil, C.R.V., et al. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989), Epilogue, 82.

⁵⁹⁷ Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *Writings in a Time of War*, trans. René Hague (New York, NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1968), 143.

the perichoretic spilling-out of the created appurtenance no less belongs to the Absolute than the actual essence. Transcending convertibility, love, and being become integrated realities that the alt-moments of love only awaken. These evinces are non-suppressible and transformative. They are realized evidences of Ideal *being* seeking its own propensity of the Absolute in beings.

The divine disposition of *being* for the human person⁵⁹⁸ is the final ground as an outcome of the preceding anthropological and ontological reflection. Resultant in this project is that if finite *being* is an eventful form in that (a) it comes from another, (b) its constitutive dual unity and common participation in *esse* is a sign of this Absolute's (trinitarian ground), and (c) at the level of human spirit it seeks in wonder throughout its historical existence to behold in freedom the Origin from which everything comes.⁵⁹⁹ I will now return to love as the appurtenance present in the human person, and begin to offer my summation.

Love as Ideal Being

The claim of Love as Ideal *being* is predicated on the premise of my research problem: how this *a priori* appurtenance presents itself as the *form* that love occupies within the human person while remaining a harmonization and passive readiness for solidarity with the other. I have argued that it is in the human individual's *personagenesis* one witnesses an unmasking of the infinite *appurtenance* of the Absolute. This, and this alone is Love. Then in the harmonization *of* and *with* this love the *other* is realized and from this shared other a resultant solidarity is formed.

⁵⁹⁸ This, from a purely Christian standpoint, is fully disclosed in the Incarnational event of Christ.

⁵⁹⁹ López, 608.

Personagenesis and solidarity

I have shown that through intuitional moments one's *being* is revealed to the *I* and transfigures the *We*. There is no person as *being* apart from persons as beings i.e., one's interpersonal experience results in an intrapersonal re-creation. This is a process of *personagenesis* where one's potential of infinite perfection is disclosed through a crescendo of complex relations. This affirms man's particularity while maintaining homogeneity with the Absolute—in and with this *idea of being* the person *becomes*. By virtue of this 'becoming' there results the mutualist comprehension of the *self* where all human agency is communitarian.

That reality of being as *personagenesis* (*being-with-other*) fosters a *syzygetic* relation with the socio-culture at large (*beings-with-us*). Here individuality and solitary are only possible in tandem.⁶⁰⁰ The human being's unmasking of *personagenesis* is conveyed as this infinite *appurtenance* of the Absolute—as Love, which substantially forms the basis of the human person as a being-as-love. The *other* is simultaneously realized—solidarity. Love then is revealed as the created's harmonic embodiment of the Absolute's self-attraction.

Summary remarks and conclusion

Stylistically, I have endeavored to replicate both the tone and style of Antonio Rosmini. My dissertation's goal has been singular, to move the being-to-being connection of love from a foundation based on attainable desires that establish an interconnectedness, to a passive yet harmonic embodiment that the created is drawn in and with by the Absolute. Each historical taxonomy of love has relevance for language clarity, but they are tethered to *being* determined by

⁶⁰⁰ As this solidarity cultivates from *idea of being*, it emanates as a manifested solidarity where the 'I' is discovered as the 'We' without an annihilation of the 'I' as subsumed into the 'We'. Each 'given love' manifests universally a claim of realized personhood i.e., *personagenesis*. Received as a sharer in this harmonic embodiment of *idea of being*, it then in return *orients* to its origin through others, i.e., solidarity.

value. Migrating Rosmini's *idea of being* from the foundation of certainty in knowledge to a foundation for certainty for love provides a resolution. One's *being is love*, one loves *as being*.⁶⁰¹

⁶⁰¹ I suspect the common person would find my project intuitive, and perhaps it would give them some systematic expression to what otherwise they tacitly know. That quite frankly would only support my project's premise, i.e., at certain alt-moments in life, this *idea of being* surfaces and by it, something inarticulable is known. In those most sublime moments of life—holding the hand of a dying spouse, the unexpected generosity from an adversary, or in reality any occasion where a discovered transcendent truth aligns with one's temporal experience, are all evidenced as breakthrough evinces of this *idea of being* as love.

Epilogue

I have explained the convertibility of both ‘knowing and being’ and ‘loving and being’. Beginning with these two premises, I then removed the middle term *being* and argued for the logical concluding convertibility of ‘knowing and loving’. By utilizing ‘knowing’ as understood in the epistemological system of Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, I recognized the necessity for demonstrating the validity of the *idea of being* as the foundational idea for knowing. Like Rosmini, I did not predicate that appurtenance on a dogmatic supposition, but without summarily dismissing the supernatural, I demonstrated how Ideal *being* satisfied the inadequacies of competing epistemological systems.

Rosmini’s goal was to preserve epistemological certainty in that all innate ideas of past thinkers which were deemed necessary for thought are in reality ‘one’ present in created being as Ideal *being*. What I have done then is to offer a vision of his system applied to the concept of love, where in similar fashion all variant ideas or expressions of love are also in reality ‘one’ and likewise present in created being as Ideal *being*. My thesis was to philosophically demonstrate that claim.

To prove my thesis, I unfragmented the inherited schemas of love in the same way Rosmini approached his argument epistemologically. The distinction remained that ‘to know’ does not occupy the same space as ‘to love’. This is compounded by the historical fact that with knowing the longstanding issue is ‘how’ one knows, but with love the query remained ‘what’ is love—recall all the varied expressions. I identified that as the error. Love then as found in the *idea of being* remains a ‘one love’ which I defended against anything which that threatens such unity, or by idealizing it robbing it of transcendence. Reframing love as ‘one’ cannot leave it dependent on either desire or choice. To that end I demonstrated love as antecedent to cognition—it is love which

knows and not vice versa. *Idea of being* as the ‘last abstraction’ of love allowed me to formulate not an ontology of love, but love as an ontology. Coupled with the way I retained *being* itself as that which *is* allowed that *being* which *is*, to be *is* as love.

There were also at least two advantageous resultants which flowed from that discovery—the creation of the ‘self’ and the relation of ‘self to other’. First, love as the appurtenance of the Absolute in created being concretely results in the self as a *being* in relation ontologically. I presented the concept that there is ‘no I without *idea of being*’ as *personagenesis* (*being* in relation). Yet since the ‘other’ holds the identical ontological status by share of the *idea of being* this simultaneously forms a realization of the ‘self’ *in* the ‘other’ which I termed an ‘ontological solidarity’. I argued from that finding that this is awakened both experientially (objectively) and affirmed epistemologically (tacitly), each verified and realized *in* and *through* universally relatable subjective evinces. I demonstrated that these evinces are ‘visibly saturated’ events where the transfigured *We* and the intrapersonal re-creation (*personagenesis*) form an innate realization *with* and *of* the other. In this relation of self and other, ‘love as knowledge’ surfaces as a *syzygetic* relation with Being and beings—drawing one into a perichoretic spilling-out and return to the Absolute.

I resisted referring to this Being/beings relation as a ‘participation’⁶⁰² expressing the relation rather as a harmonization—it holds love distinct yet inseparable and allows passivity of *being* drawn *to* and *into* the Absolute. On that account, I have sufficiently argued this harmony of Being and beings maintains a unity of love as one, without sacrificing that oneness in the plurality. The *idea of being* allows that unity/plurality as the *idea of being* originates as the Absolute (One)

⁶⁰² That term lacks the attitude of unity which I maintain necessary for love. For example, even though one may participate in a familial event (such as Babette’s Feast), that lacks the ontologically grounding of self and other. I accept there is an element of sharing that allows participation analogically.

in each beings (many) remaining foreign yet native to created *being*. This one love is created being's harmonic embodiment of the Absolute's self-attraction.

In final summation I offer one last poetic reflection. In Dante's *Divina Comedia* something is recognizable of Plato's cave where even while immersed in the dark shadows there remains for Dante that visible light of the Sun over the hill that summons him with those "sweet rays of the planet whose virtue leads men straight on every road."⁶⁰³ For Dante, this Sun forms simultaneously a point of departure, motivation, and goal; indeed upon reaching that 'Love that moves the Sun' he does not conclude a journey, but arrives at a consummation—a harmonization of Being and *being*. Yet as reason is present on his journey, related to 'love' it stands woefully insufficient to capture anything of Love's essence. Dante's guide Virgil (reason personified), could only accompany him so far. Upon entering *Paradiso* reason's limits are exposed where the Absolute's "ray enters all things according to their merit."⁶⁰⁴ Then as Virgil and reason recedes, Dante is met by Beatrice (the icon of beatific love). Though signaling to love, this *image* of love, an evince if I may, to whom Dante barely knew in earthly expression also wanes—nearer to Being even the signifier of love itself yields in proximity of the Absolute (the Signified). At this juncture nothing is left for either reason (Virgil) or love's icon (Beatrice) to guide Dante; each has lost the *raison d'être*. Drawing so near to the origin of Being, Dante's final steps require the guidance of a mystic (personified as Bernard of Clairvaux) offering what neither reason nor imagery can provide. Drawn closer as *being-with-Being*, Dante shares his experience:

Bernard then, smiling sweetly, gestured to me
to look up, but I had already become
within myself all he would have me be.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰³ Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy*, trans. John Ciardi (New York, NY: New American Library, 2003), *Inferno*, Canto I.17, p.17.

⁶⁰⁴ Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy, Paradiso*, Canto XXXI. 22-3, p. 870.

⁶⁰⁵ Dante Alighieri, *The Divine Comedy, Paradiso*, Canto XXXI. 49-51, p. 891.

Disclosed here to Dante as with all created being, is that which was sought by reason yields to an image of the Absolute discovered in oneself, which in turn can manifest only in experiences of the self *in* and *with* the other. Only then is either known. Drawn into and with the harmonic embodiment of the Absolute's self-attraction, Love as Being/beings is unveiled.

*Already I could feel my being turned—instinct and intellect
balanced equally, as in a wheel whose motion nothing
jars—by the Love that moves the Sun and other stars.
~what Dante Alighieri did say.*

Appendix A: Objections of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus

By the onset of the Medieval period the theory of divine illumination had suffered tempered blows by some great thinkers moving to reveal various perceived defects. I will focus on two of the adversaries; Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus. I state up front of course that neither terminated the theory, i.e., there was no fatal blow. But each did offer sound critiques to the underpinnings of divine illumination and it would do well to recognize their raised concerns. But in either case, their objections are of note but it was within the orthodox Roman Catholic ranks that Augustine's theory of divine illumination was contested by these thinkers. I will identify and explain a sampling of those contentions from both Aquinas and Scotus, briefly address their concerns, and then proceed to provide some means towards a resolution or response, at least in terms of holding that the merits of divine illumination remain viable beyond the level of cooperation (Scotus) or via a general efficient cause (Aquinas).

Objection of Thomas Aquinas Resolved

My purpose here in the exposition on Aquinas is to (1) demonstrate how his view on the necessary innate knowledge for things supernatural are not a contestable point against divine illumination or Rosmini's system, and (2) the use of his terms 'judgement' and 'reasoning' are really in essence *terms* that conflate the application of the innate *idea of being*.

Concerning Aquinas, this Angelic Doctor agrees that some perfection is required 'outside' the individual to ascertain *supernatural* insight, but he does not accept it as an aid or force that necessitates continual illuminating on the part of the subject to grasp things natural. For instance, the created contingent being remains insufficient in and by themselves, but this does not discount for Aquinas that even in things that can be 'naturally' grasped, the human person continually "needs Divine help, [so] that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But one does not need

a new light added to the natural light in order to know the truth in all things, but only in [those things] that surpass natural knowledge.”⁶⁰⁶

So, with Aquinas there is sufficient capacity for one to know the ‘natural’ without the addition of any illuminative power, but the senses perceiving the natural remain the means to cognition in that would not be considered otherwise incomprehensible.⁶⁰⁷ The divergence from divine illumination specifically in this schema arises by virtue that the *factor for knowing* comes not entirely *via* the means (the Absolute remains the efficient cause), but in and with the *type of knowing* by which such divine intervention is engaged (as natural or supranatural).

In one sense this is innate knowledge as by all accounts the human person is insufficient in some regard otherwise. But clearly for Aquinas man does not possess innate knowledge in the way Augustine, or later Rosmini will assert. Aquinas’ position is “that for the knowledge of any truth whatsoever man needs Divine help, so that the intellect may be moved by God to its act. But he does not need a new light added to his natural light, in order to know the truth in all things, but only in some that surpass his natural knowledge.”⁶⁰⁸ He understands God’s role as that of an ‘Assistant’ (perhaps as the First Mover, but that might be overly simplistic of his view even if that may be the crux of his position). Clearly though some ‘first principles’ (such as non-contradiction) are readily known; they are present not as the surfacing of an imprint from birth (contra Rosmini’s appurtenance), but in that they are immediately recognizable as true by natural reason once presented to the mind.

⁶⁰⁶ Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologica: Complete English Edition in Five Volumes*. Vol. II. Trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1981), I-II, q109, a1, co.

⁶⁰⁷ I would hesitate to employ the term ‘mystery’ here though it would fit Aquinas’ view. I am reserving that term to retain a connotation of a modality of a discovery-articulation tension that is not comprehensible. When in the course of this dissertation I use the term mystery to mean it as Aquinas would use it (and other colloquially), I will qualify it by context and adjacent terms.

⁶⁰⁸ Cf. Aquinas, ST I-II, q109, a1, co.

One could say perhaps, that in the case where the universal nature of a thing is present entirely and always subsistent with(in) the object, that when abstracted from the existent being as the ‘knowing subject’, the existent being is always ‘capable’ of being known by the knower. But Aquinas’ modality posits this as more akin to judgments *from* the universal, not *from* the ever-present *idea* with(in) the subject innately situated as an ongoing source of illumination. Though with Aquinas it is recognized that this resembles ‘always knowing’, the clear distinction is in the ‘method’ as there is no ongoing illumination with Aquinas. Rosmini would immediately contend that though Aquinas allows for some degree of the innate (illumination), there is always a question of not accounting for the last abstraction, i.e., what constitutes the origin of the idea even with such natural knowledge?

It would not be enough to say the senses acted (stimulated) the *idea* in the mind according to the nature of the subsistent being without properly accounting for the origin of the *idea* in the mind itself. Rosmini articulates it in that the principles take the form of *judgments* and are expressed by *propositions*. Any principle may presuppose some reasoning except for the absolutely first principle which is not under discussion here. In fact, the principle of contradiction can be deduced from a preceding principle, which Rosmini calls the *principle of knowledge* expressed by the proposition: ‘The object of thought is being or *ens*’. He reasons as follows: ‘The object of thought is being; but the phrase ‘being and not-being’ expresses *nothing*, and *nothing* is not *being*. Therefore, *being and not-being* is not an object of thought.’ Hence, for the *idea* of *being* to have taken the form of the principle of contradiction, I must have used it first to judge and reason. I must have formed a mental *ens*, *nothing*, and acquired the ideas of *affirmation* and *negation* by thinking, and seen that negation plus affirmation equals nothing.⁶⁰⁹

⁶⁰⁹ Antonio Rosmini, *A New Essay Concerning the Origin of Ideas*, Vol. 2, Ed. Antonio Belsito, Durham (UK: Rosmini House, 2017), 104-05 (emphasis in the original).

In offering this rejoinder to Aquinas I have shown that Rosmini's system would offer a categorical response. Rosmini points out that Aquinas is really only accounting for the *distinction* between judgment and reasoning, as opposed to what is really only the *application of idea of being* as both necessary and prior (innate). And to the initial issue which was to demonstrate how Aquinas' view on innate knowledge remains necessary for things supranatural, that matter remains a non-contestable point against Rosmini's innate foundational *idea of being*.

Objection of Duns Scotus Resolved

Generally, for the Medieval Franciscans (and most period metaphysicians) in as much as truth is tied to the stable nature of a thing, the focus is to thus grasp the immaterial truth entirely dependent on knowing the sensual nature. On that premise here I will (1) offer a concise presentation of Scotus' critique of divine illumination, and in my response demonstrate that (2) to a certain degree the issue revolves around the language used as a determinant of what 'type' of knowledge is being referred to, and (3) the movement from the mind's passivity and indifference to intuitive knowledge in Scotus' system does not account for the power by which this occurs; which strictly speaking is Rosmini's *idea of being*.

In the late 13th century John Duns Scotus recognized there is a cooperative aspect apparent to the divine and natural (sensual) account of knowing. But in his estimation the immutable divine illumination, though free from corruption (as Augustine would concur), does not mutually confer such prestige on the natural side of cognition for the created human person which is irreversibly susceptible to error. To restate: consider the 'natural side of cognition' as the 'weak link' which would require divine guidance to guarantee certainty. Remove the weak link, and one is left only

with the divine ‘standing alone’ with no infallible way to communicate the truth *via* the contingent being.⁶¹⁰

The issue for Scotus then is to question how one ‘transfers’ a glimpse of this state of omniscience (of the Absolute) to the creation (contingent subject) while establishing certainty in knowledge in the presence of the corruptible senses. In short it is to ask (1) how can the skeptic be refuted, without continuously appealing to divine illumination, and in light of that then (2) how does one insist that the human person is in continual ‘contact’ with the origin of knowledge? Is there not some limited cooperation by nature?⁶¹¹

For Scotus, the initial issue is a concern of language. The term ‘knowledge’ used had different nuanced meanings and he questioned what type of knowledge one may correctly consider to be innately grasped. For instance “the medieval Latin discussions of broadly epistemic issues are conducted variously using the terms *scientia*, *notitia*, and *cognitio*. Scotus begins by discussing ‘certain knowledge’ (*cognitionis*), and then thereafter limits his discussion to ‘certitude’ (*certitudo*) and applies the same conclusion to *scientia*—knowledge had by means of demonstration.”⁶¹² In this epistemic plan, with certain types of knowing present, the individual begins with the sensory, moves to the introspective, recognizes it in experience (inductive), and then considers it self-evident.

This Scotus posits as the ‘weak link’ and claims it will likely, or at least possibly, terminate in skepticism. His premise is that which is self-evident only appears evidently as an immediate

⁶¹⁰ I can foresee that certain limited applications of free agency would suffice, but I intend to not address those concerns. Perhaps free will is another presupposition for my project.

⁶¹¹ It should be noted that in the case of Duns Scotus, the Subtle Doctor was contesting the divine illumination theory of his fellow Franciscan, Henry of Ghent. The response here will and can then be analogously transferred as a criticism of Augustine and aimed at the theory in general.

⁶¹² Matthew A Benton, John Hawthorne and Dani Rabinowitz, Eds. *Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2018), 55.

intuition, and because it seems to originate in the subject it then is thought to not fall prey to any corruption as an abstraction from an actual existence. For example, to claim the shortest distance between two points is a straight line is “immediately grasped [in] the terms that are related in such a way that the proposition must be true...[leading to] conformity of that composition.”⁶¹³ But in this schema then where knowledge is not provided Divinely in a particular instance or out of necessity, Scotus would state that it is nonetheless considered mistakenly as illuminative on the ‘object’ by which the person knows.

He continues to argue that knowledge *seems* to arise as the principle may arrive *via* the sensory (one sees the straight line), but the ‘knowing’ becomes intelligible to the intellect (the straight line is the shortest distance between two points). Here it is laid out concisely...

The first is an activity of sensation, where an external object makes an impression on a sense organ. Then, second, there is an active process by the intellect whereby it ‘abstracts’ content for the sense impression and uses it to form judgments about the external world. But for Scotus this does not guarantee that whatever is arrived at *via* abstraction lines up with the existent reality. This is always the ‘risk element’ that cannot be done away with. According to Scotus the issue of mutable ideas are never free from susceptible error. He would simply posit that even God can’t ensure that we have knowledge, simply by implanting exemplars from the Divine Mind in our heads.⁶¹⁴

It would be asserted in Scotus’ view that what *seems* as self-evident needs little other than the ‘natural’ for confirmation. If objects of sensory action can rely on the cognization of one’s own actions leading to induction from known experience, then that which is self-evident can be known without divine assistance.⁶¹⁵

⁶¹³ Cf. Pasnau, Robert, "Divine Illumination", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

⁶¹⁴ Benton and Rabinowitz, 76.

⁶¹⁵ Cf. Pasnau, Robert, "Divine Illumination".

Though that does not sum up Scotus' objections,⁶¹⁶ I only intended to provide an epistemological survey to identify the presuppositions which without their systems could not exist. Consider that the primary foundation of any illumination theory is on the reliance on the supernatural, particular with Christianity—the Absolute. Though such reliance was not entirely absent in even those *secular* epistemological modes that did not require the Absolute as foundational, the Deity still appeared as some contextual presupposition, i.e., consider how Descartes' system needed to be preserved from the 'malicious demon'. Then with Scotus' system, and applicable to Aquinas, the intelligibility of the world is not granted outside the purview of the Absolute's benevolent design. In fact, it necessitates such structure, as would the very intellectual powers needed to sort through the sensory, introspective, inductive, and self-evident. There may have been a move towards the weight of natural faculties, but any genuine knowledge was still firmly attached to and dependent on the supernatural.

In consideration of that point recall Aquinas granted that the human person is born with a 'graced' potential. But it was rather the innate ability and not the 'seed' of the divine whereby the capacity of cognition is founded. He asserted how "the light of reason by which such principles are evident to us are implanted in us by God as a kind of reflected likeness in us of the uncreated truth. So, since all human teaching can be effective only in virtue of that light, it is obvious that God alone teaches interiorly and principally."⁶¹⁷ This clearly indicates a type of knowledge (an

⁶¹⁶ A retort would be based on the "claim that beliefs formed with non-divinely supplied exemplars are the products of very processes very much like the processes that produce beliefs containing divine exemplars. These mutability and susceptibility to error in the former kind of belief can therefore prevent the later from constituting knowledge, just as Scotus's epistemic argument claims. Even God can't ensure that we have knowledge, simply by implanting exemplars from the Divine Mind in our heads." See. Bill Dunaway's "Duns Scotus's Epistemic Argument Against Divine Illumination," in *Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology*, Eds. Matthew A. Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018), pp. 54-77.

⁶¹⁷ Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate* (The 29 Questions on Truth). Trans. Robert W. Mulligan, (1952), q11, a1, co., p. 347.

‘active sense’ within the subject) that the human person otherwise would without be incapable of forming knowledge independently.

This leads for Scotus to a three-step ‘activity’ that must account for a movement from both the mind’s passivity and indifference of the existent object, to the ‘presentation’ being understood which finally results in intentionality. It’s a question as to what accounts for this transition from passivity to intentionality. If a cause or change is admitted, i.e., from the object in reality to knowledge of the object in the mind—then only the mind’s intuition could account for the cause attributed to the progress of knowing.

This cause cannot be the object, since this reveals itself only as it is; nor can it be the intellect as passive faculty, for as such it receives but does not transform. The cause in question can therefore only be the intellect as an agent, and precisely in its capacity as agent intellect. ‘To explain why the agent intellect, together with common nature, makes the object universal, there is but one reason: the intellect is that kind of a power. In like manner fire heats because it is fire.’⁶¹⁸

I suggest that the intellect as a ‘power’ is the *idea of being* wherein all possibility of *being* resides; the knowing agent knows because the knowing is of the knowing agent—the fire which heats.

What I have offered here after presenting the brief presentation of Scotus’ critique of divine illumination, was to make the point that to a certain degree the issue is one stemming in part from the connection of the ‘type’ of knowledge to the specific determining language.

⁶¹⁸ Efreem Bettoni, *Duns Scotus: The Basic Principles of His Philosophy*. Trans. and Ed. Bernardine Bonansea (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), 97.

Appendix B: Rhetorical transformation

The harmonic embodiment resists such estrangement of *being* and castrated signifiers. As evidences, the realization of love as *idea of being*, becomes realized in and by those unexpected moments of unarticulated awe that literary events have such the power to expose.

Literary events

Here I offer a rhetorical move with a further introduction of literary references. This is neither intended to provoke sentiment nor concede the absence of ‘real event’ examples. Contrarily it is to assert these fictional but true⁶¹⁹ scenarios (those two factors are not inversely proportional) as noteworthy and timeless evidences based on their relevance and continuity, i.e., they endure precisely because they are relatable common experiences. The merit of their use here is furthered by the universal demonstrable representation where brief recollections of well-known literary pericopes do not require the back-story or otherwise unknown necessary circumstances. I intend these illustrations as witnesses to those saturated alt-moments where the *beings-for-another* are drawn outside of each beings to the other beings. I will begin with the *Phantom of the Opera*.

Leroux’s *Phantom of the Opera* (Erik and Christine)

Consider in Gaston Leroux’s *Phantom of the Opera*, the antagonism of the malformed *monster* Erik who had pursued Christine, his vocal tutee since childhood and object of desire. Near the end of the story, Erik had succeeded in ‘possessing’ the girl. Now ‘captured’ she was secluded as his prisoner at the underground lake under the Palais Garnier where he resided. Christine, in a real sense yielded to his pursuit. But this event was bittersweet for Erik. The forced union which he orchestrated did not unveil the trust he hoped was present underneath, i.e., her compliancy came

⁶¹⁹ Though it is popular to assert fiction as not true, it is in reality not historical. Falsehood is the polar opposite of truth, and is too often undermined or dismissed as by saying—that’s just a story. The truth is actually embedded in a constructed prose or arrangement.

to be realized as an act of love itself. That fact stifled any reciprocity of being, as his sorrow which did signal to Christine was muted by the display of force by which she was captive. There was no affirmation from Christine to overcome his monstrosity. In the text, as Erik returned in his mind—for the sake to relay this truth to the Persian (whom he referred to by the title, Daroga...his confidant, his conscience?)—he unearthed within his own *being* an alt-moment where Christine awakened his *humanness*—beings together. Christine as being-for-other was revealed to Erik; she recognized his sorrow, but it was *her* sorrow that seduced *him*. At this point in the narrative, Erik kisses Christine on the forehead. She offered no resistance; in trust she did not run away. Now robbed of power as only love is capable to do, the masked-monster tells the Persian...

‘Yes, daroga...I felt her tears flow on my forehead...on mine, mine!...They were soft...they were sweet!...They trickled under my mask...they mingled with my tears in my eyes...they flowed between my lips...Listen, daroga, listen to what I did...I tore off my mask so as not to lose one of her tears...[and in that] I have tasted all the happiness the world can offer!’⁶²⁰

The passivity of this love as *idea of being* was not as rain falling indiscriminately, but a saturation of beings recognizing sorrow in a way that reason could not reveal.

Love as shared *being* becomes such a thing which can never be willed for the other, but willed as beings in the other. This erupts, but is not spontaneous—that is created beings’ misperception. But neither can it be contrived, and in that sense remains passive and prior to the cognitive. Nonetheless arising in an alt-moment, it transforms and beholds the personal gaze *to* and *of* the other; an awakened love as *being-for-the-other*. This same pattern is found in Hugo’s *Les Misérables*. I will now use that to further illustrate the tacit knowing of beings discovered in an alt-moment of love.

Hugo’s *Les Misérables* (Bishop Myriel and Jean Valjean)

⁶²⁰ Gaston Leroux, *The Phantom of the Opera* (New York, NY: The Mysterious Press, 1988), 228. Note, the text in this translation is taken from the British Edition (Michael O’Mara Books Limited, 20 Queen Anne Street, London, W1N 9FB, 1987).

In Victor Hugo's *Les Misérables*, there is that memorable juncture of sorrow and love where the freed convict Jean Valjean had been welcomed into Bishop Myriel's residence for lodging and a meal—no one else would have him, neither inn or stable. He was surprised by that gesture, but for the Monseigneur "the universe appeared an immense malady, everywhere suffering, and that which existed for this rare priest was a permanent subject of sadness which sought consolation."⁶²¹ Recall in the story that the nineteen years Jean Valjean spent in prison labor were as recompense for the bread he stole to feed his family, compounded by the repeated escape attempts. That labeled him a threat, and he was thus required upon his release to carry papers identifying himself as a dangerous criminal. Not unlike Shelly's inhuman Creature, or Gaston's monstrous Erik, Hugo's odious deplorable Jean Valjean was a *being* discounted by despair and alienation, but nonetheless remained himself a co-mingled *being*. True then to his own being, the Bishop welcomed Jean Valjean into his own being.

Accepting the Bishop's kind gesture, he stayed the night. In the morning though, the maid Madame Magloire had discovered that not only was the 'man who was here last night' now gone, but so too was the silverware. 'Ah, the abomination! He has stolen our silver!' she shouted. The Bishop, with a settled mind made little of the uncovered theft, and did not feel indignant. He replied with resolve, 'Madame Magloire, I have for a long time detained that silver wrongfully. It belonged to the poor. Who was that man? A poor man, evidently.' Later that very morning, the *criminal* was caught by the authorities, suspicious in his gait he was found with the spoils of his desperation which he claimed were gifts. Both he and the items were returned under custody to the Bishop's residence. Upon their arrival, the Bishop feigned disbelief as to Valjean's whereabouts, curiously concurring with the criminal's life-saving lie that the items were indeed gifts, and not stolen.

⁶²¹ Cf. Hugo, Victor. *The Story of Jean Valjean: Les Misérables*. Ed. Sara E. Wiltse (Ginn and Company: Boston, MA, 1897), Fantine, Book First.—A Just Man, VII., 39.

Continuing the ruse, the Bishop insinuated how providential was his escorted return; the cleric further remarked disbelief that he did not also take along the silver candlesticks worth two hundred francs. This implied to the bewildered brigadier of gendarmes that this night guest—the convict—did not take full account of the Bishop’s generosity. In a saturated horizon event, the man ‘Jean Valjean opened his eyes wide and stared at the venerable Bishop with an expression which no human tongue can render any account of.’ An encounter of *being* drawn by the other in sorrow for love was unfolding in an alt-moment. The story continues as the good Bishop bids *adieu* to the shaken *being* before him. The text reads...

Jean Valjean was like a man on the point of fainting. The Bishop drew near to him, and said in a low voice:— “Do not forget, never forget, that you have promised to use this money in becoming an honest man.” Jean Valjean, who had no recollection of ever having promised anything, remained speechless. The Bishop had emphasized the words when he uttered them. He resumed with solemnity:— “Jean Valjean, my brother, you no longer belong to evil, but to good. It is your soul that I buy from you; I withdraw it from black thoughts and the spirit of perdition, and I give it to God.”⁶²²

As the experience entered his *being*, something penetrated him; the text speaks of an extraordinary light which brought him to weep uncontrollably. The ‘love of the other’, declared complete and whole of the Bishop’s doctrine, excited the *idea of being* in the beings. Perplexed as Jean Valjean was, nothing was added to his *being* except that it was aroused in the proximity of the *other*. It was in this alt-moment of love, his *being* was affirmed by something native, yet foreign, stimulated exteriorly only in the visible event—each drawn to the Origin *via* the *idea of being*.

Though accurate to speak of these as instances as awakenings, an account of *realization* is not sufficient. Encounters of infatuation, mutual egoism, and the like can produce similar effects—an exaggerated romanticism. It is also insufficient to simply espouse love as a deeper understanding of the other. Rather here arose an observable point where knowledge in truth was

⁶²² Hugo, *Fantine*, Book Second,—The Fall, XI., 94.

evidenced as the connection of Ideal *being*. In as much as the ‘sense data’ awakened *idea of being* as resultant knowledge of the other, likewise the *idea of being* arose as a saturated event in love of the other—but the *idea of love* was first in order (hierarchy). Overcome was any obstacle between each *being* ‘having’ one’s own experience (purely subjective). The attainable ability to ‘know’ one’s experiences⁶²³ is where that experience reveals the common import *to* the particular, allowing objectivity to be preserved. With the appurtenance as Ideal *being*, each beings is ‘pulled out’ by the Absolute toward the Absolute...each beings strung together and dragged back to the Origin of *Being* itself. No ‘types’ of love can capture this. This ‘one love’ is that extraordinary light which penetrated Jean Valjean, but it is important to recognize that sparks are not capable of fire void of fuel. There is something original in the human person, the native fuel (*idea of being*), that is ever-ready to join beings in love. I will now explore that by use of the term *synderesis*.

Non-suppressible ecstasy

Love is not instinctually willed but often enters the person as a surprise, which makes it appear spontaneous. Every evince is extraordinary (break with the temporal), but the less remarkable the ecstasy, the more likely the origin of the event will be attributed to a natural occurrence. So, we are fascinated with the more profound intense moments; they garner attention because their potency can more easily claim that ‘fuel’ within the subject has been set to fire. When Jean Valjean experienced that which ‘no human tongue can render any account of’ and Erik tasted ‘all the happiness the world can offer’, the *idea of being* was always present, but the exposition was simply magnified. The ecstasy erupted, and seemed non-suppressible as the mystical self-transcendence of those alt-moments did violence to the imminent world of created *being*. I will

⁶²³ This distinction was famously purported by Wittgenstein in terms of the meaning of ‘to know’, where the latter was a response to state that others may indeed share an experience.

now consider how these transformative events understood as love do violence to the temporal world and dissolve any division of beings.

Phenomenological awakening

As non-suppressible love, this *idea of being* violently (*violentus*) shapes an impetuous resiliency against any force contrary or contrasting to the reunification of beings. Love and violence are an odd coupling; a brief clarification is in order. In complete contradiction to any notion of the “mad world characterized by a reign of violence masquerading as love, where violence *constrains* freedom with a lack of concern,”⁶²⁴ this *love as being* rather than attitudinizing violence actually signifies freedom in every and each recognition of Ideal *being* in the other. The paring is not unconventional when the object of love’s violence traverses from the transcendent to the temporal. In the temporal love can and does masquerade as violence when it is engineered to use or control the other. Whether love is assumed relegated to (1) the affective, predicated on some conscious movement (effect) and not an engendering agency (affect) in itself, or in (2) that love is thought not capable of such destruction in that reason is axiomatic to any instance of love (as in the Thomistic choosing the good). Both place love within the subjective and irregular. That is, love is merely an affective sentiment or must be determined by some good desired in the other. Here the violence is understood as the temporal perceived as transcendent. The madness lies in thinking that only a subjective experience transpires, locking one in the temporal doing violence to the transcendent.

The major premise of this research claimed objectivity in the *a priori idea of being* (love-being) as a way of *knowing* in itself, and then as convertible this knowing arises from love

⁶²⁴ Douglas Kirsner, “Laing’s *The Divided Self* and *The Politics of Experience*,” chapter 6 (69-79) in *The Legacy of R.D. Laing: An Appraisal of His Contemporary Relevance*, ed. M. Guy Thompson (New York, NY: Routledge) 77.

originating in and with the transcendent appurtenance. Otherwise, reason developed apart from this *idea of being* as with Empiricist' induction or Rationalist' deduction not only loses its potency as convertible with love, but also yields its objectivity. Kant's critique stands and duly demonstrates that by the other methods "reason isn't competent enough to guide [towards] the satisfaction of all one's needs (which it in part even multiplies); to this end an implanted natural instinct would have led to much more certainly,"⁶²⁵ and here an objective love. Rosmini's appurtenance, over and above Kant's multiplied ideas, preserves that certainly in reasoning—in my project, even more assuredly love. The purely rational or entirely experiential requires some idea or stimuli respectfully. The skepticism they produce epistemologically, is transferred in effect to love, which in turn will always be predicated on the desire known or the experience identified with such. Love as 'types' then surfaced as the perceived antidote to an agnostic love produced by either system(s).

My approach preserves the otherwise eviscerated love void of its transformative affect,⁶²⁶ and rather than reduced as a reaction to certain external stimuli, albeit authentic responses, love is not susceptible to an external-temporal governing force that produces the ontic experience. If the Absolute stands as the origin of momentum, drawing Itself to Itself, the causality (Humean relationality) is evidenced in the experience.

[Yet] the perpetual content of experience cannot stand alone apart from a valuational content, and the nature of that valuational aspect is integral to ontic intensity. [There is] the seemingly incompatibility, pointed out by Hume, between actions determined by character

⁶²⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, in *Ethical Philosophy*, trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 396a, 9.

⁶²⁶ Consider also the more 'properly human element' that John Stewart Mill claims to have inherited from the influence of his wife Harriet Taylor, whom without which his own 'masculine' pursuits (science) would have been left in abstraction. Cf. Claudia C. Klaver, *A/Moral Economics: Classic Political Economy and Cultural Authority in Nineteenth-Century England* (Columbus, OH: The Ohio State University Press, 2003), 136.

and free ones. How can each change morally from within, without a force to alter ongoing momentum?⁶²⁷

The answer, the *response* is the native *idea of being* doing violence to the temporal, by the transcendent, sustained in a phenomenological awakening. All transcendence is a violence to that which is temporal—an awakening.

It is in this violence where freedom precisely signifies each recognition of Ideal *being* in the other—a universal (common) ontic presence with the power⁶²⁸ to transform; to Hume’s point, from within. This concept can be referred to as a ‘third phenomenological awakening’ (a sanctity of otherness of the other).⁶²⁹ I would posit it as an extension of Levinas’ egological and logocentric thought. It becomes the “starting point the premise of the *universal human potential to love...ontologically (potentially) we are this love. Failing to love [then] is ontic (experiential) and only contingent*”⁶³⁰ and does not exceed any purely phenomenal temporal existence. Love, here as human nature, can do nothing else then violence to the temporal of which the *idea of being* breaks through by virtue of its existence—it is foreign yet native. Awakened, this ‘surfacing love’ cannot be contained (saturated intuition) and even transgresses Marion’s comprehension of ‘givenness’ to encapsulate *being*. My system retains an integrity that “in the phenomenological realm is not a question of simply showing...but rather of letting the apparition show *itself* in its appearance

⁶²⁷ H.G. Wright, *Ontic Ethics: Exploring the Influence of Caring on Being* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016), 155.

⁶²⁸ The Nietzschean assertion that power is ontological substantial. In short, love as Ideal *being* must be powerless in regard to control.

⁶²⁹ This is what Steven Gans has made of Ronnie Laing’s phenomenological approach, as the ‘third’ is the break from Levinas.

⁶³⁰ Steven Gans, “Awakening to Love: Ronnie Laing’s Phenomenological Therapy,” *The European Journal of Psychotherapy, Counseling & Health*, Vol. 2, August 1999, 174.

according to its appearing.”⁶³¹ Yet this appearing is not spontaneous; it is the Absolute in its pure givenness of *being*.

Visible saturated event

This appearing is a visible saturated event—not an ‘icon’ as not visible—a genuine mystery too often sought under the guise of a *problem*. Though to exaggerate it to the realm of some unreachable mystery leaves it as an identified experience unable to be grasped. I accept, and expect many articulations to leave one like Jean Valjean—mouth agape in the moment of wonder. When this ‘experience’ overwhelms one’s *being* by the realization of the Absolute (appurtenance) manifested in alt-love moments, the ‘event’ becomes saturated and uncontainable. My use of literary pericopes were to illustrate that point. Intuition is possible even when, perhaps *especially* when there is ‘nothing’ to see and the event entire is relegated to experience. That is the paradox, nothing in reality to ‘sense’ does not result in the absence of intuition. Something arises “to provoke the unforeseeable, the excess, the absolute, or the assignation to witness—in short, to affect the flesh and saturate it with intuition.”⁶³²

Nonetheless, in a conscious mental state, one can associate the experience (intuition) with and from the Ideal *being*, from which it was birthed—and may it be added, a source of knowledge. It is the Marion paradox that *visibility* and the *invisibility contained in the experience* ebb and flow in direct proportion, i.e., the greater the invisibility the greater the visibility and vice versa.⁶³³ But what Marion preserves in mystery, has been sacrificed ontologically. In relation to the Absolute, who as Uncreated is the apogee of created being. The invisibility is nearly an insurmountable apex,

⁶³¹ Jean-Luc Marion, *Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness*, trans. Jeffrey L. Kosky (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 8.

⁶³² Marion, *Being Given*, 244.

⁶³³ Cf. Marion, “The Crossing of the Visible and the Invisible” in *The Crossing of the Visible* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 1-23, where he expands predominately on that very theme.

and thus the crown of visibility, but only capable of such in the sharing of *Being* with *being*. In the totality of this experience, this is a very real liturgical event which allows for the bracketing of such an experience.⁶³⁴

⁶³⁴ Cf. Section IV, a, 1.

Appendix C: Limitations and presuppositions

The prime limitation I want to address is the (1) presupposition of the element of the Divine. As stated, I make no pretense to offer ‘proof’ as to why or how ‘there is something and not nothing’ (even if that ‘thing’ is difficult to define). That presupposition is mutual for the theist and non-theist alike; a personal Absolute is even a greater extension of that argument. But in support of that argument, and part of the intention of including literary references, was to provide the general assumption that cultures, theistic or not, have a sense perhaps not of the Divine in the way I propose, but still hold to an apprehension of those alt-moments I have shared. It is important to state that for this project any connection to the Divine will be weighted by the epistemological export of Rosmini’s *idea of being*. That concept is then transferred as an essential feature to a being’s embodiment of love. My objective was only to maintain an internal consistency, and I do not sense I have strayed from that goal.

The other limitation I will address is the overly broad claim I have made. In no uncertain way, the (2) assertion I have argued is foundational and therefore all-encompassing. This has necessitated my research to be equally broad in order to address the many facets of the argument I felt compelled to resolve. If in light of that fact, my formulated research aims and objectives appear too broad, that is accepted as the nature of the limitations necessary to justify the choices I have made during my research process. The ubiquity of my bibliography need only attest to the considerations I have levied against my thesis. I understand there is much yet to resolve, not in terms of the efficacy of my project or unsatisfied conditions, but in the settling of the ubiquitous applications and implications of what I have asserted.

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